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Over the past several years, Medicare beneficiaries have increasingly chosen to receive their 
coverage through subsidized, private Medicare plans, rather than through the traditional, 
government-administered version of program.  At the same time, some states have turned to 
private managed care plans to provide Medicaid benefits for the elderly and disabled.  This 
dissertation explores the consequences of these trends for beneficiaries who receive coverage 
through both Medicare and Medicaid, also known as “dual eligibles.”  
 
In the first chapter, I identify factors associated with dual eligibles’ enrollment in private 
Medicare plans and explore potential explanations for the sustained growth in enrollment over 
time.  To do so, I estimate linear regression models relating enrollment patterns with various 
supply-side, demand-side, and state policy factors, as well as an event-year study relating 
enrollment with the introduction of dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNPs), which are 
exclusively available to dual eligibles.  Results highlight the important role of D-SNP availability 
and the maturation of county D-SNP markets over time in pulling dual eligibles into the private 
Medicare market.  Private Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles was also associated with 
improvements in plan offerings, decreases in supplemental plan options, increases in their 
premiums, and changes in state policy.   
 
In the second chapter, I evaluate the effect of enrollment in private Medicare Advantage (MA) 
plans on utilization and quality of care among dual eligibles. To do so, I exploit a discontinuous 
increase in government payments to plans—and subsequently in MA enrollment rates—in 
regions that exceeded a particular population threshold.  I find that increases in MA enrollment 
reduced inpatient utilization among dual eligibles, while I fail to find evidence that this came at 
the expense of average care quality. However, I also find that MA enrollment was associated 
with a shift towards lower-quality hospitals and an increase in mortality rates in counties with 
 x 
historically-low traditional Medicare spending. These results advise caution as policymakers 
debate whether to further encourage enrollment in private plans among dual eligibles. 
 
In the third chapter, I evaluate the effect of requiring dual eligibles to enroll in Medicaid 
managed care on their use of inpatient and long-term nursing home care.  To do so, I rely on a 
difference-in-differences approach to assess the introduction of an enrollment mandate in the 
state of New Jersey.  I find that Medicaid managed care shaped dual eligibles’ utilization in 
meaningful ways, despite the fact that these plans play a secondary role to Medicare for many 
services.  In particular, the enrollment mandate led to lower inpatient use among full dual 
eligibles, and I provide suggestive evidence that this change included reductions in potentially-
preventable hospitalizations and in 30-day readmission rates. The mandate was also associated 
with a decrease in the share of full dual eligibles residing in nursing homes.  This study 
highlights the important role of Medicaid managed care for dual eligibles and suggests that 
further aligning incentives between these plans and Medicare could have a meaningful effect on 








Factors Associated With Private Medicare Enrollment  
and Enrollment Trends Among Dual Eligibles 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the past fifteen years, Medicare beneficiaries have increasingly chosen to receive their 
coverage through private health insurance plans rather than through the traditional, government-
administered version of Medicare.  The growing importance of private Medicare plans has been 
especially pronounced among dual eligibles, i.e., beneficiaries who are enrolled in both Medicare 
and Medicaid.  Enrollment rates among this population increased from six percent in 2004 to 
thirty-five percent in 2017 (Figure 1.1).  Prior research has identified factors associated with 
private Medicare enrollment and potential explanations for enrollment growth over time (see, for 
example, Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004; Shimada et al. 2009; Jacobs and Buntin 2015; 
Pelech 2015; and Skopec et al. 2019).  However, it is likely that the determinants of private 
Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles differ relative to other Medicare beneficiaries.  For 
example, dual eligibles have a distinct set of private Medicare options to choose from depending 
on where they live.  Indeed, over two-fifths of dual eligibles in private Medicare are enrolled 
specifically in dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNPs) (Appendix Figure 1.1), which 
exclusively cater towards this population.  Additionally, whereas most Medicare beneficiaries 
must actively choose to enroll in a private Medicare plan, some states have passively enrolled 
dual eligibles into private, integrated Medicare-Medicaid Plans (MMPs) under a large 
demonstration program.  This could have a large effect on enrollment to the extent that 
beneficiaries have a bias towards their default enrollment option.   
 
In this study, I identify factors associated with enrollment in private Medicare plans among dual 
eligibles and explore potential explanations for the sustained growth in enrollment over time.  An 
important contribution of this research is that it will help policymakers predict the effect of 
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policy reforms and market changes on future enrollment patterns among dual eligibles.  As one 
example, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has proposed requiring D-
SNPs to offer integrated Medicare and Medicaid coverage, which could lead some plans to exit 
the market (MedPAC 2013, 2019).  Results from this study will help policy analysts predict 
whether enrollees would switch to another private Medicare plan or leave the private Medicare 
market altogether following a plan exit, which has important consequences for program spending 
and beneficiary outcomes.  By identifying why dual eligibles enter private Medicare plans in the 
first place, this research may also provide a window into the potential impact on their well-being.  
For instance, proactive enrollment in a private Medicare plan may indicate that a beneficiary 
identified this coverage as being advantageous, while the same is not necessarily true for 
beneficiaries who were passively enrolled in an MMP.  Understanding the reasons why dual 
eligibles in particular join private Medicare plans is especially important given that this 
population has fewer resources and more significant health problems than other beneficiaries on 
average (Jacobson, Neuman, and Damico 2012).   
 
My analysis includes linear regression models relating enrollment patterns with various supply-
side, demand-side, and state policy factors, as well as an event-year study relating enrollment 
with the introduction of D-SNPs.  I find that the availability of D-SNPs and their experience in a 
given market had a strong association with private Medicare enrollment rates among dual 
eligibles and accounted for much of the growth in enrollment among this population from 2006 
through 2015.  Event-study analyses suggest that this relationship was causal.  Private Medicare 
enrollment among dual eligibles was also associated with improvements in plan offerings, 




1.2.1. Traditional Medicare and private Medicare plans 
One of the most important choices facing Medicare beneficiaries is whether to receive their 
primary benefits through the traditional, government-administered version of the program 
(“traditional Medicare”) or through a subsidized, private Medicare plan.  Under traditional 
Medicare, the government sets provider reimbursement rates and establishes relatively uniform 
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benefits, premiums, and cost-sharing requirements. Enrollees can receive care from most 
providers in the United States, and they face few constraints in how they make use of the 
program’s benefits (Berenson and Harris 2002; Bagley 2013; Neuman and Jacobson 2018).  
Most beneficiaries in traditional Medicare also receive coverage through a supplemental plan 
(Cubanski et al. 2018).  Survey data from 2016 indicate that about 30% of traditional Medicare 
beneficiaries are enrolled in a retiree plan offered by their or their spouse’s former employer; 
29% purchase a private, supplemental Medigap plan; and 22% are enrolled in Medicaid 
(Cubanski et al. 2018).  Supplemental plans often help cover beneficiaries’ costs in the 
traditional program and may insure services that are not part of Medicare’s standard benefit 
package, such as vision and comprehensive dental care.   
 
As an alternative to traditional Medicare, beneficiaries may also choose to receive their benefits 
through a private plan.  I refer to this option as “private Medicare”, which is distinct from other 
private plans that may supplement the traditional program.  Most beneficiaries who opt for this 
route enroll in a plan through the Medicare Advantage (MA) program, though the government 
has also authorized additional private Medicare plan options.  Under the MA program, private 
plans compete for enrollment within a tightly-regulated marketplace and receive risk-adjusted, 
capitated payments from the government to provide Medicare’s benefits (Lipschutz et al. 2015; 
MedPAC 2018).  If benchmark payment rates are insufficient to cover a plan’s premium, 
enrollees must cover the difference (MedPAC 2018).  Within the contours of MA regulations, 
plans have considerable flexibility when determining their benefit structure and defining their 
care management approach.  First, cost-sharing requirements vary by plan, though each plan’s 
benefit value for Medicare-covered services must be at least as great as that of the traditional 
program on average (CRS 2009).  Second, MA plans may include additional benefits that are not 
part of the standard Medicare package.  Finally, unlike the traditional program, most MA plans 
rely on managed care techniques to shape and integrate care delivery.  For example, nearly all 
MA enrollees are in plans that limit full coverage to a specific network of providers and most are 
in plans that require prior authorization before receiving certain types of services (Jacobson, 




In addition to deciding whether to enroll in traditional Medicare or a private Medicare plan, 
beneficiaries must also choose whether to obtain prescription drug coverage through the 
Medicare Part D program.  This benefit is provided exclusively through subsidized, private 
plans.  Beneficiaries in traditional Medicare can choose to enroll in a Part D stand-alone 
prescription drug plan (PDP).  MA enrollees typically receive Part D coverage as part of an 
integrated benefit package through their MA plan (CRS 2018).  MA plans that incorporate Part D 
coverage are known as Medicare-Advantage prescription drug (MA-PD) plans. 
 
1.2.2. Dual eligibles 
In 2018, there were about 11 million dual eligibles, i.e., Medicare beneficiaries with limited 
resources who also receive Medicaid coverage (MMCO 2019).  For this population, Medicare is 
the primary payer while Medicaid provides additional benefits, covers some or all of Medicare’s 
cost-sharing requirements, and/or pays the program’s premiums on behalf of dual eligibles 
(Jacobson, Neuman, and Damico 2012).  Although Medicare beneficiaries can qualify for 
Medicaid through several different pathways, this study groups dual eligibles into three 
categories: full dual eligibles, Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) partial dual eligibles, and 
non-QMB partial dual eligibles.  These groups roughly correspond to the restrictiveness of 
Medicaid’s eligibility criteria and the generosity of its benefits (Table 1.1).   
 
Full dual eligibles (about 71% of dual eligibles in 2015) typically have the fewest resources and 
are unique in that they qualify for the complete set of benefits offered under their state’s 
Medicaid program (CMS 2011; Young et al. 2013).  This includes coverage for some services 
that are not part of Medicare’s benefit package, such as long-term care services and supports and 
— depending on the state — dental, vision, and/or hearing services (MACPAC 2018b).  
Additionally, states pay all of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and premiums on behalf of 
the majority of full dual eligibles (MACPAC 2018b). 
 
Partial dual eligibles do not qualify for full Medicaid benefits in their state, but instead receive 
assistance exclusively through one of four Medicare Savings Programs (MSPs), which are also 
administered by state Medicaid programs (Jacobson, Neuman, and Damico 2012).  The Qualified 
Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program is the most generous MSP.  QMB partial dual eligibles 
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(about 14% of dual eligibles in 2015) receive coverage for Medicare’s cost-sharing and premium 
requirements (MACPAC 2018b).  Non-QMB partial dual eligibles (about 15% of dual eligibles 
2015) meet less restrictive eligibility criteria and typically only receive coverage for the 
Medicare Part B premium (MACPAC 2018b).  
 
All dual eligibles also automatically qualify for assistance with Part D premiums and cost-
sharing requirements through Medicare’s Low Income Subsidy (LIS) program (CRS 2018) 
(Table 1.1).  The LIS program covers Part D premiums on behalf of dual eligibles up to a 
regional benchmark amount (CRS 2018).  This benchmark is set to ensure that dual eligibles 
have access to least one plan at no cost (CRS 2018; KFF 2018).  The LIS program also covers 
some or all of dual eligibles’ prescription drug costs under Part D (CMS 2019c).  Nearly all dual 
eligibles (over 99% in 2015) have Part D coverage and receive LIS assistance.   
 
1.2.3. Determinants of enrollment 
A variety of factors may affect the value of private Medicare relative to traditional Medicare 
enrollment, including the traits of individual enrollees and the characteristics of private Medicare 
plan options, traditional Medicare supplement options, and local health care markets (Appendix 
Table 1).  While previous studies have evaluated the relationship between these factors and 
private Medicare enrollment rates (Appendix Table 1.1), unique aspects of dual eligibles’ 
circumstances likely affect their enrollment decisions (Appendix Table 1.2).   
 
First, dual eligibles receive varying levels of assistance with Medicare’s cost-sharing 
requirements.  They may therefore be less responsive to instances where private Medicare plans, 
for example, reduce copays or deductibles for Medicare-covered services.  Rather, they may be 
particularly attentive to the availability of supplemental benefits in private Medicare plans that 
are not necessarily be covered by Medicaid.  Indeed, in 2015, dual eligibles in private Medicare 
were disproportionately likely to enroll in plans that included dental, vision, or hearing benefits.  
Additionally, while prior work suggests that supplemental Medigap plans may be a substitute for 
private Medicare coverage among the overall Medicare population (McLaughlin, Chernew, and 
Taylor 2002; Atherly and Dowd 2005; Pelech 2015), these plans largely duplicate Medicaid 
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coverage for many dual eligibles.  Hence, variation across Medigap markets may have a much 
smaller effect on their enrollment decisions.   
 
Second, depending upon where they live, dual eligibles may have different private Medicare 
options than other beneficiaries.  In many counties, this includes the availability of dual-eligible 
special needs plans (D-SNPs), a type of MA plan that was first offered in 2004 and exclusively 
enrolls dual eligibles (Schmitz et al. 2008; MedPAC 2013).  D-SNPs may be particularly alluring 
to dual eligibles to the extent that these plans target marketing to them, cater benefits towards 
their specific needs, or take into account dual eligibles’ Medicaid and LIS coverage when 
designing plan benefit packages and setting premiums.  Additionally, D-SNPs may facilitate the 
integration of dual eligibles’ Medicare and Medicaid benefits, such as by contracting with states 
to share data or to provide some or all of Medicaid’s benefits (Bella and Palmer-Barnette 2010).  
In 2015, D-SNPs accounted for over two-fifths (44%) of dual eligibles’ enrollment in private 
Medicare plans (Appendix Figure 1.1).   
 
Third, state policies may shape the enrollment decisions of dual eligibles.  For one, some states 
have collaborated with the federal government and insurers to offer private, fully integrated 
Medicare-Medicaid Plans (MMPs) under a large demonstration project (MACPAC 2018a).  
Whereas traditional Medicare is generally the default choice for beneficiaries, states may 
automatically enroll full dual eligibles into MMPs, with the option to change enrollment.  This 
process is known as “passive enrollment”.  Prior research suggests that beneficiaries tend to stay 
in either traditional Medicare or private Medicare over time—e.g., due to status quo bias—which 
suggests that passive enrollment may have a sustained effect on their coverage (Sinaiko, 
Afendulis, and Frank 2013; Afendulis, Sinaiko, and Frank 2015).  State Medicaid policies may 
also influence dual eligibles’ enrollment decisions.  For example, some states allow or require 
dual eligibles to receive their Medicaid benefits through a private Medicaid managed care plan 
(CMS 2019a).  Medicaid managed care enrollment may complement enrollment in private 
Medicare plans if, for example, a single insurer is providing both plans.  Additionally, 
organizations that have experience with dual eligibles in Medicaid managed care markets may be 
better positioned to serve them in Medicare markets, such as by offering a D-SNP.  Finally, state 
Medicaid programs vary in the degree to which they include benefits beyond Medicare-covered 
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services (KFF 2019).  In states with more generous coverage, dual eligibles may not need to seek 
these supplemental benefits in private Medicare plans.   
 
While this discussion generally pertains to full dual eligibles, some of these points may not 
necessarily extend to partial dual eligibles. For example, partial dual eligibles are typically 
excluded from Medicaid managed care enrollment and are not allowed to enroll in MMPs.  Some 
D-SNPs also limit enrollment among partial dual eligibles, particularly non-QMB partial dual 
eligibles (CMS 2014).  Among beneficiaries enrolled in private Medicare plans in 2015, about 
48% of QMB partial dual eligibles were in D-SNPs, compared to only 15% of non-QMB partial 
dual eligibles (Appendix Figure 1.1).  Additionally, partial dual eligibles typically receive less 
comprehensive coverage than full dual eligibles (see Section 1.2.2).  Non-QMB partial dual 
eligibles in particular may be much more sensitive to changes in plan copays and deductibles and 
in local Medigap options, given that these beneficiaries only receive government assistance with 
prescription drug cost-sharing requirements.   
 
1.3. Empirical strategy and data  
1.3.1. Empirical strategy 
I begin by identifying factors that are associated with private Medicare enrollment rates.  To do 
so, I estimate the following model, where the indices represent county (𝑐) and year (𝑡), 𝑌𝑐𝑡 is the 
share of dual eligibles enrolled in private Medicare plans, 𝑀𝑐𝑡 is a vector of private Medicare 
market characteristics, 𝑆𝑐𝑡 is a vector of traditional Medicare supplemental plan variables, 𝑋𝑐𝑡 is 
a vector of dual eligible characteristics, 𝑃𝑐𝑡 is a vector of state policies, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 represents year 
dummy variables, and 𝑐 represents county fixed effects: 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = [𝛼 +𝑀𝑐𝑡𝛽 + 𝑆𝑐𝑡 + 𝑋𝑐𝑡𝜓 + 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝜔] + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝜙 + 𝑐 + 𝑐𝑡 (1) 
 
I weight this model based on the number of dual eligibles in a given county in the first year of 
my sample and estimate heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level.   
 
I next evaluate the extent to which various groups of my explanatory variables account for 
changes in private Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles.  To do so, I rely on an approach 
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from a prior study that considered enrollment trends among the entire Medicare population 
(Pelech 2015).  This entails first estimating unadjusted trends in county-level enrollment rates—
i.e., by reestimating equation (1) without the terms in brackets—and then evaluating the extent to 
which adding different combinations of explanatory variables to the model reduces residual 
trends.  I consider overall changes in enrollment from 2006 through 2015 and also examine 
changes from 2006 through 2009 and 2009 through 2015.  As will be discussed, trends in private 
Medicare offerings changed in the latter period, likely reflecting reductions in government 
payments to plans and changes in market regulations (Afendulis, Landrum, and Chernew 2012; 
Jacobson et al. 2014; Pelech 2015; Pelech and Song 2018). 
 
To gain a more nuanced understanding of enrollment patterns, I next run stratified analyses by 
dual eligible group.  This is important given that enrollment options and the costs and benefits of 
private Medicare enrollment vary by the level of dual eligibility (Section 1.2.3).   
 
Finally, because I expect that the proliferation of D-SNPs will be closely associated with 
increases in private Medicare enrollment, I provide additional evidence on the causality of this 
relationship.  One concern may be that, for example, the growth in private Medicare enrollment 
among dual eligibles could lead D-SNPs to enter a given county, rather than the other way 
around.  I explore this possibility by evaluating the timing of D-SNP market entry and the 
growth in private Medicare enrollment, such as whether the latter preceded the former.  To do so, 
I estimate the following event-study model, where 𝑇𝑐 indicates the year that D-SNPs first entered 
county 𝑐 (known as the “event”), 𝟏(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑐 = 𝜏) is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
difference between the year of observation and 𝑇𝑐 equals 𝜏 (known as an “event-year dummy”), 
𝛽𝜏 represents the treatment effect of D-SNP market entry on county enrollment rates after 𝜏 
years, and 𝐶𝑐𝑡 is a vector of the explanatory variables from equation (1) (excluding D-SNP 
variables): 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝟏(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑐 = 𝜏)𝛽𝜏
−2
𝜏≤−5
+∑𝟏(𝑡 − 𝑇𝑐 = 𝜏)𝛽𝜏
≥3
𝜏=0




To create a balanced sample that includes several pre- and post-periods, I focus on counties 
where D-SNPs entered in either 2011 or 2012, and I group event-year dummies where 𝜏 is less 
than or equal to −5 or greater than or equal to 3.  My analysis also includes counties that never 
had D-SNPs.  For these counties, I set all event-year dummies to 0.  Because my model 
incorporates county fixed effects, these areas do not contribute additional variation to the event-
year dummies.  In addition to my primary analysis, I conduct a placebo test to evaluate whether 
the introduction of D-SNPs coincided with increases in enrollment among non-dual eligibles, 
who are not allowed to join these plans. I also explore the possibility that the Medicaid managed 
care enrollment mandate might have made dual eligibles more amenable to joining a D-SNP 
(Section 1.2.3).  To do so, I run stratified analyses for counties that had Medicaid managed care 
enrollment mandates in place before D-SNPs became available, as well as counties that never 




This study requires data on private Medicare plan enrollment by level of dual eligibility as well 
as several key explanatory variables.  These variables include: (1) supply-side factors (such as 
the premiums and benefits of private Medicare plan options); (2) demand-side factors (such as 
beneficiary characteristics as well as supplemental plan offerings that may substitute for private 
Medicare enrollment); and (3) state policies (such as Medicaid managed care enrollment 
mandates, which may increase demand for private Medicare plans).  I obtain this information for 
my sample period (2006-2015) based on administrative Medicare and Medicaid files and several 
public use datasets. 
 
Enrollment 
The Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) and the Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) 
Personal Summary (PS) files include detailed enrollment and basic demographic information for 
the universe of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries respectively (Barosso 2013; CMS 2018).  I 
first rely on the 2006-2015 MBSF to identify whether an individual was enrolled in traditional 
Medicare or a private Medicare plan.  I next use this file to categorize individuals based on their 
level of dual eligibility from 2009 through 2015.  My version of the MBSF does not identify 
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detailed levels of dual eligibility in earlier years, so I instead rely on the corresponding variable 
from the 2006-2008 MAX PS files.   
 
Supply 
My analysis includes separate measures for three types of private Medicare plans: D-SNPs, other 
MA plan options, and MMPs (which are grouped under state policies).  These measures 
disregard several plan types that are likely to be less salient for the general dual eligible 
population.  For one, with the exception of D-SNPs, I exclude MA plans that restrict enrollment 
to a subgroup of Medicare beneficiaries, including employer-sponsored plans, chronic condition 
and institutional special needs plans (C-SNPs and I-SNPs), and Program of All-Inclusive Care 
for the Elderly (PACE) plans.  I also drop plan types that, for various reasons, enrolled no or 
relatively few dual eligibles in my sample as of 2015. This includes MA plans that do not offer 
Part D coverage, Medical Savings Account (MSA) plans, a small number of demonstration plans 
that were no longer offered in 2015, and Medicare Cost plans.  Additionally, I exclude plans that 
had fewer than 10 enrollees in a given year.  My explanatory variables rely on the remaining 
plans—which represented 94% of private Medicare enrollment in my sample as of 2015—while 
my outcome variable is based on enrollment in any type of private Medicare plan.   
 
All of these measures come from publicly-available data from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). I first identify where D-SNPs were offered by linking plan service 
area data with D-SNP identifiers from the Plan Benefit Package (PBP) dataset.  Because D-SNPs 
are a relatively new type of MA plan, I also measure the number of years since they first became 
available in a given county.  This is to account for the possibility that market entry will have 
larger effects on enrollment over time as these plans gain experience in a given region and as 
beneficiaries become more familiar with them.  I generate this measure by combining the data 
above with 2004-2005 data from the Medicare Plan Finder dataset. 
 
I also create several measures of the availability and features of other MA plans.  I first use plan 
service area and contract information files to focus on relevant MA plan types and to identify 
where they were offered.  My analyses include both the number of plans available to each dual 
eligible in a given county as well as the number of plans squared.  I incorporate a quadratic term 
11 
 
based on a prior finding that increases in the number of plan options may have a decreasing 
marginal effect on enrollment (McWilliams et al. 2011).   
 
Measures of average MA plan characteristics come from several sources.  I first use contract 
information files to distinguish between health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred 
provider organization (PPO), and private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans.  All else equal, 
beneficiaries may prefer PPO and PFFS plans as they provide greater flexibility than HMOs to 
go to a physician or hospital of one’s choice (Sinaiko and Zeckhauser 2015).  I next pull 
premium data from the PBP file and Medicare Part D Plan reports.  Part C premiums come from 
the former and reflect the cost of benefits that are part of the traditional Medicare benefit 
package, while Part D premiums come from the latter and reflect the price of prescription drug 
coverage (taking into account the LIS premium subsidy).  Data on MA plan benefits come from 
the Medicare Plan Finder data and the PBP.  The Medicare Plan Finder provides an estimation of 
expected out-of-pocket (OOP) cost-sharing requirements under a given plan for the average 
beneficiary (CMS 2019b).  This measure of benefit generosity is included in an online Medicare 
tool that is designed to help beneficiaries choose between plans.  It mostly takes into account 
services that are part of the traditional Medicare and Part D benefit package (CMS 2019b).  
Because Medicaid covers most or all of the cost-sharing requirements for these services on 
behalf of many dual eligibles, I also evaluate whether plans offer certain supplemental benefits 
that may be more salient to this population.  In particular, I use PBP data to identify whether 
plans include coverage for comprehensive dental services, eyewear, and hearing aids as a 
mandatory component of their benefit package.   
 
Demand 
I generate three measures of traditional Medicare supplement markets: stand-alone PDP plan 
counts and Part D premiums (from the same resources that I use for MA plans) and Medigap 
Plan F premiums by state (from the Medicare Plan Finder file).  Plan F is the most common 
Medigap policy, and its premiums are highly correlated with other common Medigap plan types 
(Jacobson, Huang, and Neuman 2014).  Because Medigap plan premiums likely relate to 
traditional Medicare spending patterns in a given region, I also control for standardized and risk-
adjusted per capita spending in traditional Medicare as part of an alternative specification to my 
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primary model (Jacobs and Buntin 2015).  This variable comes from the Medicare Geographic 
Variation file.  Finally, I calculate the share of dual eligibles who are 65 or older and the share in 
each dual eligibility group based on MBSF data.   
 
State policy 
I collect data on three sources of variation in state policy that could affect dual eligibles’ 
enrollment decisions.  First, I identify counties where states have required full dual eligibles to 
enroll in a comprehensive Medicaid managed care plan.  Direct information on county-level 
enrollment mandates are available in the Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports from 
2013-2015, but not in earlier years.  When matching the 2013 report to MAX PS data from the 
same year, I find that focusing on counties with Medicaid managed care enrollment rates of at 
least 40% is a fairly accurate approach for pinpointing mandate regions.  I apply this threshold to 
MAX PS data as available to identify county-level mandates from 2006 through 2013, and I 
clean potential inconsistencies in the data (e.g., by generally presuming that mandate counties 
remained so in later years).  Second, I combine plan service area data with a government report 
to identify counties where states were passively enrolling full dual eligibles in MMPs (MACPAC  
2018a).  The first full year of passive enrollment occurred in 2015, which is also the last year of 
my sample.  Finally, I rely on 2004-2012 biennial surveys of state Medicaid programs from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation to identify states that cover dentures, eyewear, and hearing aids, 
pulling data forwards to fill in years when the survey was not conducted.  State coverage of these 
services likely reduces the appeal of MA plans that offer similar benefits, so I interact state 
coverage with the corresponding MA variable.  While optional Medicaid benefits may be 
important in shaping demand for private Medicare coverage, relatively few states added or 
dropped these services over time.  Further, many of the changes that did occur involved 
eliminating benefits shortly after the beginning of the Great Recession.  Because the timing of 
this policy may correspond to other important changes in state economies and Medicaid 
programs, I only incorporate it as part of an alternative specification to my primary model.   
 
Sample restrictions 
My analysis includes a few sample restrictions to account for missing data and to simplify my 
approach.  First, I drop regions where there were no MA offerings at any point during my sample 
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period.  This affects about a quarter of all counties, but only 12% of my person-year 
observations.  Without this sample restriction, my model would be more complicated as I would 
need to fully interact MA variables with a dummy for the availability of any MA plan.  Second, I 
drop non-QMB partial dual eligibles from the state of Arizona as enrollment data appear to be 
incomplete for this population early in my sample period.  Finally, I drop counties that were ever 
missing one or more variable.   
 
1.4. Results 
1.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Basic summary statistics highlight important changes over time and preview some of the main 
findings in this study regarding enrollment trends (Table 1.2).  First, the number of dual eligibles 
in my sample increased from 6.6 to 9.1 million beneficiaries between 2006 and 2015.  
Enrollment growth was larger among partial dual eligibles, though full dual eligibles continued 
to account for the large majority of the dual eligible population (73%) in the last year of my 
sample.  Second, the share of dual eligibles in private Medicare plans nearly tripled during my 
sample period, increasing from 11% in 2006 to 30% in 2015.  This trend included large increases 
in enrollment rates across all three dual eligible groups (Figure 1.2).  Third, MA plan offerings 
improved on average from 2006 through 2009 in terms of an increasing number of options, lower 
Part C premiums, and greater overall benefit generosity, before mostly reversing course from 
2009 through 2015.  It is therefore unlikely that these factors alone explain the sustained growth 
of private Medicare enrollment over my sample period (Pelech 2015; Sinaiko and Zeckhauser 
2015; Frakt 2017; Skopec et al. 2019).  Nonetheless, the share of counties with D-SNPs and their 
market experience continued to increase throughout this timeframe, as did the share of MA plans 
covering certain supplemental benefits.  Both of these changes may be particularly salient for 
dual eligibles.  Fourth, the number of stand-alone PDP options followed the same pattern over 
time as did the number of MA plans.  Because PDPs are a substitute for Part D coverage in MA 
plans, this trend may have offset changes in the MA market.  Nonetheless, PDP premiums 
increased substantially and Medigap plan premiums grew slightly during my sample period.  
Fifth, there were large changes in policy during my sample period.  The share of dual eligibles in 
counties with Medicaid managed care mandates increased from 6% in 2006 to 30% in 2015, and 
19% of dual eligibles resided in a county that had introduced MMP passive enrollment by 2015.  
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There was also a slight reduction in the share of dual eligibles residing in states covering certain 
optional benefits.  Finally, Appendix Figures 1.2 and 1.3 confirm that there was substantial 
geographic variation in enrollment trends among dual eligibles, and the last column of Table 2 
indicates a large degree of variation in trends across counties for most of my explanatory 
variables.  This will be useful when estimating regression models with county fixed effects. 
 
1.4.2. Enrollment 
Results from my primary model largely confirm predicted relationships between explanatory 
variables and private Medicare enrollment rates among dual eligibles (Table 1.3).  First, the 
availability of D-SNPs and an increase in the number of years since D-SNPs first entered a given 
county were both associated with a statistically significant increase in private Medicare 
enrollment rates.  Second, private Medicare enrollment increased with both the number of MA 
plan options in a county and the share with less restrictive provider networks, and it decreased 
with Part D premiums.  The association between enrollment and average expected OOP cost-
sharing requirements under MA plans was not statistically significant.  This was anticipated, 
given that Medicaid covers most or all of these costs for the majority of dual eligibles.  At the 
same time, enrollment increased with the share of plans offering comprehensive dental, eyewear, 
or hearing aid coverage.  This association was concentrated in counties where state Medicaid 
programs did not already provide a similar set of benefits (see the larger coefficient in Column 4 
and the negative interaction term in the last row of this column).  Third, private Medicare 
enrollment decreased with the number of PDPs available to traditional Medicare beneficiaries 
(though PDP premium results were not statistically significant).  Fourth, enrollment increased 
with the share of dual eligibles who were elderly (versus nonelderly disabled) and with the share 
who were partial dual eligibles.  Finally, Medicaid managed care enrollment mandates and MMP 
passive enrollment were both associated with a statistically significant increase in private 
Medicare enrollment.   
 
The maturation of D-SNP markets and the introduction of MMP passive enrollment were both 
associated with noticeably large increases in private Medicare enrollment rates.  For example, 
there was a 12.1 percentage point marginal effect of moving from a county where D-SNPs were 
never available to a county where they had been available for 10 years (i.e., approximately 3.7 + 
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0.8 x 10 years).  MMP passive enrollment was similarly associated with an 11.2 percentage point 
increase in enrollment rates.  Several other variables that were statistically significant had much 
smaller point estimates when considered on their own.  For instance, an increase in average MA 
Part D premiums of one standard deviation was associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase 
in enrollment rates (0.5 x -1.0).  As another example, although Medicaid managed care 
enrollment mandates may lead to substantial increases in the share of dual eligibles in those 
plans, they only corresponded to a 3.3 percentage point increase in private Medicare enrollment. 
 
One surprising result is that Medigap premiums had a positive and statistically significant 
association with private Medicare enrollment rates.  In particular, an increase in Medigap 
premiums of one standard deviation corresponded to a 1.8 percentage point increase in 
enrollment rates (i.e., approximately 3.2 x 0.6).  I had anticipated that there would not be a strong 
relationship between these variables, given that Medigap plans are expensive and often include 
redundant coverage for dual eligibles.  One possible explanation is that Medigap premiums are 
capturing other aspects of regional health care markets that are more relevant to dual eligibles’ 
decision-making, such as costs and efficiency in the traditional program.  Controlling for 
standardized and risk-adjusted per capita spending in traditional Medicare did not change my 
results (Table 1.3, Column 5), though other factors could also be at play.   
 
1.4.3. Enrollment trends 
My explanatory variables collectively account for much of the change in private Medicare 
enrollment rates.  Enrollment rates among dual eligibles grew by 19.0 percent points from 2006 
through 2015 (Table 1.4, Column 1).  After adjusting for each of my explanatory variables, the 
residual, unexplained change over this time period was only 6.4 percentage points, or 33% of the 
actual trend (Table 1.4, Column 2).  These variables absorbed a particularly large amount of 
enrollment trends after 2008, leaving a residual trend that was 23% of the actual change from 
2009 through 2015 (Table 1.4, Column 2). 
 
D-SNP variables by themselves accounted for a much larger portion of enrollment trends than 
any other group of variables.  Simply controlling for the availability of a D-SNP in a given 
county and the number of years since a D-SNP first entered the market leaves a residual trend 
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that is 56% of the actual change in enrollment from 2006 through 2015 (Table 1.4, Column 3).  
The next most important factor—MMP passive enrollment—leaves much more of the trend 
unexplained (90%) (Table 1.4, Column 8).  When combined, these variables account for about 
half (49%) of the increase in private Medicare enrollment over my sample, and more than half 
(59%) in the growth since 2009 (Table 1.4, Column 10). 
 
Other variables are less useful in explaining overall trends.  For one, while changes in other MA 
plan offerings account for over half of the growth in private Medicare enrollment from 2006 
through 2009, plan trends suggest that enrollment in private Medicare would have fallen from 
2009 through 2015 if only these factors were relevant (Table 1.4, Column 4).  Conversely, 
although changes in supplemental plan markets explain some of the enrollment increase in recent 
years, they predict decreases in private Medicare enrollment from 2006 through 2009 (Table 1.4, 
Column 5).  In other words, MA and supplemental plan variables offset each other’s explanatory 
power to some degree (Table 1.4, Column 9).  Finally, changes in the characteristics of dual 
eligibles and the growth of Medicaid managed care enrollment mandates each account for a 
modest share of private Medicare enrollment trends (Table 1.4, Columns 6 and 7). 
 
1.4.4. Enrollment and enrollment trends by dual eligible group 
Enrollment analyses stratified by level of dual eligibility generally yielded results that were 
consistent with my predictions and overall findings (Table 1.5).  Nonetheless, there were a few 
unexpected outcomes.  First, although MMP passive enrollment only directly effects full dual 
eligibles, it was associated with a decrease in private Medicare enrollment rates among partial 
dual eligibles.  Point estimates for full dual eligibles were large, positive, and statistically 
significant, as expected.  Second, while I focus on state Medicaid managed care mandates for full 
dual eligibles, this policy was associated with an increase in private Medicare enrollment across 
full and partial dual eligibles alike.  Finally, among non-QMB partial dual eligibles, increases in 
expected cost-sharing requirements under MA plans were associated with increases in private 
Medicare enrollment rates.  This is counterintuitive and was not true among other dual eligible 




D-SNP variables again accounted for much of the increase in private Medicare enrollment 
among full dual eligibles and QMB partial dual eligibles, but not among non-QMB partial dual 
eligibles (Tables 1.7 through 1.9).  After controlling for these variables, the residual enrollment 
trend was 47% of the actual change in enrollment rates from 2006 through 2015 among full dual 
eligibles, 53% of the actual change among QMB partial dual eligibles, but 95% of the actual 
change among non-QMB partial dual eligibles.  This is consistent with: (1) the fact that many D-
SNPs do not enroll non-QMB partial dual eligibles, and (2) the possibility that D-SNPs may be 
less relevant for non-QMB partial dual eligibles given the limited scope of their Medicaid 
benefits.   
 
1.4.5. Enrollment and D-SNP market entry 
Event-study results provide suggestive evidence that the positive relationship between D-SNP 
market entry and private Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles overall may be causal.  On 
the one hand, D-SNPs entered counties where private Medicare enrollment was already 
increasing relative to other parts of the country (Figure 1.3, top panel).  This undercuts the 
argument that D-SNP market entry led to enrollment growth—rather than the other way 
around—to some degree.  On the other hand, enrollment growth in the pre-period relative to 
other regions was modest, especially in the years just before D-SNP market entry and 
particularly in comparison to enrollment growth in the years after.  For example, the event-study 
results suggest a 1.6 percentage point increase in enrollment rates from four years to one year 
before D-SNP market entry, but a 6.0 percentage point increase from one year before to two 
years after (Figure 1.3, top panel), representing a difference of 4.4 percentage points (p<0.01, 
result not shown).  This is not substantially smaller than the 5.3 percentage point increase 
predicted in my primary model (3.7 + 2 x 0.8) (Table 1.3, Column 3). 
 
Evaluating trends among non-dual eligibles provides additional evidence that this growth in 
enrollment is the product of D-SNP market entry.  Because non-dual eligibles are not allowed to 
enroll in D-SNPs, market entry should not have affected enrollment rates among this population 
unless there had been some other change occurring in counties at the same time.  While D-SNP 
market entry was associated with a statistically significant increase in enrollment among non-




D-SNP market entry was associated with particularly large increases in enrollment rates in 
counties that had previously implemented mandatory Medicaid managed care (Figure 1.4).  
Among these counties, D-SNP market entry was associated with a 7.9 percentage point increase 
in enrollment rates two years afterwards.  In counties that never had a mandate, it corresponded 
to a 5.4 percentage point increase.  Additionally, there was less evidence of a pre-period 
enrollment trend among mandate counties and, unlike counties without a mandate, the increase 
in enrollment did not taper off in the final years following market entry. 
 
1.4.6. Limitations 
Although I provide evidence that the introduction of D-SNPs over time led to increases in private 
Medicare enrollment, it is unclear whether other associations observed in this study are causal.  
For instance, I find that private Medicare enrollment was positively correlated with the number 
of MA plan options in a given county.  One interpretation of this result is that increases in the 
competitiveness and diversity of plan options led to greater enrollment, while another possibility 
is that increases in the demand for private coverage led plans to enter a given market.  A useful 
avenue of future research would be to more carefully delineate these relationships.  Doing so will 
be challenging given that: (1) prior research has only proposed a small number of methods for 
identifying exogenous sources of variation in private Medicare markets, and (2) most of these 
approaches relate to changes in government payments to plans, which could affect multiple 
dimensions of plan offerings.  Surveys and focus groups might be a practical alternative for 
obtaining useful insights into dual eligibles’ decision-making process.   
 
Another limitation of this study is that it was unable to explore the role of two potentially 
important factors.  For one, during my sample period, the government enhanced its process for 
risk-adjusting payments to MA plans.  This likely increased the incentive of plans to cater to 
high-need beneficiary populations, including dual eligibles (Newhouse et al. 2012).  
Understanding the relationship between risk adjustment and enrollment among dual eligibles will 
be particularly important moving forward, given that the government recently modified its 
method for taking dual eligibility into account and is continuing to tinker with its approach 
(CMS 2015, 2017).  Another factor that may merit attention is that states have the option of 
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subsidizing Part C premiums on behalf of certain dual eligibles (CMS 2007).  This presumably 
increases MA enrollment, but the degree to which this is the case is unclear and will be of 
particular interest to states.   
 
1.5. Conclusion 
This study explores the relationship of private Medicare enrollment and enrollment growth 
among dual eligibles with several supply-side, demand-side, and state policy factors.  Results 
highlight the important role of D-SNP availability and the maturation of county D-SNP markets 
over time in pulling dual eligibles into the private Medicare market.  Controlling for D-SNP 
variables accounts for about half of the growth in private Medicare enrollment from 2006 
through 2015 among full dual eligibles and QMB partial dual eligibles.  The timing of these 
trends supports the interpretation that D-SNPs led to large increases in enrollment, rather than 
the other way around.  Private Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles was also associated 
with improvements in plan offerings, decreases in supplemental plan offerings and increases in 
their premiums, and changes in state policy.  Some of these factors are unique to dual eligibles.  
For instance, some states were passively enrolling full dual eligibles in MMPs in the last year of 
my sample, which was associated with a large expansion of private Medicare enrollment.   
 
This research draws attention to the crucial role that state policy plays in determining private 
Medicare enrollment patterns among dual eligibles.  First, states have the ability to shape local 
D-SNP markets. Before offering D-SNPs, insurers must enter into a contract with a given state 
that describes the plan’s structure and responsibilities (MedPAC 2013).  Second, private 
Medicare enrollment has increased in counties where states have rolled out MMP plans and 
passively enrolled full dual eligibles.  Finally, states may influence private Medicare enrollment 
among dual eligibles in a subtler way by modifying their Medicaid programs, such as by 
introducing managed care mandates or altering the set of optional benefits.  Although state 
policy may have a large effect on private Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles, most of the 
implications for spending are at the federal level.  This ties into a broader discussion of how the 
incentives of states and the federal government may be misaligned in ways that lead to 




Finally, this study might shape how researchers view the welfare effect of increasing private 
Medicare enrollment among dual eligibles.  For example, this research finds that MMP passive 
enrollment accounted for a sizable share of the growth in private Medicare among dual eligibles 
in recent years.  The well-being of beneficiaries who are passively enrolled in private Medicare 
plans may be much different than that of beneficiaries who actively choose these plans.  
Beneficiaries who actively choose private Medicare coverage presumably make a calculation 
that they would be better off under this enrollment option than in traditional Medicare (Balsa, 
Cao, and McGuire 2007).  This is less clear among passively-enrolled beneficiaries, who may 
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Table 1.1. Dual Eligible Groups 
Table 1.1. Dual Eligible Groups 























Medicare cost sharing 
Part A premium 
Part B premium 





1.4 ≤100% FPL $7,390  
Medicare cost sharing 
Part A premium 
Part B premium 





1.5 101%-120% FPL $7,390  Part B premium 
Copay cap (high) 
Premium subsidy 
 
SOURCES: MACPAC 2018b and 2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF).  
NOTES: *Enrollment estimates from January 2015. **Eligibility requirements and benefit levels applicable to the majority of 
beneficiaries in each dual eligible group. Other members of each group qualify through different eligibility pathways or based 
on different asset and income limits in particular states. Other full dual eligibles may receive less comprehensive Medicaid 
coverage of cost sharing and premiums based on their eligibility pathway and state of residence. A very small number of dual 
eligibles (<50) receive Part A premium coverage alone. ***Part D LIS benefits vary by eligibility pathway.  This column 
represents the most common benefits among the relevant dual eligible group.  In 2019, the program capped copay 
requirements for dual eligibles at $0 (low), $1.25/$3.80 for generic/brand name drugs (medium), and $3.60/$8.95 for 
generic/brand name drugs (high) (CMS 2019).  The program also provides a benchmark premium subsidy, with dual eligibles 
paying any difference between their Part D premium and the benchmark. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary. 
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Total population (in millions) 6.6 7.1 9.1 0.5 2.0 2.5
Share in private Medicare 20% 15% 11% 19% 30% 8% 11% 19% 13%
D-SNPs
Any 74% 44% 55% 75% 83% 20% 7% 28% 47%
Years since first in county 3.5 3.2 0.3 2.2 7.1 1.9 4.9 6.8 3.3
Other MA plans
# of plans 16.2 14.5 12.3 18.9 17.2 6.5 -1.6 4.9 5.4
Avg. Part C prem. $36.1 $25.6 $38.2 $33.6 $33.3 -$4.6 -$0.3 -$4.9 $25.8
Avg. Part D prem. $5.9 $5.4 $5.4 $7.3 $7.4 $1.9 $0.1 $2.0 $7.5
Avg. OOP costs $303.8 $35.2 $329.0 $245.2 $320.9 -$83.8 $75.7 -$8.1 $39.3
Share with supp. benefit 62% 27% 57% 63% 71% 6% 8% 13% 32%
Share HMO 48% 31% 46% 40% 56% -5% 15% 10% 20%
Share PPO 29% 23% 23% 21% 37% -3% 16% 13% 34%
Share PFFS 21% 28% 28% 37% 5% 9% -32% -23% 34%
Trad. Medicare supp. plans 
# of PDPs 45.0 31.8 43.2 52.9 36.8 9.8 -16.2 -6.4 6.0
Avg. PDP prem. $17.7 $6.9 $8.6 $18.0 $21.2 $9.4 $3.2 $12.6 $5.1
Avg. Medigap prem. $158.2 $32.5 $156.9 $161.0 $164.3 $4.1 $3.3 $7.4 $24.0
Beneficiary characteristics
Share 65+ 59% 11% 61% 60% 58% -1% -2% -4% 4%
Share full dual 76% 17% 81% 78% 73% -3% -5% -8% 8%
Share QMB partial dual 11% 11% 9% 10% 13% 1% 3% 4% 5%
Share non-QMB partial dual 13% 8% 10% 12% 15% 2% 2% 5% 5%
TM spending per capita $10,493.1 $1,092.2 $9,994.3 $10,824.4 $10,587.2 $830.1 -$237.2 $592.9 $817.9
State policy
Mandatory Medicaid MC 16% 37% 6% 13% 30% 7% 17% 24% 43%
Passive enrollment in MMP 3% 16% 0% 0% 19% 0% 19% 19% 39%
Supp. Medicaid benefits 61% 49% 65% 65% 56% 0% -9% -9% 28%
By yearAll years Level or percentge point change
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics
NOTES: Overall figures are weighted by county populaton.  Figures by year and changes over time are weighted by county enrollment in 2006 to correspond to later regressions. 
Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. 
HMO = Health maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-pocket. PDP = Stand-alone prescription 
drug plan. PPO = Preferred provider organization. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary.
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Trad. Medicare supp. plans 





































TM spending per capita ($1,000s) $10.5 $1.1 0.0
(0.3)
State policy












Supp. Medicaid benefits 61% 49% 1.5*
(0.9)
Interaction with share of MA plans with supp. Benefit -3.4***
(1.0)
Table 1.3. Relationship Between Private Medicare Enrollment Rates Among Dual Eligibles and 
Explanatory Variables
Coefficients and standard errors
NOTES: N = 22,750 county-year observations. Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare 
enrollment rates with the relevant explanatory variables, as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-
SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs 
plan. HMO = Health maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid 























































Coeff. as % of baseline 33% 56% 96% 98% 94% 96% 90% 93% 51%




















Coeff. as % of baseline 49% 63% 44% 125% 93% 97% 100% 80% 66%



















































































Trad. Medicare supp. plans 










































Baseline model, plus the following variables…
Table 1.4. Unexplained Trends in Private Medicare Enrollment Among Dual Eligibles 
After Controlling for Explanatory Variables
NOTES: N = 22,750 county-year observations. Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with the relevant explanatory variables, 
as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in 
MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. HMO = Health maintenance 
organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-pocket. PDP = Stand-alone prescription drug plan. PPO = 
Preferred provider organization. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary. TM = Traditional Medicare.
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Trad. Medicare supp. plans 






































Supp. Medicaid benefits 61% 49%
N (county-year) = 22,750 22,372 22,518
Table 1.5. Relationship Between Private Medicare Enrollment Rates and Explanatory Variables, 
by Dual Eligible Group
Coefficients and standard errors
NOTES: Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with the relevant 
explanatory variables, as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors clustered at the county level. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other 
private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. HMO = Health 
maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-

















































Coeff. as % of baseline 40% 47% 98% 103% 112% 97% 83% 38%


















Coeff. as % of baseline 54% 48% 23% 147% 113% 97% 100% 53%

































































Trad. Medicare supp. plans 




























Table 1.6. Unexplained Trends in Private Medicare Enrollment Among Full Dual Eligibles 
After Controlling for Explanatory Variables
Baseline model, plus the following variables…
NOTES: N = 22,750 county-year observations. Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with the relevant explanatory 
variables, as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Private Medicare 
includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. 
HMO = Health maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-pocket. PDP = Stand-
alone prescription drug plan. PPO = Preferred provider organization. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary. TM = Traditional Medicare.
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Coeff. as % of baseline 41% 53% 94% 90% 105% 97% 102%
















Coeff. as % of baseline 55% 70% 57% 100% 105% 98% 100%



























































Trad. Medicare supp. plans 


























Table 1.7. Unexplained Trends in Private Medicare Enrollment Among QMB Partial Dual Eligibles 
After Controlling for Explanatory Variables
Baseline model, plus the following variables…
NOTES: N = 22,372 county-year observations. Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with the relevant 
explanatory variables, as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county 
level. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-
SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. HMO = Health maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-
Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-pocket. PDP = Stand-alone prescription drug plan. PPO = Preferred provider organization. QMB = Qualified Medicare 
Beneficiary. TM = Traditional Medicare.
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Coeff. as % of baseline 73% 95% 85% 96% 110% 96% 104%
















Coeff. as % of baseline 87% 94% 95% 88% 107% 98% 100%



























































Trad. Medicare supp. plans 


























Table 1.8. Unexplained Trends in Private Medicare Enrollment Among Non-QMB Partial Dual Eligibles 
After Controlling for Explanatory Variables
Baseline model, plus the following variables…
NOTES: N = 22,518 county-year observations. Estimates come from linear regression models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with the relevant 
explanatory variables, as well as year dummies and county fixed effects. Models include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county 
level. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-
SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. HMO = Health maintenance organization. MA = Medicare Advantage. MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-
Medicaid Plan. OOP = Out-of-pocket. PDP = Stand-alone prescription drug plan. PPO = Preferred provider organization. QMB = Qualified Medicare 
Beneficiary. TM = Traditional Medicare.
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Appendix Table 1.1. Previous Literature on the Association Between Enrollment in Private Medicare and Potential Explanatory Variables 
Appendix Table 1.1. Previous Literature on the Association Between  
Enrollment in Private Medicare and Potential Explanatory Variables * 
Factor 
(1) 




Number plans Increases in the number of plans available were associated with increases in MA 
enrollment, at least initially (McWilliams et al. 2011; Jacobs and Buntin 2015; Pelech 
2015).  Two of these studies found a decreasing marginal effect (McWilliams et al. 
2011; Jacobs and Buntin 2015) and one found negative effects when there were already 
many plans in a given county (McWilliams et al. 2011). 
Premiums Increases in premiums were associated with decreases in MA enrollment (Jacobs and 
Buntin 2015; Pelech 2015) and enrollment in specific plans (Dowd, Feldman, and 
Coulam 2003; Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004; Jacobs and Buntin 2015; Reid et al. 
2016).  They were positively associated with plan disenrollment (Ng et al. 2007; 
Meyers et al. 2019). 
Benefits Increases in plan generosity were associated with increases in MA enrollment 
(McWilliams et al. 2011; Pelech 2015) or were not associated by a statistically 
significant amount (Sinaiko, Afendulis, and Frank 2013). Increases in plan generosity 
were associated with greater enrollment in specific plans (Jacobs and Buntin 2015; Reid 
et al. 2016).  Vision coverage was associated with an increase in enrollment in a 
specific plan (Dowd, Feldman, and Coulam 2003; Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004) 
as was dental coverage in one study (Dowd, Feldman, and Coulam 2003), though 
neither dental nor hearing coverage results were statistically significant in another 
(Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004).  Results for copays were mixed (Dowd, Feldman, 
and Coulam 2003; Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004).  
Provider networks Plan disenrollment rates were lower among PPO contracts than among HMO contracts 
(DuGoff and Chao 2019). 
Quality Increases in star ratings were associated with increases in enrollment in specific plans 
and decreases in disenrollment rates (Lied et al. 2003; Reid et al. 2013; DuGoff and 
Chao 2019; Meyers et al. 2019). 
Demand-side  
Health status Increases in health have generally been associated with increases in MA enrollment (see 
for example Hellinger and Wong 2000; Mello et al. 2003; and Rahman et al. 2015), 
though there is also evidence that this relationship has decreased over time (Newhouse 
et al. 2012; Newhouse et al. 2015). 
 
Age Among Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older, studies have found that increases in age 
are negatively associated with MA enrollment  (Mello et al. 2003; Atherly, Dowd, and 
Feldman 2004; Afendulis, Sinaiko, and Frank 2015; Jacobs and Buntin 2015) with one 
exception (Shimada et al. 2009). 
 
Income Studies excluding dual eligibles have found that MA enrollment tends to be higher 
among lower-income beneficiaries (Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004; Shimada et al. 
2009; Jacobs and Buntin 2015).  One study included duals and found that increases in 
income were associated with increases in MA enrollment but that dual eligibility was 





Summary of findings  
(2) 
Status quo bias Two studies suggest that beneficiaries were more likely to make optimal enrollment 
decisions when they first became eligible for Medicare, which the authors take as 
evidence of status quo bias (Sinaiko, Afendulis, and Frank 2013; Afendulis, Sinaiko, 
and Frank 2015). Another study found that plan enrollees were not switching to cheaper 
alternatives and were particularly unlikely to do so as tenure increased, implying inertia 
in enrollment (Jacobs and Molloy 2017).   
Suppl. markets Increases in Medigap premiums were associated with increases in MA enrollment 
(McLaughlin, Chernew, and Taylor 2002; Atherly, Dowd, and Feldman 2004; Pelech 
2015). 
Increases in the number of PDPs were associated with decreases in MA enrollment, 
though the relationship between PDP premiums and MA enrollment were not 
statistically significant (Pelech 2015). 
Notes: *All results in this table come from peer-reviewed publications, with the exception of Pelech 2015 (an 
unpublished chapter of a dissertation).  HMO = health maintenance organization.  MA = Medicare Advantage.  





Appendix Table 1.2. Potential Determinants of Enrollment in Private Medicare Plans 
Appendix Table 1.2. Potential Determinants of Enrollment in Private Medicare Plans 
Factor 
(1) 
Predicted relationship*  
(2) 




Number plans Enrollment will initially increase with the 
number of plans as markets become more 
competitive and add a greater diversity of 
options (McWilliams et al. 2011).  
Marginal effects will decrease and may 
become negative due, for example, to 
choice overload (McWilliams et al. 2011). 
Dual eligibles may be particularly sensitive 
to the availability of D-SNPs.  D-SNPs are 
a relatively new plan type so may have 
larger effects on enrollment as they gain 
experience in a given county and as 
beneficiaries become more familiar with 
them. 
Premiums Enrollment will decrease with plan 
premiums. 
All duals receive a flat premium subsidy 
for Part D coverage.   
Benefits Enrollment will increase with plan benefit 
generosity. 
Many dual eligibles receive coverage for 
all or most of their cost-sharing 
obligations, though there are some gaps 
(e.g., most dental care in some states). 
Provider networks Enrollment will increase with the breadth 
of provider networks. 
 
Quality Enrollment will increase with plan quality. 
 
   
Demand-side 
  
Health status Enrollment will increase with health status 
due to cream skimming and adverse 
selection (e.g., as healthier beneficiaries 
may be less averse to managed care 
restrictions) (Brown et al. 2014;  
Newhouse and McGuire 2014). 
 
Age Enrollment will generally decrease with 
age as health deteriorates.  Beneficiaries 
under age 65 may be less likely to enroll; 
they qualify for Medicare on the basis of 
disability and report more significant cost 
and access challenges (Cubanski and 
Neuman 2010).   
 
Cohort Enrollment will increase with birth cohort 
as younger cohorts may have greater 
experience with managed care (Sinaiko 
and Zeckhauser 2015). 
 
Income Enrollment will decrease with income as 
lower-income beneficiaries are more 
willing to accept managed care restrictions 
in exchange for lower cost-sharing 
requirements under private plans 
(Newhouse and McGuire 2014). 
Generosity of Medicaid and LIS benefits 
tends to fall with income.  More generous 
benefits may reduce the incentive to seek 
similar coverage through private plans. 
There is less variation in income after 





Predicted relationship*  
(2) 
Nuance for dual eligibles 
(3) 
Suppl. markets Enrollment will decrease as the number of 
plans increase and premiums fall given 
that supplemental coverage for traditional 
Medicare may be a substitute for private 
Medicare (Pelech 2015). 
All duals receive a flat premium subsidy 
for PDP coverage. 
Medigap coverage is largely redundant for 
many dual eligibles who receive similar 
benefits through Medicaid. 
State policy   
Medicaid Only directly applicable to dual eligibles. Enrolling in a Medicaid managed care plan 
and private Medicare plan offered by the 
same insurer may facilitate the 
coordination of benefits across Medicare 
and Medicaid. Hence, state Medicaid 
managed care mandates may also lead to 
an increase in  private Medicare 
enrollment.  
Insurers that have experience serving dual 
eligibles in the Medicaid managed care 
market may be more willing to cater 





Only directly applicable to dual eligibles. Prior research suggests stickiness in 
Medicare enrollment (Sinaiko, Afendulis, 
and Frank 2013; Afendulis, Sinaiko, and 
Frank 2015), which could indicate an 
important role for passive enrollment. 
Notes: *Holding all else equal.  D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan.  MC = Managed care. MMP = 
Medicare-Medicaid Plan. PDP = Stand-alone prescription drug plan. 
 




Figure 1.1. Share of Beneficiaries in Private Medicare, by Dual Eligible Status 
 
Figure 1.2. Share of Dual Eligibles in Private Medicare, by Eligibility Group 
 
(MMCO (Medicare-Medicaid Coordination Office) 2018) 
Figure 1.1. Share of Beneficiaries in Private Medicare, 






2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Non-dual eligibles
Dual eligibles
NOTE: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional 
Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. 
SOURCE: 2006-2007 Denominator Files, 2008-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary, Files, and MMCO (2018) 












NOTE: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., 
MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. QMB = Qualified Medicare 
Beneficiary.
SOURCE: 2005-2007 Medicaid Analytic eXtract Personal Summary files and 2005-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary Files. 
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Figure 1.3. Relationship Between D-SNP Availability and the Share of Beneficiaries in Private Medicare 
 
NOTE: Estimates come from event-study models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with event-year dummies, 
explanatory variables from other models that are unrelated to D-SNPs, and county and year fixed effects.  The thick blue line 
plots coefficients for event-year dummies, with -1 as the reference year.  The thin blue lines represent 95% confidendence
intervals. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to 
traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = 
Medicare-Medicaid Plan. 
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Figure 1.4. Relationship Between D-SNP Availability and the Share of Beneficiaries in Private Medicare 
  
NOTE: Estimates come from event-study models that relate private Medicare enrollment rates with event-year dummies, 
explanatory variables from other models that are unrelated to D-SNPs, and county and year fixed effects.  The thick blue 
line plots coefficients for event-year dummies, with -1 as the reference year.  The thin blue lines represent 95% 
confidendence intervals. Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private 
alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. 
MC = Managed care. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. 
Figure 1.4. Relationship Between D-SNP Availability 
and the Share of Beneficiaries in Private Medicare
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Appendix Figure 1.1. Share of Private Medicare Enrollees in D-SNPs, by Dual Eligible Group 
 
Appendix Figure 1.2. Percentage Point Increase in Private Medicare  Enrollment Rates, 2006-2015 
 
Appendix Figure 1.1.  Share of Private Medicare 
Enrollees in D-SNPs, by Dual Eligible Group
NOTE: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to 
traditional Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = 
Medicare-Medicaid Plan. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary.















Appendix Figure 1.2.  Percentage Point Increase in 
Private Medicare Enrollment Rates, 2006-2015
NOTE: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare (e.g., 
MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan.
SOURCE: 2006-2007 Denominator Files, 2008-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary, Files.
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Appendix Figure 1.3. Private Medicare Enrollment Rates, by State and Year 
Appendix Figure 1.3.  Private Medicare Enrollment Rates, 
by State and Year 
2006
2015
NOTES: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional Medicare 
(e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan.




Dual Advantage or Double the Burden?:  
The effect on dual eligibles of providing Medicare benefits through private plans 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic change in the structure of Medicare, the 
federal health insurance program that currently covers about 60 million elderly and disabled 
Americans (CMS 2018b). Historically, beneficiaries obtained coverage almost exclusively 
through a government-administered version of the program known as “traditional Medicare.”  
Today, however, over 20 million beneficiaries choose to receive their coverage through 
subsidized, private plans under Medicare Advantage (MA) (CMS 2018b).  The government 
introduced, and at times encouraged, this enrollment option as a mechanism for capitalizing on 
the perceived efficiencies of market competition and managed care.  Indeed, prior research 
suggests that MA plans have been able to reduce the intensity of beneficiaries’ resource use 
without necessarily harming the quality of care, albeit with the caveat that the government’s 
subsidies to MA plans have often been generous relative to its average expenditures under 
traditional Medicare.  Despite these potentially promising results, most studies have estimated 
the average effect of MA enrollment on beneficiary outcomes.  Few have considered whether 
some groups of beneficiaries have more to gain or lose from the expanding role of private plans 
in Medicare.  
 
This study evaluates the effect of MA enrollment on the resource use and quality of care among 
dual eligibles — i.e., the approximately 11 million Medicare beneficiaries who also receive full 
or partial benefits through state Medicaid programs — and whether this effect varies within the 
dual eligible population based on health status, level of Medicaid benefits, and regional spending 
levels (MMCO 2019b).  Dual eligibles merit special attention for several reasons.  First, they are 
a uniquely vulnerable population, possessing limited resources as a requirement of Medicaid 
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eligibility and often having the significant health needs associated with the intersection of 
poverty, old age, and/or disability (Figure 2.1).  Second, given the high needs of this population, 
they incur more than twice as much Medicare spending on average than other beneficiaries 
(Figure 2.1) and are therefore of interest from a fiscal perspective. Third, because of their unique 
characteristics — such as having poor health, low levels of health literacy and patient activation, 
and low incomes on average and receiving supplemental coverage through Medicaid — the 
effects of MA likely differ for dual eligibles relative to other Medicare beneficiaries.  Fourth, 
studying dual eligibles is tractable, given the availability of administrative enrollment data, 
whereas evaluating other vulnerable groups may not be. 
 
Finally, focusing on the effect of MA among dual eligibles is especially salient given that policy 
changes over time have encouraged this population to enroll in private plans.  These changes 
include the authorization of specialized MA plans that exclusively enroll dual eligibles and the 
creation of a large demonstration program that permits states to passively enroll dual eligibles in 
private, integrated Medicare-Medicaid plans (MedPAC 2013; MACPAC 2018a).  For these and 
other reasons, the share of dual eligibles enrolled in MA and other private plans has grown 
substantially, increasing from 6% in 2004 to 35% in 2017 (Figure 2.2).   
 
To identify the effect of MA enrollment on outcomes among dual eligibles, I rely on a regression 
discontinuity design that has been validated by prior studies (Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 2016; 
Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017). This approach exploits a discrete increase in average 
government benchmark payments to MA plans in metropolitan statistical areas that exceeded a 
population threshold of 250,000. This increase subsequently led to a discontinuous jump in MA 
enrollment rates, including among dual eligibles. I use this exogenous source of variation in 
enrollment to explore the relationship of MA with inpatient utilization patterns and the quality of 
care among dual eligibles.  
 
My primary results suggest that the generally positive findings from much of the prior literature 
extend to dual eligibles.  In particular, I find that increases in plan payments and MA enrollment 
reduced inpatient utilization — including potentially unnecessary admissions — among dual 
eligibles.  At the same time, I fail to find evidence that these changes came at the expense of care 
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quality in terms of either hospital quality ratings or patient mortality.  Despite these promising 
results, there is a much different story when focusing on counties with historically-low 
traditional Medicare spending.  In these regions, MA enrollment was associated with a smaller 
reduction — if any — in inpatient utilization, as well as a shift towards lower-quality hospitals 
and an increase in one-year mortality rates.  These results highlight the importance of identifying 
how the effects of MA enrollment may vary across subpopulations of beneficiaries.  They also 
suggest caution as policymakers debate whether to further encourage MA enrollment among dual 
eligibles.   
 
2.2. Background and literature 
2.2.1. Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage 
One of the most important choices facing Medicare beneficiaries is whether to receive their 
benefits through the traditional, government-administered version of the program (“traditional 
Medicare”) or through one of the private, subsidized plans offered in Medicare Advantage (MA).  
Traditional Medicare has been available since the program’s implementation in 1966 and 
initially resembled a single-payer system for the elderly and disabled (Oberlander 2003).  Under 
traditional Medicare, the government sets provider reimbursement rates and establishes relatively 
uniform benefits, premiums, and cost-sharing requirements. Enrollees can receive care from 
most providers in the United States, and they face few constraints in how they make use of the 
program’s benefits (Berenson and Harris 2002; Bagley 2013; Neuman and Jacobson 2018).   
 
MA has been available since 1985 and represents a managed competition system (Zarabozo 
2000; Frank and McGuire 2017).  Under this arrangement, private plans compete for enrollment 
within a tightly-regulated marketplace and receive risk-adjusted, capitated payments from the 
government to provide Medicare’s benefits (Lipschutz et al. 2015; MedPAC 2018b).  If 
benchmark payment rates are insufficient to cover a plan’s premium, enrollees must cover the 
difference (MedPAC 2018b).  Within the contours of MA regulations, plans still have 
considerable flexibility when determining their benefit structure and defining other aspects of 
their care management approach.  Unlike traditional Medicare, nearly all MA plans rely on 
managed care techniques to shape and integrate care delivery (Jacobson, Damico, and Neuman 
2018).  For example, plans may limit full coverage to a specific network of providers, require 
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beneficiaries to obtain referrals from their primary care provider before receiving specialist 
services, necessitate prior authorization before using expensive tests and procedures, and/or offer 
case management programs to coordinate care for high-need patients. 
 
While most beneficiaries receive their primary coverage through traditional Medicare or an MA 
plan, they can also choose to enroll in supplemental plans that assist with each program’s cost-
sharing requirements and/or provide additional benefits.  A large majority of beneficiaries (73% 
in 2017) receive prescription drug coverage through Medicare Part D (CMS 2018b).  
Beneficiaries may also receive supplemental coverage through private Medigap policies, retiree 
health plans, and state Medicaid programs.   
 
2.2.2. Dual eligibles 
In 2018, there were about 11 million dual eligibles, i.e., Medicare beneficiaries with limited 
resources who also receive Medicaid coverage (MMCO 2019b).  For this population, Medicare 
is the primary payer while Medicaid provides additional benefits, covers some or all of 
Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements, and/or pays the program’s premiums on behalf of dual 
eligibles (Jacobson, Neuman, and Damico 2012).  Although Medicare beneficiaries can qualify 
for Medicaid through several different pathways, this study groups dual eligibles into three 
categories: (1) full dual eligibles, (2) Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) partial dual 
eligibles, and (3) non-QMB partial dual eligibles.  These three categories roughly correspond to 
the restrictiveness of Medicaid’s eligibility criteria and the generosity of its benefits (Table 2.1).   
 
Full dual eligibles (about 71% of dual eligibles in 2015) typically have the fewest resources and 
are unique in that they qualify for the complete set of benefits offered under their state’s 
Medicaid program (CMS 2011; Young et al. 2013).  This includes coverage for some services 
that are not part of Medicare’s benefit package, such as long-term care services and supports and 
— depending on the state — dental, vision, and/or hearing services (MACPAC 2018).  
Additionally, states pay all of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and premiums on behalf of 
the majority of full dual eligibles (though provide less complete coverage for others) (MACPAC 




Partial dual eligibles, by contrast, do not qualify for full Medicaid benefits in their state, but 
instead receive assistance exclusively through one of four Medicare Savings Programs (MSPs), 
which are also administered by state Medicaid programs (Jacobson, Neuman, and Damico 2012).  
The QMB program is the most generous MSP.  QMB partial dual eligibles (about 14% of dual 
eligibles in 2015) receive coverage for Medicare’s cost-sharing and premium requirements 
(MACPAC 2018b).  Non-QMB partial dual eligibles (about 15% of dual eligibles 2015) meet 
less restrictive eligibility criteria and typically only receive coverage for the Medicare Part B 
premium (MACPAC 2018b).  Finally, nearly all dual eligibles (over 99% in 2015) are enrolled 
in a Medicare Part D prescription drug plan and receive assistance with their plans’ premiums 
and cost sharing through the Low Income Subsidy (LIS) program.   
 
2.2.3. The effect of MA on utilization and quality of care 
Theory 
General comparisons of traditional Medicare and MA mirror debates about the relative efficiency 
of single-payer and managed competition systems (Einav and Levin 2015).  On the one hand, 
traditional Medicare has relatively few administrative costs and is able to set low provider 
reimbursement rates while still affording beneficiaries access to the majority of providers (i.e., 
by leveraging its substantial market power) (Einav and Levin 2015; Gruber 2017).  Expanding 
the role of private plans in Medicare could also lead to inefficiencies — e.g., as a result of choice 
complexity, adverse selection, insurer market power, and to the extent that plans overly stint on 
care — that might offset any potential gains in part or in whole (Newhouse and McGuire 2014; 
Einav and Levin 2015; Gruber 2017).  On the other hand, managed competition models, such as 
MA, can mitigate these inefficiencies through regulation (e.g., by simplifying plan choices for 
ease of comparison and by adjusting capitation rates based on enrollee health to reduce risk 
selection) (Enthoven 1993).  Further, capitated payments and competitive pressures in MA may 
force plans to deliver care more efficiently than traditional Medicare (Gruber 2017; Henke et al. 
2018).  Perhaps most importantly, nearly all MA plans employ managed care techniques, which 
can improve efficiency by reducing moral hazard (e.g., through utilization review or risk sharing 
with providers), informing patients about their care options (e.g., by distributing provider quality 
information), and integrating care (e.g., through case or disease management programs) (Glied 
2000; Landon et al. 2012; Ayanian et al. 2013; Gruber 2017).  Finally, MA may improve the 
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match between coverage features and beneficiary preferences by offering several different plan 
options (Newhouse and McGuire 2014; Gruber 2017).   
 
An important feature of the Medicare program is that beneficiaries can choose between these two 
models of public health insurance.  The fact that many beneficiaries opt into MA may be 
evidence in itself that the program improves the welfare of its enrollees to the extent that 
beneficiaries are making fully-informed, rational decisions (Balsa, Cao, and McGuire 2007).  
However, beneficiaries may make mistakes when choosing between traditional Medicare and 
MA given the complexity of this decision.  For example, setting aside decisions about 
supplemental coverage, beneficiaries had the option of enrolling in traditional Medicare or one of 
21 MA plan options on average in 2018 (Jacobson, Damico, and Neuman 2018).  Plan options 
vary along several dimensions — such as cost-sharing requirements, supplemental benefits, 
premiums, provider networks, care management, and quality — some of which are not always 
immediately transparent.  Not surprisingly, research suggests that many MA enrollees may not 
be making optimal enrollment decisions (Sinaiko, Afendulis, and Frank 2013; Afendulis, 
Sinaiko, and Frank 2015; Abaluck and Gruber 2016; Jacobs and Molloy 2017).   
  
Even if MA enrollment did produce welfare gains, it is unclear whether this would lead to 
reductions in utilization, improvements in care quality, or both.  For example, some insurers may 
be able to offer premium rebates and/or relatively low cost sharing by establishing networks of 
cheaper — and potentially lower-quality — providers. Beneficiaries who especially value the 
financial aspects of coverage might prefer such a plan to traditional Medicare (Newhouse and 
McGuire 2014). Hence, enrolling in MA would increase their welfare, even though the quality of 
care they receive may be worse. 
 
Previous literature 
Despite this theoretical ambiguity, prior research has generally suggested that MA plans have 
been able to reduce the intensity of beneficiaries’ resource use, without necessarily harming the 
quality of their care.  In particular, studies have found that MA enrollment is associated with 
greater use of preventive care (Landon et al. 2004; Keenan et al. 2009; Ayanian et al. 2013; 
Timbie et al. 2017), less inpatient utilization (Mello, Stearns, and Norton 2002; Baicker, 
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Chernew, and Robbins 2013; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017; Feyman and Frakt 2017; 
Duggan, Gruber, and Vabson 2018), and less post-acute care following a hospitalization 
(Huckfeldt et al. 2017).  Studies evaluating quality of care have either produced mixed results or 
favored MA.  For example, researchers have reported conflicting results when evaluating patient-
reported measures of quality (Keenan et al. 2009; Elliott et al. 2011; Ayanian et al. 2013; Timbie 
et al. 2017), hospital readmissions (Friedman et al. 2012; Lemieux et al. 2012; Afendulis, 
Chernew, and Kessler 2017; Duggan, Gruber, and Vabson 2018), and the quality of hospitals 
where beneficiaries received their care (Erickson 2000; Friedman and Jiang 2010; Duggan, 
Gruber, and Vabson 2018).  Nonetheless, studies have found that MA is associated with better 
performance on clinical quality measures (Ayanian et al. 2013; Timbie et al. 2017) and fewer 
preventable hospitalizations (Basu and Mobley 2007; Nicholas 2013; Duggan, Gruber, and 
Vabson 2018).  Finally, researchers have found that the effect of MA on mortality is either not 
statistically significant or negative (Bian, Dow, and Matchar 2006; Afendulis, Chernew, and 
Kessler 2017; Duggan, Gruber, and Vabson 2018).  Many studies have attempted to address 
selection by controlling for beneficiary characteristics, but others have obtained similar results 
when employing more rigorous approaches that rely on natural experiments to identify 
exogenous sources of variation in MA enrollment (Mello, Stearns, and Norton 2002; Baicker, 
Chernew, and Robbins 2013; Baicker and Robbins 2015; Feyman and Frakt 2017; Afendulis, 
Chernew, and Kessler 2017; Duggan, Gruber, and Vabson 2018).   
 
One strand of the literature has considered the possibility that increases in MA enrollment rates 
have spillover effects, i.e., that they affect traditional Medicare beneficiaries in the same health 
care market.  For example, as MA enrollment expands, plans could begin to fundamentally 
change the way that local physicians practice medicine by promoting clinical guidelines or 
providing capitated and/or value-based reimbursements (Baker 2011).  This could have a 
spillover effect on traditional Medicare beneficiaries to the extent that they receive care from 
some of the same providers (Baker 2011).  Indeed, prior studies suggest that the spillover effects 
of MA on traditional Medicare beneficiaries parallel the direct effects on MA enrollees in terms 
of increasing outpatient care and decreasing inpatient care without having a statistically 
significant effect on mortality (Baker 1999; Chernew, DeCicca, and Town 2008; Baicker, 




2.2.4. The effect of MA on the utilization and quality of care of dual eligibles 
While the results above inform general expectations about the relationship of MA enrollment 
with resource use and quality of care, the premise of this study is that the effects may differ for 
dual eligibles relative to other populations. In particular, dual eligibility is associated with 
several unique characteristics, each of which may mediate the effects of MA on beneficiary 
outcomes. 
 
Mediating factor: Health needs 
Dual eligibles have much more significant and complex health needs on average than other 
beneficiaries.  For example, they are more than twice as likely as other Medicare beneficiaries to 
report being in fair or poor health (50% versus 20%) (Figure 2.1).  They are also much more 
likely to describe having three or more chronic conditions (18% versus 10%) and one or more 
limitations in activities of daily living (54% versus 31%) (Figure 2.1).   
 
Beneficiaries with significant health needs could disproportionately benefit from the coordinated 
care initiatives and disease management programs offered through managed care plans (Keenan 
et al. 2009; Glazer and McGuire 2013; Newhouse and McGuire 2014).  Alternatively, managed 
care restrictions could create unique barriers for the sick, such as by making it more difficult to 
see specialists or access expensive tests and procedures (Sutton and DeJong 1998; Keenan et al. 
2009; Elliott et al. 2011).  It seems unlikely, however, that these constraints will have a 
significant effect in the long run, given that dual eligibles have multiple opportunities during the 
course of a year to leave MA for traditional Medicare should they find their plans’ requirements 
to be overly burdensome (CMS 2018c). 
 
Mediating factor: Patient activation and health literacy 
Dual eligibles have lower levels of patient activation than other beneficiaries and are more likely 
to have traits associated with low levels of health literacy, including lower education levels, 
lower incomes, and much higher rates of cognitive impairments (Paasche-Orlow et al. 2005; 
Parker, Regan, and Petroski 2014; Serper et al. 2014; MMCO 2019a; MACPAC 2018b). Care 
management could be particularly beneficial for such populations by helping them navigate the 
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complexities of the health system (Elliott et al. 2011). At the same time, these beneficiaries may 
face unique challenges when negotiating with managed care plans to access needed care (Elliott 
et al. 2011).  Once again, this drawback of managed care may not be a significant factor, given 
that dual eligibles who have difficulty engaging with their MA plan can easily switch to 
traditional Medicare.   
 
Mediating factor: Supplemental coverage 
Although states and the federal government separately administer Medicaid and Medicare, MA 
can serve as a mechanism for integrating these programs’ benefits.  For example, states have the 
option of contracting with dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNPs) or, under a large 
demonstration program, Medicare-Medicaid Plans (MMPs) to provide fully-integrated Medicare 
and Medicaid benefits (Bella and Palmer-Barnette 2010; MACPAC 2018a).  These initiatives 
could reduce the complexity and potential inefficiencies of providing coverage through two 
separate programs (Cassidy 2011; Grabowski 2012), a potential benefit of MA enrollment that is 
restricted to dual eligibles.   
 
Mediating factor: Socioeconomic status 
Finally, Medicare beneficiaries must have limited resources (gross or net of health expenses) in 
order to qualify for Medicaid.  Presuming that the demand for health care and care quality 
decreases with income, lower-income beneficiaries in MA may tend to enroll in cheaper — and 
potentially lower-quality — plans than wealthier beneficiaries, all else equal.  Additionally, they 
could be more willing to enter MA even when the marginal benefits to health relative to 
traditional Medicare are small, given that the program often includes options that are cheaper 
than traditional Medicare (i.e., that offer more generous coverage at no additional premium) 
(Glazer and McGuire 2009, 2013; Newhouse and McGuire 2014).  Altogether, one might expect 
to observe that the effect of MA relative to traditional Medicare is less beneficial among 
beneficiaries with limited means.   
 
Medicaid complicates this story to some degree.  For example, Medicaid coverage of cost-
sharing requirements and supplemental benefits reduces or eliminates the financial incentive of 
full dual eligibles to enroll in MA (Newhouse and McGuire 2014).  Indeed, while non-QMB 
54 
 
partial dual eligibles are much more likely to enroll in MA than non-dual eligibles, full dual 
eligibles are less likely to enroll than either group (Appendix Figure 1.1).  Nonetheless, full 
Medicaid benefits may further reduce the incentive of MA enrollees to join high-cost plans to the 
extent that plan premiums include the cost of a redundant set of benefits.  As expected, both plan 
premiums and quality ratings are strictly decreasing with income (Appendix Figure 1.1).   
 
Prior literature 
Previous studies have assessed the relationship of enrollment in specific types of Medicare 
managed care plans with utilization and quality of care outcomes among dual eligibles.  One 
group of studies has evaluated a long-standing waiver program in Minnesota which has given 
dual eligibles the option of receiving their Medicare and Medicaid benefits through a single, 
integrated managed care plan (Kane and Homyak 2004).  Altogether, these studies have found 
that plan enrollment is associated with less inpatient care and fewer potentially-preventable 
hospitalizations and ER visits, but did not find a statistically significant effect on mortality (Kane 
et al. 2004, 2005; Zhang et al. 2008; Anderson, Feng, and Long 2016).  Other studies have 
evaluated Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) organizations, which provide 
integrated benefits to a mostly dual-eligible population and are intended to help beneficiaries 
who are eligible for nursing home care remain in the community (MedPAC 2012).  Research has 
found that enrollment in PACE is associated with less inpatient care, a lower likelihood of 
having a long-term nursing home stay, and lower mortality rates, though it also suggests that the 
program has incurred more government spending (Ghosh, Orfield, and Schmitz 2014; Ghosh, 
Schmitz, and Brown 2015).  A small number of studies have focused on D-SNPs.  Two industry-
sponsored reports found that enrollment in specific D-SNPs was associated with less inpatient 
utilization, fewer potentially-preventable hospitalizations, and/or lower readmission rates 
(Murugan, Drozd, and Dietz 2012; Purva and Munevar 2012), and one peer-reviewed article 
found that increases in D-SNP enrollment across the country corresponded to lower Medicare 
spending (Zhang and Diana 2017).  Most recently, a series of government-sponsored studies have 
evaluated MMPs.  This research has found mixed results for both utilization and quality of care 




While the research on dual eligibles is generally consistent with the broader literature on MA 
(see Section 2.2.3), this research has two significant limitations.  First, each of these studies 
focuses on a specific type of managed care plan and nearly all of them consider potentially high-
performing plans that integrate Medicare and Medicaid benefits.  It is unclear whether lessons 
gleaned from these particular plans will extend to the broader MA program.  Second, while many 
of these studies employ strong research designs, most do not rely on advanced methods of causal 
inference to identify the effect of enrollment on beneficiary outcomes.  By contrast, this paper 
uses a rigorous econometric method to estimate the broader effect of MA enrollment on 
outcomes among dual eligibles. 
 
2.2.5. Heterogeneous treatment effects across subpopulations of dual eligibles 
The premise of this study is that the effects of MA may differ among dual eligibles relative to 
other Medicare beneficiaries, given the unique characteristics of this population.  However, dual 
eligibles themselves represent a diverse group of beneficiaries (Brown and Mann 2012).  For 
instance, about two-fifths of dual eligibles (44%) report that they have no difficulty performing 
activities of daily living while about one-fifth (21%) reside in an institution (MACPAC 2018).  
Hence, it is also plausible that the effects of MA enrollment may vary across subpopulations of 
dual eligibles.  This study considers whether there is heterogeneity based on level of Medicaid 
benefits, health needs, and regional spending levels. 
 
By level of dual eligibility 
Comparisons of full and partial dual eligibles mirror those of dual eligibles with other 
beneficiaries (see Section 2.2.4).  For example, full dual eligibles have more significant health 
needs than partial dual eligibles on average (Appendix Figure 2.2) and may therefore benefit 
more from the care coordination and management offered through most MA plans.  Full dual 
eligibles are also more likely to benefit from efforts in MA to integrate Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits.  This is both because full dual eligibles typically have the most comprehensive 
Medicaid coverage — including long-term care services and supports — and because some 
integrated plans restrict enrollment to this population (i.e., all plans in the financial alignment 
demonstration and a subset of D-SNPs) (CMS 2014; MedPAC 2016a).  While these factors 
suggest that the effect of MA may be more beneficial among full relative to partial dual eligibles, 
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the reverse could also be true, given that full dual eligibles typically have fewer resources and 
may therefore be more likely to enroll in cheaper and potentially lower-quality MA plans 
(Section 2.4.4).     
 
By health needs 
Dual eligibles with more significant health needs may have more to gain from MA than healthier 
dual eligibles (see Section 2.4.1).  Because of data limitations, I consider a rough proxy for 
health by comparing dual eligibles between the ages of 55 and 64 who qualified for Medicare on 
the basis of a disability with dual eligibles between 65 and 74 who qualified on the basis of age.  
Utilization and reported health needs tend to be greater among the younger, disabled population.  
For example, they report being in worse health and having greater difficulty with activities of 
daily living on average (Appendix Figure 2.3).  Additionally, while the prevalence of many 
common chronic conditions is similar across disabled and aged dual eligibles when focusing on 
this narrow age range, rates of mental illness are much higher among the former.   
 
By regional spending levels 
Increases in MA enrollment rates may be more beneficial in regions where traditional Medicare 
spending per capita is high.  A well-known result in the health services literature is that: (1) there 
is substantial variation in traditional Medicare spending per person, even after controlling for 
several characteristics of local beneficiary populations and (2) higher spending does not clearly 
correspond to higher quality (Skinner 2011; Newhouse et al. 2012).  One explanation for this 
trend is that beneficiaries in high-spending areas receive much more care to the point where the 
marginal benefit is close to zero (Fuchs 2004).  If that were the case, then MA plans would be 
able to restrain utilization in expensive regions without necessarily harming beneficiary health.  
Another explanation is that high-spending regions produce care less efficiently — e.g., due to 
differences in provider quality or clinical practice norms — which also suggests greater potential 
gains from MA enrollment (Baicker and Chandra 2009; Bernstein, Reschovsky, and White 2011; 
Gold and Hudson 2013).  Finally, government benchmark payment rates to MA plans tend to 
increase with traditional Medicare spending per capita, and plans may pass higher payments on 




2.2.6. Expected findings 
This section has yielded four major conclusions.  First, whether or not the generally positive 
results from previous MA studies extend to dual eligibles remains an empirical question.  Dual 
eligibles could benefit more than other beneficiaries from coordinated care and care management 
in MA and might receive additional value from the program if they enroll in plans that integrate 
Medicare and Medicaid benefits.  However, it is also conceivable that they could have less 
positive experiences in MA to the extent that these beneficiaries gravitate towards less expensive 
and potentially lower-quality plans.  Second, whether or not full dual eligibles have more to gain 
from MA than partial dual eligibles also remains an empirical question for reasons similar to the 
theoretical ambiguity of comparisons between dual eligibles and other beneficiaries.  Third, 
increases in MA enrollment will have more beneficial effects among dual eligibles with 
significant health needs relative to healthier dual eligibles.  Finally, increases in MA enrollment 
rates will lead to better outcomes in regions with high relative to low traditional Medicare 
spending per capita. 
 
2.3. Empirical strategy and data 
2.3.1. Empirical strategy 
There are two key empirical challenges when attempting to identify the causal effect of MA 
enrollment on beneficiary outcomes.  One major challenge is the likelihood that the expansion of 
MA in a given health care market not only has a direct effect on plan enrollees, but also has an 
indirect spillover effect on traditional Medicare beneficiaries in the same region (Section 2.2.3).  
Given that increases in MA enrollment may affect both populations, it would not be appropriate 
to simply compare individual-level outcomes across the two groups.  Instead, I evaluate the 
relationship between the share of beneficiaries enrolled in MA at the county level and average 
outcomes among the entire dual eligible population in that region.  By looking at outcomes 
across all dual eligibles in a given county, this approach captures both the direct effect of MA 
enrollment rates on plan enrollees as well as the county-level spillover effect on traditional 
Medicare beneficiaries.  Because spillover effects relate to MA enrollment rates among all 
Medicare beneficiaries in a region rather than among dual eligibles alone, I rely on the former as 
my primary explanatory variable.  Nonetheless, there is a strong correlation between these two 




The second major challenge for this study is to address selective enrollment, i.e., the likelihood 
that beneficiaries in traditional Medicare and MA differ in predetermined ways that could also 
affect their outcomes.  For example, several studies suggest that healthier beneficiaries may be 
more likely to enroll in MA than sicker beneficiaries (perhaps because they are less averse to 
managed care restrictions or because insurers design plans to attract this generally less-expensive 
population) (Mello et al. 2003; Newhouse et al. 2015; Jacobs and Kronick 2018).  This trend 
would bias estimates in favor of MA.  For instance, if MA enrollment were negatively associated 
with hospitalizations, it would be difficult to parse out whether this was because MA plans were 
able to constrain inpatient utilization or because MA enrollees tend to be healthier and therefore 
need less care than traditional Medicare beneficiaries.  Controlling for all relevant beneficiary 
characteristics is almost certainly impossible due to data limitations (e.g., the limited availability 
of accurate income data and the inherent difficulty in collecting relevant measures, such as 
beneficiaries’ aversion to risk and preferences for expensive services).  Further, controlling for 
beneficiary health would introduce its own complications, given that beneficiary health is also an 
outcome of interest.   
 
My empirical strategy relies on arbitrary differences in benchmark payment rates to MA plans 
across regions to identify exogenous variation in enrollment.  Historically, the government 
determined payments to plans based on (1) average traditional Medicare spending at the county 
level and (2) an adjustment based on beneficiary characteristics (Pope et al. 2006).  In 1998, the 
government introduced a payment floor (the “rural floor”) to encourage plans to enter counties 
where they previously would have received low payment rates (Gold et al. 2004; Pope et al. 
2006).  This was followed by the introduction of a second, higher payment floor for urban 
counties (the “urban floor”) in March 2001 in an effort to stem the flow of plan exits from 
populous regions of the country (GPO 2000; Gold et al. 2004; McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 
2011).  This urban floor specifically applied to counties in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
with populations of 250,000 or more (Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  As a result of the 





This discontinuous increase in plan payments at the 250,000 population threshold persisted 
during my sample period (2009-2015).  By that time, the government had initiated a bidding 
process to determine plan reimbursements (McGuire, Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011).  Under this 
approach, plans submit bids to provide Medicare coverage for a standard beneficiary and the 
government compares these bids with county-level benchmark payment rates (MedPAC 2016b).  
If bids are above the benchmark rate, then plans receive the benchmark as their base rate (i.e., 
prior to risk-adjustment) and enrollees cover the difference through a plan premium (MedPAC 
2016b).  If bids are below the benchmark, then plans receive their bid as the base rate plus a 
portion of the difference between their bid and the benchmark — which they must use to reduce 
cost-sharing requirements, offer a premium rebate, or provide supplemental benefits — while the 
government retains the remainder (Frank and McGuire 2017).  Importantly, benchmark payment 
rates were, in many cases, based on minimum updates over historical payment rates.  Hence, the 
urban floor discontinuity continued to play an important role in benchmarks in later years (Figure 
2.3).  Beginning in 2012, changes under the Affordable Care Act began to phase out the link 
between benchmark payments and the urban floor, but this was not complete until 2017, after the 
end of my sample period (MedPAC 2016b). 
  
Increases in average benchmark payment rates at the population threshold led to a jump in MA 
enrollment rates, both among the overall Medicare population and among different groups of 
dual eligibles (Figure 2.4).  There are multiple reasons why higher plan payments may be 
associated with greater MA enrollment.  Depending on the extent to which MA markets are 
competitive, plans may pass on some or all of a payment increase from the government to 
beneficiaries by reducing premiums (or increasing premium rebates), offering more generous 
benefits (e.g., by lowering deductibles or by covering new, optional services), or investing in 
plan quality.  Research suggests that there may indeed be a moderate amount of pass-through in 
the form of reduced premiums and/or improved benefit generosity, but studies have not found an 
effect of payment rates on plan quality (Song, Landrum, and Chernew 2012; Stockley et al. 
2014; Layton and Ryan 2015; Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 2016; Geruso, Cabral, and Mahoney 
2018).  Increases in payment rates may also lead to greater MA enrollment by inducing new 
plans to enter the market or by encouraging plans to more aggressively market to beneficiaries.  




I generally assume that the urban floor is only associated with beneficiary outcomes through its 
effect on MA enrollment.  In reality, the urban floor could also have a direct effect on the 
outcomes of existing plan enrollees by, for example, leading plans to offer more generous 
benefits.  In the terminology of instrumental variable analyses, this would violate the exclusion 
restriction.   In Section 2.4.9, I consider whether this is likely to be the case and explore a 
method for isolating the effect of the urban floor on MA enrollment.  In the meantime, it is 
important to note that a violation of this assumption would require reinterpreting estimates as the 
aggregate effect of MA payment increases on beneficiary outcomes, both in terms of leading to 
better plan options and nudging beneficiaries into the MA program (Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 
2016; Baicker and Robbins 2015; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  This framing is still 
salient, given that policymakers have made dramatic changes to payment rates over time and 
have used them as a tool for increasing MA enrollment (Zarabozo and Harrison 2009; McGuire, 
Newhouse, and Sinaiko 2011).  My study is one of several that have used exogenous changes in 
plan payments to identify the effects of MA enrollment on beneficiary outcomes (Chernew, 
DeCicca, and Town 2008; Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins 2013; Baicker and Robbins 2015; 
Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017; Feyman and Frakt 2017). 
 
Moving forward with this assumption, I rely on a regression discontinuity (RD) design that uses 
the discrete jump in MA enrollment at the urban floor threshold to identify the causal effect of 
MA on beneficiary outcomes.  In RD parlance, my running variable is the MSA population 
where a county is located and the cutoff is at a population of 250,000.  Presuming that dual 
eligibles do not choose where to live in order to take advantage of the urban floor, the discrete 
increase in the probability of enrollment at the threshold is “as good as random” (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010).  One previous study successfully used this RD design to examine the effect of 
MA on a similar set of outcomes among the overall Medicare population (Afendulis, Chernew, 
and Kessler 2017).  
 
I begin by testing the internal validity of this RD design.  First, I consider the key assumption of 
this approach: that individuals do not precisely manipulate the running variable (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010).  In theory, this assumption could be violated if, for example, dual eligibles 
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moved to urban floor counties in order to take advantage of more generous plan offerings in 
those regions.  In practice, this is unlikely to be the case, given the magnitude of decisions about 
where to live and the difficulty comparing plan options in general, let alone across counties.   
Nonetheless, I formally assess whether dual eligibles gravitated towards or away from urban 
floor counties by evaluating whether there was a discrete change in the population density at the 
RD threshold (i.e., a “manipulation test”) (McCrary 2008).  Second, I test whether individuals 
just above and below the cutoff are similar to each other outside of differences attributable to the 
discrete policy change (i.e., a “balance test” near the threshold).  One would expect this to be the 
case if changes in enrollment at the threshold were indeed as good as random (Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
 
After exploring the validity of my RD design, I evaluate the direct effect of the urban floor on 
plan payment rates, the share of Medicare beneficiaries in MA, the share of dual eligibles in MA, 
and various utilization and quality of care measures.  To do so, I estimate the following RD 
model, where the indices represent county (𝑐) and year (𝑡), 𝑌𝑐𝑡 represents county-level outcomes, 
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 represents the population of a county’s MSA in 2000, 𝐼(𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 ≥ 250,000) is a 
dummy for being an urban floor county, 𝑋𝑐𝑡 represents county-level control variables, and 𝑠(𝑐) 
and 𝜏𝑡 represent state and year fixed effects respectively.   
 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐼(𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 ≥ 250,000)𝛽 +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐𝜓+𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐
2 + 𝑋𝑐𝑡𝜙 + 𝑠(𝑐) + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 (1) 
 
The RD estimator 𝛽 identifies the discrete change in outcomes at the population threshold, which 
is interpreted as the effect of the urban floor payment policy.  This approach is akin to a fuzzy 
RD model, given that the urban floor may have increased the share of beneficiaries in MA in a 
given county but was not deterministic of enrollment.   
 
I focus on counties within the 100,000 to 400,000 MSA population bandwidth.  A sizable 
minority of dual eligibles (15%) lived in these counties in 2009.  Among this group, the 
distribution was slightly skewed towards the lower end of the population range (Figure 2.5).  
Nonetheless, a large share (20%) resided in MSAs that were very close to the urban floor 
threshold (within 50,000), which facilitates the estimation of discontinuities.  I weight county-
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year observations based on the corresponding dual eligible population and estimate 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county level.  As is standard practice 
when implementing an RD design, I confirm that my findings are robust to different model 
specifications and population bandwidths.  I anticipate that the urban floor will be associated 
with an increase in plan payments, MA enrollment rates among all beneficiaries, and MA 
enrollment rates among dual eligibles.  However, the effect on beneficiary outcomes is 
theoretically ambiguous (Section 1.2.6).   
 
After identifying the effect of the urban floor on MA enrollment and on beneficiary outcomes, I 
combine these results in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework, as is common practice for 
fuzzy RD designs. In particular, I use the urban floor discontinuity to instrument for MA 
enrollment rates among all beneficiaries in a given county and year.  In other words, the first-
stage equation (2) is equivalent to the RD equation (1) where the outcome is the county-level 
MA enrollment rate.  𝑀𝐴𝑐𝑡 represents MA enrollment rates, 𝑀?̂?𝑐𝑡 represents predicted values 
from equation (2), and all other variables have the same interpretation as in equation (1): 
 
𝑀𝐴𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐼(𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 ≥ 250,000)𝛽 +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐𝜓 +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐
2 +𝑋𝑐𝑡𝜙 + 𝑠(𝑐) + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 (2) 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝛿 +𝑀?̂?𝑐𝑡𝛾 +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐
2𝜉 + 𝑋𝑐𝑡𝜇 + 𝑠(𝑐) + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜈𝑐𝑡 (3) 
 
It is important to note that the standard interpretation of the 2SLS estimator (𝛾) — i.e., as the 
effect of treatment (MA enrollment) on compliers (dual eligibles who enroll in MA as a result of 
the urban floor) — may not apply here.  This is because of the likelihood that MA enrollment has 
spillover effects on other beneficiaries (Section 2.2.3) (Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  
Instead, I scale 𝛾 to identify how MA enrollment increases associated with the urban floor 
affected outcomes among all dual eligibles in the relevant counties.  Because I find that the urban 
floor led to an approximately 9 percentage point increase in MA enrollment rates (Section 2.4.4), 
I multiply 𝛾 by 0.09.  The results are approximately equal to the RD estimates from equation (1) 
by construction.  However, they are useful for identifying whether the effect of MA enrollment 




I estimate linear models, despite the fact that many of my outcomes are county-level shares and 
are therefore constrained to values from 0 to 1.  Many researchers rely on two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) models when considering inherently nonlinear relationships (Chapman and 
Brooks 2016).  However, two recent studies provide evidence that 2SLS produces consistent 
estimates of local average treatment effects in the presence of “essential heterogeneity” — i.e., 
when there are heterogeneous treatment effects and the magnitude affects individual enrollment 
decisions, as is likely the case here — while 2SRI does not (Chapman and Brooks 2016; Basu, 
Coe, and Chapman 2018).  First-stage and reduced form results are very similar under linear and 
nonlinear models (Appendix Table 2.1, Columns 2 and 6), which further supports the use of 
2SLS.   
 
My final analysis considers whether the effect the urban floor varies within the dual eligible 
population.  To do so, I estimate the following, which is an RD model that allows the effect of 
the urban floor to differ across groups of beneficiaries.  This includes the same set of variables 
from equation (1), a dummy variable 𝐺𝑐𝑡 representing the group (i.e., based on health status, 
level of Medicaid benefits, or regional spending levels), and interactions between each variable 
and this dummy: 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼(𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 ≥ 250,000)(𝛽0 + 𝐺𝑐𝑡𝛽1) +𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑐 × (𝜓0 + 𝐺𝑐𝑡𝜓1) + ⋯+ 𝑐𝑡 (4) 
 
In this case, estimates of 𝛽1 indicate whether the effect of the urban floor varies by group.  This 
could occur because of differences in the effect of the urban floor on MA enrollment by group as 
well as differences in the relationship between enrollment and outcomes.  Because I am 
primarily interested in the latter, I carefully note where the former is the case and incorporate it 
into my interpretation.   
 
2.3.2. Data  
This study requires information at the county level about: (1) traditional Medicare and MA 
enrollment for each relevant beneficiary group (e.g., among all beneficiaries and among dual 
eligibles), (2) utilization and quality of care patterns by enrollment group, (3) MSA population 
and MA payment rates (to identify the urban floor and its effect on payment rates), and (4) 
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relevant geographic and socioeconomic characteristics (to test the validity of the RD design and 
to include as controls).  Additionally, data on enrollment and outcomes need to capture a large 
number of dual eligibles to ensure an adequate level of statistical power.  I make use of several 
datasets to meet these requirements.  I describe each file and measure below and provide 
additional details in the Appendix. 
 
Enrollment data 
One of my two primary resources is the 2009-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File 
(MBSF), an administrative dataset that includes detailed enrollment and basic demographic 
information for the universe of beneficiaries (CMS 2018a).  I rely on this file to identify whether 
an individual was in traditional Medicare or MA and whether they were dually-enrolled in 
Medicaid in a particular month.  I then roll this information up to the county-year level to obtain 
my key explanatory variable: the share of months a given beneficiary group spent in MA.  A 
small share of beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care plans that are offered outside of the 
MA program (e.g., PACE plans, cost plans, and MMPs).  These options are closer in spirit to 
MA than traditional Medicare, so I include their enrollees under the former.  For subgroup 
comparisons, I rely on the MBSF to sort dual eligibles on the basis of health status, level of dual 
eligibility, and county-level traditional Medicare spending per capita.  To obtain traditional 
Medicare spending, I merge the MBSF with CMS Fee-For-Service (FFS) Data.   
 
Outcomes data 
My other primary resource is the 2009-2015 Medicare Provider and Analysis Review (MedPAR) 
file.  MedPAR summarizes claims data for every traditional Medicare hospital discharge (NCHS 
2012; ResDAC 2016).  Beginning in early 2008, the government required hospitals receiving 
disproportionate share (DSH) payments or indirect or direct medical education adjustments to 
also report information for MA enrollees (ResDAC 2011; Huckfeldt et al. 2017).  I restrict my 
analysis to only include this subset of hospitals (see Appendix A.1 for details).  My sample 
includes the large majority of Medicare discharges from acute care hospitals (about 91% from 
2009-2015 based on CMS Cost Report data).  Because DSH hospitals treat a disproportionate 
share of low-income patients by definition, these data may be even more complete for the dual 
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eligible population (CMS 2017b).   Appendix A.1 provides additional information about 
MedPAR data and its usefulness relative to other large datasets. 
 
I first use MedPAR to create variables related to the intensity of inpatient utilization.  My 
primary outcomes are the share of beneficiaries with a hospital admission, the average number of 
inpatient days among those with an admission (which I refer to as “length of stay”), and the 
average number of inpatient days among all beneficiaries.  To gain a more nuanced 
understanding of differences in inpatient use, I also evaluate the share of beneficiaries with an 
emergency inpatient admission and a non-emergency admission.  Emergency admissions are 
defined as those where the patient “required immediate medical intervention as a result of severe, 
life threatening, or potentially disabling conditions” (ResDAC 2018).   
 
I next use MedPAR data to create several inpatient-based measures of care quality and MBSF 
data to identify one-year mortality rates.  First, I consider the share of beneficiaries with a 
potentially-preventable hospitalization (also known as hospitalizations for “ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions”).  Potentially-preventable hospitalizations reflect admissions that could 
possibly have been avoided with proper primary care (e.g., hospitalizations for pneumonia) and 
are therefore viewed as an indicator of poor outpatient care quality (Gao et al. 2014; Fingar et al. 
2015).  Second, I look at 30-day readmission rates, which have become a common measure of 
inpatient care quality (e.g., as they may reflect whether patients’ conditions were resolved or 
whether they received proper discharge instructions) (Benbassat and Taragin 2000).  Third, I 
evaluate the quality of hospitals where beneficiaries receive their care.  In particular, I rely on 
CMS Hospital Compare data to generate pooled measures of hospital cost and quality across 
three dimensions: 30-day mortality rates, 30-day readmission rates, and patient experience.  One 
recent study provided causal evidence that beneficiaries who were admitted to hospitals with 
high Hospital Compare ratings had better outcomes than those admitted to hospitals with low 
ratings (Doyle, Graves, and Gruber 2017).  Finally, I rely on the MBSF to identify one-year 






RD variables  
I use public Census data to group counties into MSAs and to identify MSA population, i.e., the 
basis of the urban floor threshold.  I base these definitions on data from 1999 through 2003 to 
reflect the fact that urban floor designations during my sample period were effectively carried 
over from prior years (see Appendix A.2 for more details).  I combine these RD data with the 
2009-2015 MA Ratebook files to identify the effect of the urban floor on plan payment rates. 
 
Control variables 
I rely on three datasets to generate a wide array of control variables.  I first calculate the county-
level share of dual eligibles by age, gender, and race based on the MBSF.  I next pull several 
county-level variables from the 2009-2015 Area Health Resources File (AHRF), a government 
repository of statistics on health care markets.  This includes population; land area; median 
income; poverty rates (overall and among those 65 and older); the share of the population in 
Medicare; and physicians, specialists, general hospitals, and general hospital beds per capita.  
Finally, I use 2000 CMS FFS Data to obtain average risk scores among traditional Medicare 
beneficiaries.  I focus on risk score data from the year prior to the implementation of the urban 
floor because of the possibility that this policy may have affected outcomes, in part, through its 
effect on the health of traditional Medicare beneficiaries.  Risk score data are not publicly 
available for MA enrollees in this year.   
 
Sample restrictions 
In addition to focusing on dual eligibles, I impose a few sample restrictions to account for policy 
context and missing data.  First, I restrain the sample to include beneficiaries who were enrolled 
in both Medicare Parts A and B, which is a requirement for joining MA.  Second, I drop all 
territories given the unique way in which Medicare operates in those regions.  Third, I exclude 
dual eligibles from the state of Maryland, where MedPAR data are incomplete due to the state’s 
all-payer hospital payment system.  Fourth, I omit full dual eligibles who were not enrolled in an 
MSP.  These beneficiaries typically qualify for Medicaid through medically needy programs or 
other eligibility pathways with less restrictive income criteria than MSPs (CMS 2011).  Finally, I 





I impose two additional sample restrictions that focus the analysis on regions and beneficiaries 
that were most likely to be affected by the urban floor.  I first drop the top decile of counties in 
terms of historical payment rates (i.e., that exceeded $475 per month in 2000).  These counties 
were much more likely than others to have payment rates that exceeded the urban floor during 
my sample period (Appendix Figure 2.4).  I also exclude dual eligibles who had been enrolled in 
Medicare for at least five years when the urban floor was first introduced.  The urban floor had a 
much smaller effect on this population, which aligns with evidence of substantial inertia in 
Medicare enrollment (Sinaiko, Afendulis, and Frank 2013; Jacobs and Molloy 2017).   
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
There are several ways in which the group of dual eligibles who are in sample differ from those 
who are not (Tables 2.2 and 2.3, Columns 1 and 2).  First, the sample includes a relatively young 
group of dual eligibles, largely reflecting the sample restriction that excludes beneficiaries who 
first enrolled in Medicare at least five years before the urban floor payment took effect.  Second, 
a smaller proportion of the dual eligibles in sample are racial or ethnic minorities.  Third, dual 
eligibles in sample reside in smaller MSAs on average and are more likely to live in the south or 
Midwest.  Fourth, MA enrollment rates are lower among the dual eligibles in sample, which may 
relate to the fact that a large proportion of this population lives in regions below the urban floor 
payment threshold.  Fifth, the dual eligibles in sample reside in counties that, on average, have 
lower median incomes and fewer physicians and specialists per capita.  Finally, the beneficiaries 
in sample ultimately use slightly less inpatient care and have lower mortality rates than other 
dual eligibles.  In Section 2.4.10, I discuss the implications of focusing on a subset of dual 
eligibles with these distinct characteristics.   
 
2.4.2. Internal validity 
Manipulation and balance tests generally support the internal validity of my research design.  For 
one, I do not find a discrete change in the population density at the RD threshold.  This may 
come as a surprise, given that the share of dual eligibles residing in MSAs just above the 
threshold is much larger than the share residing in MSAs just below the threshold (Figure 2.5). 
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However, the difference largely reflects my choice of sample inclusion criteria rather than 
beneficiary behavior.  Specifically, I exclude most dual eligibles in counties that received the 
urban floor designation but fell below the population threshold (Appendix A.2).  Because these 
beneficiaries typically lived in areas just under the threshold, excluding them creates the artificial 
impression of a discontinuity (Figure 2.5, orange versus blue bars).  Regardless of whether I 
include or exclude these beneficiaries, I fail to reject the hypothesis that the population density is 
smooth at the threshold when running manipulation tests that allow for a discrete running 
variable and small degrees of nonlinearity (𝑝 = 1.00 and 𝑘 = 0.001 in each case) (Frandsen 
2017).   
 
In most instances, I also fail to reject the hypothesis that the covariates are balanced near the RD 
threshold when conditioning on geographic variables.  It should first be noted that differences in 
the mean value of covariates across populations above and below the threshold are usually small 
and not statistically significant, even without focusing attention on the population threshold 
(Table 2.2, Column 5).  Estimates of discontinuities at the threshold are also typically not 
statistically significant after controlling for county geographic characteristics (Column 7).   One 
noticeable exception is that there is a large and statistically significant decrease in county-level 
median income around the cutoff (similar to a finding in Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  
However, RD estimates are not statistically significant for county-level poverty rates, risk scores, 
and provider capacity.  Nor are they statistically significant when evaluating the age, race, and 
gender distribution of dual eligibles (with the exception of a statistically significant, but small, 
point estimate for the share who are not white, African-American, or Hispanic).  I control for all 
of these variables, including median income, in subsequent analyses.   
 
2.4.3. Benchmark payment rates 
As expected, RD analyses confirm that there was a large and statistically significant effect of the 
urban floor on monthly benchmark payment rates (Table 2.4).  This table lists baseline 
benchmark payment rates (i.e., the predicted value presuming that counties were at the 
population threshold but did not receive the urban floor designation), RD estimates of the change 
in payment rates at the threshold, and the percent change relative to baseline in Columns 1 
through 3 respectively. Pooling all years in sample, the urban floor led to a $59 increase in 
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benchmark payment rates, which represents an 8% increase over the baseline rate of $749.  The 
effect of the urban floor was larger during earlier years of the sample.  For example, in 2009, the 
urban floor was associated with an $80 increase in benchmark payment rates (an 11% increase 
over baseline).  By contrast, the urban floor only led to a $19 increase in 2015 (a 3% increase 
over baseline).  This is likely the result of changes under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which 
phased in an entirely new payment system between 2012 and 2017 and therefore eliminated 
much of the relationship between plan payment rates and MSA population (MedPAC 2016b).  
The one exception is that the ACA also established a demonstration program that provided 
bonuses to MA contracts with high quality ratings and offered double bonuses in a small subset 
of urban floor counties (Layton and Ryan 2015).  The decline in benchmark payment rates is 
smaller among high-quality plans when taking these bonus payments into account. 
 
2.4.4. Enrollment 
The urban floor was also associated with a large and statistically significant increase in MA 
enrollment (Table 2.5).  The first row displays results for the entire population of Medicare 
beneficiaries.  This row roughly corresponds to the first-stage results for subsequent 2SLS 
analyses (which vary slightly due to sample and weighting differences).  The urban floor led to a 
9 percentage point increase in the share of months that Medicare beneficiaries spent in MA 
(Column 2), which represents a 49% increase in MA enrollment over the baseline enrollment 
rate of 18%.  This increase is quite large when considering that the urban floor rate was only 
associated with an 8% increase in benchmark payment rates during the sample period.  
Nonetheless, the two previous studies that have evaluated the urban floor also found large 
increases in enrollment rates of 7 or 8 percentage points when excluding private fee-for-service 
plans (Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 2016; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).   
 
The urban floor also had a large and statistically significant effect on enrollment rates among 
dual eligibles (the remaining rows of Table 2.5).  In particular, it led to a 9 percentage point 
increase in the share of months that dual eligibles spent in MA, which represents a 61% increase 
over the baseline enrollment rate of 15%.  Further, the urban floor increased enrollment rates 
among each of the three major categories of dual eligibles considered in this study: full dual 
eligibles, QMB partial dual eligibles, and non-QMB partial dual eligibles.  The largest 
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percentage point increase occurred among non-QMB partial dual eligibles, i.e., the group with 
the least generous support from Medicaid.  Nonetheless, the largest percent increase over 
baseline occurred among full dual eligibles, i.e., the group with the most comprehensive 
Medicaid coverage.  It is possible that increases in plan payment rates may have fostered 
enrollment growth among these groups through different pathways.  For example, non-QMB 
partial dual eligibles do not receive assistance with Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements, so 
may have been drawn to MA to the extent that the urban floor led plans to reduce cost sharing or 
offer supplemental benefits.  Full dual eligibles, who are already protected from cost-sharing 
requirements and receive some degree of supplemental benefits through Medicaid, may have 
instead been attracted to MA if the urban floor led new plans to enter the market, such as D-
SNPs, that were more geared towards these beneficiaries’ needs.   
 
Large enrollment effects persisted throughout the sample period (Table 2.6).  This may come as 
a surprise, given that the government phased out much of the urban floor by the end of my 
sample period (Section 2.3.1). Prior research suggests that there may be substantial inertia in 
Medicare enrollment decisions (Sinaiko, Afendulis, and Frank 2013; Jacobs and Molloy 2017), 
which could explain why there was not a large and immediate response of enrollment to changes 
in payment rates and any corresponding changes in plan premiums and benefits.  Regardless of 
the reason, this empirical result supports the use of the urban floor RD design for all years in 
sample. 
 
2.4.5. Main findings 
The urban floor was ultimately associated with less inpatient utilization among dual eligibles 
(Table 2.7, Column 2).  For one, the urban floor led to a two percentage point decrease at the 
population threshold in the share of dual eligibles who were hospitalized in a given year, 
representing an 11% reduction relative to baseline.  This effect was concentrated among non-
emergency admissions.  While the urban floor did not have a statistically significant effect on 
emergency admissions, it led to a reduction in the share of dual eligibles with a non-emergency 




Although the urban floor led to fewer admissions, it was also associated with an increase in the 
average number of inpatient days among those who were hospitalized in a given year (Table 
2.7).  This result was unexpected, given that capitated payments to plans create a strong incentive 
to restrain inpatient care and that prior research has found that managed care reduces length of 
stay (Miller and Luft 2002).  One potential explanation is that increases in MA enrollment may 
have prevented relatively uncomplicated admissions that would have resulted in short lengths of 
stay.  If true, this would increase the average observed length of stay when focusing on the 
remaining pool of admissions (i.e., sample selection bias).  To explore this possibility, I ran 
admission-level analyses to evaluate whether controlling for diagnosis-related group (DRG) and 
admission type (emergency versus non-emergency) would eliminate the positive relationship 
between the urban floor and average length of stay.  This was not the case.  However, my 
analysis does not rule out the possibility that there was sample selection bias conditional on 
DRG and admission type (e.g., which would have been the case if MA enrollment prevented 
relatively uncomplicated admissions within a given DRG). 
 
While the urban floor was associated with an increase in the average length of stay, it ultimately 
led to a decrease in the average number of inpatient days when considering the entire dual 
eligible population (Table 2.7).  This finding implies that either (1) the urban floor reduced the 
number of hospitalizations more than it increased the average length of stay or (2) the urban floor 
also reduced the average length of stay, but estimates suggest otherwise due to sample selection 
bias.   
 
At least some of the decrease in hospital utilization appears to represent an improvement in the 
quality of care.  For one, the urban floor led to a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the share of 
beneficiaries with a potentially-preventable hospitalization — i.e., an admission that might have 
been avoided with proper outpatient care — which represents a 16% decrease relative to baseline  
(Table 2.8).  It was also associated with a 1.3 percentage point reduction in 30-day readmission 
rates or a 6% decrease relative to baseline (Table 2.8).  It is conceivable that the latter result may 
reflect a change in the pool of hospitalizations used to calculate readmission rates (i.e., sample 
selection bias), rather than a decrease in the likelihood of being readmitted after a given hospital 
discharge.  Nonetheless, the urban floor was also associated with a shift of admissions towards 
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hospitals with lower readmission rates (Table 2.8), which suggests a potential mechanism for this 
change.   
 
Results for other measures of hospital quality and for all-cause mortality rates were not 
statistically significant (Table 2.8).  However, it is important to note that these estimates do not 
have the precision to reject the possibility that the urban floor may have had a sizable positive or 
negative effect.  For instance, the 95% confidence interval for all-cause mortality ranges from a 
decrease of 0.6 percentage points (13% relative to baseline) to an increase of 0.3 percentage 
points (5% relative to baseline).  
 
Whereas prior analyses separately identify the effect of the urban floor on enrollment and the 
effect of the urban floor on beneficiary outcomes, 2SLS results combine these findings and 
confirm that the relationship between changes in enrollment and beneficiary outcomes is 
statistically significant (Table 2.9).  Table 2.9 shows that first-stage F-statistics exceed 10.  This 
is commonly viewed as an indicator that a single instrumental variable (i.e., the urban floor) is 
not weak and therefore can be reliably used to identify the effect of the endogenous variable (i.e., 
MA enrollment rates) on outcomes (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).  Additionally, results are 
statistically significant for the same set of outcomes under 2SLS as under prior RD models that 
were evaluating the effect of the urban floor.  I present 2SLS point estimates that have been 
scaled down to convey the effect of a 9 percentage point increase in county-level MA enrollment 
rates (i.e., the first-stage result) (see Section 2.3.1 for an explanation).  Hence, these results 
mechanically have the same sign and magnitudes of prior RD estimates, but are nonetheless 
useful for confirming that the effects of MA enrollment on outcomes are statistically significant.   
 
It would not be appropriate to interpret unscaled 2SLS results as the effect of switching 
compliers from traditional Medicare to MA given the likely presence of spillover effects on other 
beneficiaries (Section 2.3.1).  Indeed, if one disregarded spillover effects and assumed that the 
effects of MA were constant across dual eligibles, then my 2SLS estimates would imply that 
shifting every dual eligible from traditional Medicare to MA would lead to 2.1 fewer inpatient 




2.4.6. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
The next set of results consider whether the effects of the urban floor vary based on the level of 
dual eligibility, health status, or regional health spending.  Differences in the effect of the urban 
floor across subgroups of dual eligibles could reflect (1) differences in its effect on MA 
enrollment rates, (2) differences in the relationship between MA enrollment rates and beneficiary 
outcomes, or (3) both.  I consider each possibility when reviewing these results. 
 
By level of dual eligibility 
Although full and non-QMB partial dual eligibles represent two very distinct populations, I did 
not generally find evidence that the effect of the urban floor on outcomes varied across these 
groups (Table 2.10).   In most cases, point estimates and standard errors were similar among full 
and non-QMB partial dual eligibles.  The one exception is that the urban floor was associated 
with a large and statistically significant reduction in readmission rates among non-QMB partial 
dual eligibles but not among full dual eligibles, a difference which was statistically significant.  
Nonetheless, I did not find evidence that the urban floor had a varying effect on where these 
groups received their care in terms of hospital readmission rates or other measures of hospital 
quality.  An important caveat is that the urban floor had a smaller effect on MA enrollment 
among full dual eligibles.  Hence, these results may understate the magnitude of the effect of MA 
enrollment increases on outcomes among full dual eligibles relative to partial dual eligibles.   
 
By health needs 
Among dual eligibles ages 55-74, the effects of the urban floor were largely concentrated among 
those under 65 who qualified for Medicare on the basis of disability (Table 2.11).  In particular, 
the urban floor led to a decrease in the share who were hospitalized, the average number of 
inpatient days, the share with a potentially-preventable admission, and hospital readmission rates 
among the under-65 group, but not among those 65-74 who aged onto Medicare.  Differences in 
the effect of the urban floor on MA enrollment rates across groups were small and not 
statistically significant.  Because the under-65 group is a potentially sicker group of dual 
eligibles, these results confirm the expected finding that MA enrollment increases would have 




By regional spending levels 
Finally, the effects of the urban floor varied significantly depending on regional health care 
spending patterns (Table 2.12).  Results generally mirror the main findings of this study when 
evaluating counties where historical spending per capita in traditional Medicare was high.  
However, the urban floor had less favorable effects — and in some cases led to adverse 
outcomes — among dual eligibles in counties where historical spending per capita in traditional 
Medicare was low.  First, the effect of the urban floor on the average number of inpatient days 
among this population was small and not statistically significant.  Reductions in the probability 
of being hospitalized were offset by increases in the average length of stay.  Second, the effect of 
the urban floor on readmission rates was positive and not statistically significant.  Third, the 
urban floor led to a shift in admissions towards lower-quality hospitals in terms of 30-day 
mortality rates and patient experience.  Finally, the urban floor was associated with an increase 
in one-year mortality rates among this population.   
 
There are a few possible explanations for this important distinction between counties.  First, 
there may be more waste in regions with historically high Medicare spending (Section 2.2.5).  
This would provide plans with an opportunity to constrain utilization and costs without 
necessarily harming quality, e.g., by implementing outpatient interventions to prevent 
potentially-avoidable hospitalizations.  Conversely, if there were less waste in counties with 
historically low spending, then plans may be more likely to constrain utilization in ways that 
harm beneficiary health.  Second, government payments to MA plans were lower on average in 
counties with historically low Medicare spending.  Hence, the urban floor would have nudged 
beneficiaries into less-subsidized — and potentially lower-quality — plans.  Finally, the urban 
floor exclusively affected enrollment among dual eligibles and not enrollment among the broader 
beneficiary population in counties with historically low Medicare spending (Table 2.12).  It is 
conceivable that dual eligibles benefit from the spillover effects of MA (e.g., to the extent that 
MA plans increase adherence to medical guidelines) while facing challenges when enrolling in 
an MA plan themselves (e.g., as a result of low-quality provider networks).  Regardless of which 
explanation is correct, each suggests that there may be negative effects of MA enrollment on 




2.4.7. Robustness check: Model specification  
The primary findings in this study are largely robust to a number of different model 
specifications.  In particular, I considered models with different population windows (0-500,000; 
150,000-350,000; and 200,000-300,000), a model that allows coefficients for MSA population 
and population-squared to vary before and after the threshold, a fractional probit model for 
outcomes that represent shares, a local linear regression model with the standard population 
window, and a local linear regression with a data-driven population window (approximately 
150,000-350,000) (Appendix Table 2.1).  In most instances, the urban floor was associated with 
an increase in MA enrollment rates, as well as a reduction in the share of dual eligibles with a 
hospitalization, the average number of inpatient days, the share with a potentially-preventable 
hospitalization, readmission rates, and readmission rates at the hospitals where beneficiaries 
received their care.  Findings related to hospitalization type (emergency or non-emergency), 
hospital mortality and patient experience measures, and all-cause mortality were not as robust.  
For example, under both local linear models, the urban floor was associated with a shift of 
admissions towards hospitals with higher mortality rates, but also a reduction in all-cause 
mortality.  Neither of these results were statistically significant under my primary specification.  
Further, some of the results from the model with the narrowest bandwidth (200,000-300,000) 
were at odds with the rest of this study.  For instance, the urban floor was actually associated 
with a large and statistically significant decrease in the share of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled 
in MA.  While the regions included in that analysis are important because of their proximity to 
the threshold, these regions account for only 31 MSAs, 78 counties, and about 69,000 dual 
eligibles (i.e., less than two percent of my main sample).   
 
2.4.8. Placebo tests 
Results from placebo tests also generally support the main findings of this study, though there 
were a few exceptions (Appendix Table 2.2).  I first estimated the effect of the urban floor in 
regions with historically high MA plan payment rates, i.e., where rates were much less likely to 
be bound by the floor (Column 2).  As expected, the urban floor did not have a statistically 
significant effect on enrollment in these regions.  While there was a negative association with 
length of stay, hospital patient experience scores, and hospital readmission rates, only the last is 
consistent with my primary findings.  I next considered the effect of a placebo threshold of 
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400,000 among MSAs with populations between 250,000 and 550,000 (Column 3).  The placebo 
urban floor corresponded to an increase in average length of stay, but all other results were not 
statistically significant.  Finally, I estimated the same model, but restricted to counties with 
historically low payment rates (Column 4).  In this case, the enrollment and length of stay 
estimates were large and statistically significant, but the remaining results were not.   
 
2.4.9. Robustness check: Plan payments 
An important question when interpreting the results of this study is whether the effect of the 
urban floor on beneficiary outcomes is the result of higher MA enrollment rates alone or also 
reflects improvements in plan offerings.  Prior research does not provide strong evidence for the 
latter.  First, previous studies have failed to find evidence that increases in MA payment rates 
lead to improvements in plan quality (Layton and Ryan 2015; Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 2016).  
Second, prior work suggests that plans use only a fraction of payment rate increases to improve 
their benefit packages (Song, Landrum, and Chernew 2013; Duggan, Starc, and Vabson 2016; 
Geruso, Cabral, and Mahoney 2018).  Finally, any increases in benefit generosity will have a 
muted effect on full dual eligibles and QMB partial dual eligibles, as these beneficiaries are 
already shielded from Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and/or receive supplemental 
benefits through Medicaid.   
 
To further explore this issue, I reran my analyses after excluding the most competitive MA 
markets, i.e., regions where plans were most likely to pass higher payments through to 
beneficiaries.  Duggan et al. (2016) found that the effect of the urban floor on plan cost-sharing 
requirements was only statistically significant in the top quintile of counties.  As might be 
expected, the urban floor had a smaller effect on MA enrollment rates when excluding the most 
competitive regions (Appendix Table 2.3).   Perhaps as a result of this, several other results were 
smaller and less likely to be statistically significant, though they generally pointed in the same 
direction as my primary findings.   
 
2.4.10. Limitations 
This study relies on MedPAR data for information on hospital care, which may raise concerns 
about missing data.  For example, if inpatient data were more likely to be missing for MA than 
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traditional Medicare patients, then estimates relating MA enrollment and total hospital use would 
be biased downwards.  This could be the case if MA enrollment increased the likelihood of 
receiving care at hospitals that were out-of-sample or if hospitals in sample did not submit claims 
for all MA patients to the government (e.g., given that MA plans typically reimburse hospitals 
through a separate process) (ResDAC 2011; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  
Nonetheless, my data account for the vast majority of Medicare discharges from acute care 
hospitals (see Section 2.3.2) and the hospitals in my sample were required to submit claims for 
all MA enrollees (ResDAC 2011; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017; CMS 2019).  
Appendix A.1 describes the usefulness of MedPAR data relative to other large datasets. 
 
Another limitation of this study is that it identifies local average treatment effects (LATEs), 
which may or may not extend to other populations of dual eligibles.  One sense in which these 
estimates are local is that they evaluate the effect of MA at the urban floor population threshold.  
It is conceivable that MA may have different implications for dual eligibles in smaller or larger 
regions.  For instance, this study provided evidence that plans were shifting beneficiaries into 
hospitals with lower readmission rates.  This would not be an option for beneficiaries residing in 
remote areas with only one hospital in close proximity.  Despite this potential heterogeneity, the 
results in this paper still have policy relevance, given that about one-seventh of dual eligibles 
(15%) reside in the sample counties (i.e., in MSAs with populations between 100,000 and 
400,000). 
 
Another sense in which these estimates are local is that they capture the effect on specific 
populations within urban floor counties, i.e., the direct effect of MA enrollment on those who 
were nudged into MA due to the urban floor (compliers) and the indirect spillover effects on all 
other beneficiaries.  This estimate is important from a policy perspective, given that 
policymakers have made substantial changes to plan payments over time and have at times used 
plan payments as a mechanism for expanding the role of MA in Medicare (Zarabozo and 
Harrison 2009).  Nonetheless, it is possible that the effects of MA enrollment increases will 
differ as the program continues to reach new segments of the Medicare population.  For example, 
plans might have adverse effects on dual eligibles who have enrolled in traditional Medicare 
because they anticipate having difficulties under managed care (e.g., in terms of retaining access 
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to providers who specialize in unique diseases).  It is also unlikely that increases in MA 
enrollment will have the same spillover effects as the program begins to saturate the market.   
 
Another limitation of this particular RD design is that it does not apply to counties that are 
unbound by the urban floor.  During much of the sample period, MA payment rates were based 
on the greater of either average traditional Medicare spending or the rural or urban floor as 
applicable.  In other words, counties that were unaffected by the urban floor were regions where 
traditional Medicare spending was high.  These areas accounted for about 15% of dual eligibles 
residing in MSAs with populations between 100,000 and 400,000.  Section 2.4.6 suggests that 
MA may have more beneficial effects on dual eligibles in regions with historically-high 
traditional Medicare spending. 
 
My results may also not apply to beneficiaries who had been enrolled in Medicare long before 
the urban floor payment policy went into effect.  I found that older cohorts of beneficiaries were 
less responsive to the urban floor than were younger cohorts, possibly due to inertia in plan 
choice.  As a result, I removed them from my analysis.  Older Medicare beneficiaries tend to 
have more significant health needs than younger, nondisabled beneficiaries.  Section 2.4.6 
suggests that MA may have more favorable effects among sicker populations of dual eligibles.  
 
My analyses also exclude full eligibles who were not enrolled in an MSP.  This group accounted 
for about one-sixth (18%) of dual eligibles in 2013 and typically qualifies for Medicaid through 
medically needy programs or other eligibility pathways with less restrictive income criteria than 
MSPs (CMS 2011; MACPAC 2018b).  MA enrollment may have unique implications for this 
population to the extent that, for example, beneficiaries qualifying through a medically needy 
program have significant health needs.   
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This study found that the average experiences of dual eligibles in MA parallel those of the 
general Medicare population.  In short, increases in MA enrollment — driven by exogenous 
increases in plan payments —  were associated with significant reductions in inpatient utilization 
among dual eligibles and, if anything, improvements in the quality of care.  Effects were similar 
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across non-QMB partial dual eligibles relative to full dual eligibles but were much larger among 
disabled beneficiaries ages 55-64 relative to non-disabled beneficiaries ages 65-74.  Despite 
these promising outcomes, results among counties where traditional Medicare spending was 
historically low are a cause for concern.  In these regions, increases in MA enrollment were not 
associated with an overall reduction in inpatient care and resulted in both an increase in the share 
of admissions occurring in lower-quality hospitals and an increase in one-year mortality rates.   
 
This study highlights several important avenues for future research.  First, this is the only study 
to my knowledge that evaluates whether the effects of MA vary geographically, let alone that 
finds negative implications of enrollment in certain regions of the country.  Given the importance 
of geography for MA payment policy, further research should be conducted to validate this 
result, explore whether it extends to other groups of beneficiaries, and identify the mechanisms 
that drive this finding.  Second, future research should assess the experiences of dual eligibles in 
plans that integrate Medicaid and Medicare benefits, which are becoming increasingly common.  
Ongoing evaluations of the financial alignment demonstration will be informative in this regard.  
Researchers may also want to explore how the roll-out of integrated D-SNP plans across counties 
over time has affected outcomes among dual eligibles (e.g., in line with Zhang and Diana 2017).  
Third, my study found positive effects of MA enrollment rates on average among dual eligibles, 
but was unable to distinguish whether this was due to the direct effect of plan enrollment or to 
general spillover effects.  Policymakers may be especially interested in the former, given 
targeted legislative efforts to specifically enroll dual eligibles in MA.  Finally, this study and 
many others have evaluated the effect of MA enrollment during a period when the government 
reimbursed plans at rates that exceeded average spending in traditional Medicare.  It will be 
useful to examine whether these effects persist in instances where traditional Medicare spending 
and MA payments are closer to a level playing field.   
 
Dual eligibles are in the midst of an ongoing transformation in how they receive their Medicare 
benefits.  The share of dual eligibles enrolled in private Medicare plans increased from 6% in 
2004 to 35% in 2017, exceeding enrollment rates among non-dual eligibles for the first time in 
2016.  Recent policy initiatives have continued to nudge dual eligibles into private plans.  For 
example, the financial alignment demonstration has allowed some states to passively enroll dual 
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eligibles in MMPs with the option to opt-out, whereas other beneficiaries must actively choose to 
enroll in a private plan.  This study may reassure policymakers, as it confirms that the generally 
positive findings in the MA literature to-date appear to extend to dual eligibles on average.  
Nonetheless, as is generally the case with programs and populations of this magnitude, the devil 
is in the details.  This study found that MA enrollment had negative consequences for dual 
eligibles residing in counties with historically low Medicare spending and that the effects of MA 
on dual eligibles may vary based on the diverse needs of this population.  The finding that MA 
plans were shifting beneficiaries towards low-quality hospitals in certain counties suggests that 
the government should carefully monitor the provider networks of plans that disproportionately 
enroll dual eligibles.  Finally, these results highlight the crucial need for additional research 
evaluating the heterogeneity of beneficiary experiences in MA in order to further inform plan 






A.1. MedPAR data 
This study relies on MedPAR claims data for information about inpatient utilization among 
traditional Medicare and MA beneficiaries.  Hospitals receiving disproportionate share (DSH), 
indirect medical education (IME), or direct graduate medical education (GME) payments were 
required to submit information-only claims for MA enrollees during my sample period, in 
addition to submitting claims for traditional Medicare beneficiaries (ResDAC 2011; Huckfeldt et 
al. 2017).  I restrict my analysis to this subset of hospitals.  To do so, I rely on MedPAR data to 
identify hospitals with DSH or IME payments in a given calendar year.  I am unable to isolate 
hospitals receiving GME payments based on MedPAR data alone.  However, the vast majority of 
hospitals receiving GME payments also received IME or DSH payments during my sample 
period (about 99% based on Cost Report data).  I also evaluated an alternative approach where I 
used Cost Report data to identify hospitals receiving DSH, IME, or GME payments during a 
given year.  This method captured a very similar set of hospitals and yielded comparable results 
when rerunning my primary analyses.   
 
There are at least two other potentially-relevant data resources, though each comes with 
important limitations.  One alternative is the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 
State Inpatient Databases (SID), which include the universe of hospital discharges for the 
majority of states.  However, only a subset of these states (36 in 2011) identify dual eligibles and 
even fewer (18 in 2011) also distinguish between traditional Medicare and MA (Barrett and 
Jiang 2014).  Further, dual eligibles are identified in the HCUP SID based on whether the 
expected payer for a hospitalization was both Medicare and Medicaid (Barrett and Jiang 2014).  
This presumably does not include non-QMB partial dual eligibles and it does not distinguish 
between full and QMB partial dual eligibles.  Prior research has also found large error rates when 
evaluating the accuracy of the expected payer field (Buchmueller, Allen, and Wright 2003; 
Chattopadhyay and Bindman 2005; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  Another alternative 
would be to combine traditional Medicare claims data with MA encounter data, which have only 
recently become available to researchers (CMS 2018d).  However, preliminary work suggests 
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that there are significant gaps in the encounter data (e.g., as it captured only 78% of MedPAR 
admissions in 2015) (Johnson and Podulka 2018). 
 
A.2. MSA population 
I inferred how government administrators defined MSA population by experimenting with 
different MSA boundary definitions and population counts and identifying the combination that 
minimized discrepancies with plan payment rates.  Observable discrepancies include instances 
where: (1) a county was in an MSA with a population below 250,000 but plan payments were set 
at the urban floor amount and (2) a county was in an MSA with a population above 250,000 but 
plan payments were set below the urban floor amount.   
 
The following were generally consistent with plan payment rates: 
 2001-2003:  June 1999 MSA definitions applied to 1999 population estimates 
 January-February 2004:  June 1999 MSA definitions applied to the population in 2000 
 March-December 2004:  December 2003 MSA definitions applied to the population in 2000 
 MSA population definitions were, in effect, locked into place in later years.  
 
Payment rate patterns also imply that counties could not lose the urban floor designation over 
time.  This means that the urban floor during my sample period was actually based on whether a 
region exceeded the threshold based on any of the three MSA population definitions listed 
above.  When implementing my RD design, I relied on the most recent definition of MSA 
population and dropped the relatively small number of urban floor counties that were below the 
population threshold (i.e., that exceeded the population threshold based on an earlier definition).   
 
A.3. Potentially-preventable admissions 
I define potentially-preventable admissions using the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs) Technical Specification files (AHRQ 
2017).  The PQIs include admissions for one of the following conditions (AHRQ 2017):  
 Diabetes, short-term complications 
 Perforated appendix 
 Diabetes long-term complications  
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 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) or asthma in older adults  
 Hypertension  
 Heart Failure  
 Low birth weight  
 Dehydration  
 Community acquired pneumonia 
 Urinary tract infection 
 Uncontrolled diabetes  
 Asthma in younger adults  
 
A.4. Rehospitalization rates 
I generate 30-day rehospitalization rates based on a widely-cited study (Jencks, Williams, and 
Coleman 2009).  In particular, I define the numerator as all discharges from acute care hospitals, 
excluding instances where the patient was listed as deceased on the same day, the patient was 
transferred on the same day to another acute care hospital, or the patient was eventually 
readmitted for rehabilitation within the 30-day window.  I then calculate the share of these 
discharges where the patient was admitted to an acute care hospital within 30 days of being 
discharged.   
 
A.5. Hospital quality indicators 
I rely on definitions from Doyle et al. (2017) to generate three summary measures of hospital 
quality based on raw averages of Hospital Compare data: 
30-day mortality rates  
 30-day mortality rate: AMI 
 30-day mortality rate: Pneumonia 
 30-day mortality rate: Heart failure 
 
30-day readmission rates  
 30-day readmission rate: AMI 
 30-day readmission rate: Pneumonia 




Patient experience of care  
 Doctors always communicated well  
 Nurses always communicated well  
 Pain was always well controlled  
 Patients always received help as soon as they wanted  
 Room was always clean  
 Room was always quiet at night  
 Staff always explained medicines before providing them 
 Patient received information about what to do during recovery at home 
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2.8. Tables and figures 










asset limit Typical** benefits








QMB partial dual 
eligibles 




Non-QMB partial dual 
eligibles
1.5 101%-120% FPL $7,390 Part B premium
Sources: MACPAC 2018, 2015 Medicare Beneficairy Summary File (MBSF), and 2009 Mediciad Analytic 
Extract. 
Notes: *As of January 2015. **Most common eligibility pathway(s) for each enrollment group along with the 
most common income and asset requirement for that pathway. Many of these limits vary by state. ***Most 
common benefits for each enrollment group. Full dual eligibles who do not receive QMB benefits may have less 
comprehensive coverage of Medicare's cost sharing and premiums depending on their state of residence. A very 
small number of non-QMB partial dual eligibles (<50) receive coverage for the Part A premium alone.
Table 2.1. Dual Eligible Groups
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MA enrollment rate 0.239 0.190 0.158 0.241 0.083*** 0.149*** 0.097***
Age group
<45 0.123 0.196 0.195 0.197 0.003 0.006 -0.012
45-54 0.130 0.158 0.157 0.161 0.004 0.018 -0.002
55-64 0.151 0.178 0.178 0.179 0.001 0.008 0.004
65-74 0.276 0.307 0.308 0.306 -0.002 -0.011 0.013
75-84 0.212 0.158 0.161 0.154 -0.006 -0.018 -0.003
≥85 0.108 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.003** -0.001
Race/ethnicity
NH White 0.532 0.649 0.659 0.634 -0.024 0.191*** 0.015
NH African-American 0.206 0.183 0.178 0.191 0.013 -0.030 -0.060
Hispanic 0.174 0.128 0.120 0.141 0.022 -0.178** 0.019
Other 0.088 0.040 0.044 0.034 -0.010 0.016 0.026*
Female 0.619 0.613 0.612 0.614 0.002 0.011 -0.008
Census region
Northeast 0.207 0.126 0.123 0.132 0.009 0.145
Midwest 0.153 0.190 0.183 0.201 0.018 -0.100
South 0.404 0.485 0.468 0.512 0.044 0.251
West 0.236 0.199 0.226 0.156 -0.070 -0.297**
MSA population (1,000s) 3470 219 151 328 177***
County characteristics
Area (1,000 sq. miles) 144.4 139.8 148.4 126.0 -22.4 -58.0
Population (1,000s) 1271.8 181.3 136.9 252.0 115.1*** -36.5
% in Medicare 0.170 0.184 0.186 0.180 -0.006 0.049*** 0.028
Median income $50,429 $44,925 $44,493 $45,612 $1,119 -$5,208** -$4,682**
% in poverty 0.172 0.182 0.182 0.181 -0.001 -0.004 0.010
% of 65+ in poverty 0.110 0.097 0.098 0.097 -0.001 0.005 0.018
2000 risk score 1.006 0.972 0.975 0.967 -0.009 -0.001 0.018
Physicians/1,000 2.784 2.301 2.305 2.295 -0.010 -1.015 -1.194
Specialists/1,000 0.984 0.729 0.727 0.731 0.004 -0.330 -0.348
Hospitals/100,000 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.013 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002
Beds/1,000 2.703 3.031 3.125 2.881 -0.243 -0.336 -0.681
N (1,000,000s)= 53.5 8.0 4.8 3.2
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Analytic Sample
NOTES: a. Estimates from a linear regression of outcomes against the urban floor dummy. b. Linear RD estimates with controls for MSA 
population, MSA population-squared. c. Linear RD estimates with controls for MSA population, MSA population-squared, county population, 
county population-squared, county land area, urban continuum dummies, state fixed effects. All models include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors 
with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Any hospitalization 0.191 0.186 0.186 0.184 -0.002
Emergency 0.139 0.123 0.121 0.126 0.005
Non-emergency 0.041 0.090 0.092 0.085 -0.007**
Length of stay 1.844 1.685 1.690 1.678 -0.012
Total inpatient days 0.334 0.322 0.323 0.319 -0.004
Quality outcomes
Potentially-prev. hosp. 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.042 -0.001
Rehospitalization rate 0.228 0.212 0.212 0.211 -0.001
Hospital Compare
Mortality 0.126 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.000
Patient exp. 0.684 0.700 0.699 0.702 0.003
Readmissions 0.205 0.197 0.198 0.194 -0.004***
One-year mortality 0.058 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.001
N (person-years) = 53,548,685 8,043,882 4,805,040 3,238,842
N (hospitalization-years) = 15,957,944 2,417,658 1,447,473 970,185
Table 2.3. Summary Statistics of Outcomes
Analytic Sample
NOTES: a. Estimates from a linear regression of outcomes against the urban floor dummy. Includes heteroskedasticrobust 
standard errors with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.4. Effect of Urban Floor on Benchmark Payment Rates
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual 
eligible population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, 
population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in 
Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and 
include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.5. Effect of Urban Floor on MA Enrollment Rates
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual 
eligible population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, 
population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in 
Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county level. 
























































Table 2.6. Effect of Urban Floor on Enrollment Rates 
Among All Beneficiaries, by Year
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-
squared, dual eligible population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county 
characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ 
poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, 
hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models 
are weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.7. Effect of Urban Floor on Utilization
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, 
dual eligible population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land 
area, population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of 
population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds 
per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by county dual 
eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county 
level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.8. Effect of Urban Floor on Quality
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, 
dual eligible population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics 
(land area, population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, 
share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per 
capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by 
county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at 
the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.9. Effect of an Increase in MA Enrollment Rates From 18% to 27% 
on Inpatient Utilization and Quality
NOTES: Results are from 2SLS models where the endogenous variable is the county-level MA enrollment rate and the 
instrument is an urban floor dummy variable.  All results are multiplied by 0.09 to capture a change in MA enrollment 
rates to 18% to 27%.  All models control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible population 
characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, 
median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists 
per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models are 
weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the 
county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 2.10. Effect of Urban Floor 
Among Full and Non-QMB Partial Dual Eligibles
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible population 
characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, median income, 
poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and 
beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by county dual eligible popualtion and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county level. 








































































































































































NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible population 
characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, median income, 
poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and 
beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models also include a group dummy variable and its interaction with 
each control variable.  All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors 
with clusters at the county level. 











Table 2.11. Effect of Urban Floor 
























MA enrollment rate (all)










MA enrollment rate (group)














































































































Table 2.12. Effect of Urban Floor 













NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible population 
characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, median income, 
poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and 
beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All models also include a group dummy variable and its interaction with 
each control variable.  All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors 
with clusters at the county level. 






















































































































































































































































N (county-years)= 16,310 2,681 1,505 532 2,681 2,681 2,681 1,554
Appendix Table 2.1.  Robustness to Model Specification
NOTES: Columns (1) - (6) present results from linear or fractional probit models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible population characteristics 
(age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, 
physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  The model in Column (5) also includes interaction 
terms between the urban floor dummy and MSA population and MSA population-squared.   Columns (7) and (8) present results from local polynomial regression models with same set 
of controls as models from Columns (1) - (4).  The model in Column (8) relies on data-driven population bandwidths based on an evaluation of enrollment that excludes control 
variables.  All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with clusters at the county level.  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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N (county-years)= 2,688 308 1,498 1,281
Appendix Table 2.2.  Placebo Test
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible 
population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, 
population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, 
physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects. All models are weighted by county dual eligible population and include heteroskedastic-
robust standard errors with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Appendix Table 2.3. Effect of Urban Floor Excluding the Top HHI Quantile
NOTES: Results are from RD models that control for MSA population, MSA population-squared, dual eligible 
population characteristics (age, race, gender distribution), county characteristics (land area, population, 
population-squared, median income, poverty rate, 65+ poverty rate, share of population in Medicare, 
physicians per capita, specialists per capita, hospitals per capita, and beds per capita), state fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects All models are weighted by county dual eligible popualtion and include heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors with clusters at the county level. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Figure 2.1. Beneficiary Characteristics, by Dual Eligible Status 
 






















Figure 2.1. Beneficiary Characteristics,
by Dual Eligible Status
Non-dual eligibles Dual eligibles
NOTES: Chronic conditions and Medicare spending figures are from CBO analysis of 2011 data.  All other figures are weighted 
results from the 2015 MCBS PUF.    














Figure 2.2. Share of Beneficiaries in MA 
and Other Private Medicare Plans
Non-dual eligibles Dual eligibles
NOTE: Private Medicare includes beneficiaries in MA plans (D-SNPs and others) and other private alternatives to traditional 
Medicare (e.g., MMPs). D-SNP = Dual-eligible special needs plan. MA = Medicare Advantage. MMP = Medicare-Medicaid Plan. 
SOURCE: MMCO 2018 and author’s analysis of 2004 Medicare Denominator File.
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Figure 2.3. MA Rates by MSA Pop, 2009 
 
Figure 2.4. Effect of the Urban Floor on MA Enrollment, 2009-2015 
 
  
NOTES:  AAPCC = adjusted average per capita costs in traditional Medicare. Slight jitter to convey mass at urban and rural floors. 
SOURCE: 1999 and 2000 Census and 2009 CMS Ratebook data.
NOTES:  Data represent means of county-year observations that are grouped together based on data-driven MSA population bins.
SOURCE: 1999 and 2000 Census, 2009-2015 CMS Ratebook, and 2009-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) data.
≈ 80% increase ≈ 67% increase
≈ 87% increase ≈ 74% increase
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Figure 2.5. Dual Eligible Population Density (within RD bandwidth) 
 
Appendix Figure 2.1. MA Enrollment, Premiums, and Quality By Level of Dual Eligibility 
 
  
All areas Areas in sample
NOTES:  Total MSA population is based on 2000 Census data and December 2003 MSA definition file.  Analytic sample excludes (1) urban floor counties in 
MSAs with populations under 250,000 and (2) counties where the adjusted average per capita costs in traditional Medicare exceeded $475 in 2000.  
SOURCE:  2009-2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF)
Figure 2.5. Dual Eligible Population Density
(within RD bandwidth)
Total MSA Population (in 1,000s)















Full QMB partial Non-QMB partial Non-dual eligible
Appendix Figure 2.1. MA Enrollment, Premiums, and Quality
By Level of Dual Eligibility
(Adjusted for County of Residence)
NOTE: The summary star rating represents a weighted average of several quality measures.  Calculations vary slightly by 
contract depending on the completeness of their quality measure data and whether the contract offers special needs plans 
(SNPs) (as there were a small number of additional quality measures for SNPs in the sample year).
SOURCE:  2015 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF), 2015 CMS Part C and Part D Performance Data, and 2015 
Medicare Plan Finder data.
116 
 
Appendix Figure 2.2. Medicare Spending and Chronic Conditions, by Level of Dual Eligibility 
 



























Full dual eligibles Partial dual eligibles
NOTES: CHF = Congestive heart failure. IHD = Ischemic heart disease.  Chronic condition figures for traditional Medicare only.
SOURCE:  2012 Medicare-Medicaid Linked Enrollee Analytic Data Source (MMLEADS) Public Use File (PUF)
Appendix Figure 2.2. Medicare Spending and 



















Appendix Figure 2.3. Beneficiary Characteristics,
Among Those Ages 55-64 and 65-75
Disabled (55-64) Aged (65-74)
SOURCE:  2014 Health and Retirement Study
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Appendix Figure 2.4. MA Rates by MSA Pop, 2009 (among counties with 2000 AAPCC > $475) 
 
 
NOTES:  AAPCC = adjusted average per capita costs in traditional Medicare.  Data are jiggered to convey mass at urban and rural floor. 




Transforming Secondary Coverage for a Critical Population:  
The effect of Medicaid managed care on hospital use among full dual eligibles 
 
3.1. Introduction 
While many states have a long history of contracting with private managed care plans to provide 
Medicaid coverage for adults and children, only recently has it become common to extend these 
initiatives to dual eligibles, i.e., Medicaid beneficiaries who also qualify for Medicare coverage.  
An extensive literature suggests that Medicaid managed care plans may be able to reduce the 
intensity of beneficiaries’ care, with ambiguous implications for quality.  However, because 
Medicare is the primary payer for most medical benefits for dual eligibles, Medicaid managed 
care plans may have less ability or incentive to shape their care.   
 
This study evaluates the effect of requiring dual eligibles to enroll in Medicaid managed care on 
the use of inpatient and nursing home care among dual eligibles.  This topic is important for 
several reasons.  For one, dual eligibles are a uniquely vulnerable group of Medicaid 
beneficiaries, often having the significant health needs associated with the intersection of 
poverty, old age, and disability (Figure 3.1).  Second, given the high needs of this population, 
dual eligibles are much more expensive than other beneficiaries in Medicare and Medicaid 
(Figure 3.1) and are therefore of interest from a fiscal perspective. Third, because Medicaid 
provides secondary coverage for dual eligibles, studying enrollment mandates will provide 
insight into the effect of a relatively constrained application of managed care techniques for this 
population and will create a baseline for more extensive reforms.  Finally, Medicaid enrollment 
mandates may affect many more dual eligibles than do managed care initiatives in the Medicare 




To explore the effect of Medicaid managed care, I evaluate the introduction of an enrollment 
mandate for full dual eligibles—i.e., those who qualify for the full set of Medicaid benefits—in 
the state of New Jersey in October 2011.  As a result of New Jersey’s enrollment mandate, over 
100,000 full dual eligibles shifted from FFS Medicaid to one of four Medicaid managed care 
plans overnight.  Relying on large administrative datasets, I identify the effect of this policy on 
inpatient and nursing home care by comparing full dual eligibles in New Jersey to full dual 
eligibles in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania.   
 
This study finds that Medicaid managed care can have important effects on dual eligibles’ health 
care use, even though these plans play a secondary role to Medicare for many services.  First, the 
managed care enrollment mandate was associated with a decrease in the share of dual eligibles 
with a hospitalization as well as in the average number of hospital days.  This occurred despite 
the fact that plans were not typically allowed to constrain use through prior authorization 
requirements or provider network restrictions.  Second, I provide suggestive evidence that the 
mandate reduced the share of dual eligibles with potentially-preventable admissions—an 
indicator of low-quality outpatient care—and the share of those with 30-day hospital 
readmissions, an indicator of low-quality hospital care.  Third, I find that the mandate was 
associated with a small reduction in the share of the population admitted to a nursing home.  This 
may indicate that plans reduced the need for nursing home care—i.e., by slowing the decline of 
enrollees’ functional status—given that plans did not cover current residents.  Finally, despite 
these decreases in utilization, the mandate was not associated with a statistically significant 
change in total Medicaid spending.  Any Medicare savings may therefore represent a net 
reduction in government spending.     
 
3.2. Background and literature 
3.2.1. Dual eligibles 
In 2018, there were about 11 million dual eligibles, i.e., individuals who receive coverage 
through both the Medicare and Medicaid programs (MMCO 2019b).  Medicare serves as the 
primary payer of medical services for this population, while Medicaid pays Medicare’s 
premiums, covers some or all of Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements, and/or provides 
supplemental benefits depending on beneficiaries’ level of eligibility (Jacobson, Neuman, and 
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Damico 2012).  Additionally, nearly all dual eligibles (over 99% in 2015) are enrolled in a 
Medicare Part D prescription drug plan and receive assistance with their plans’ premiums and 
cost sharing through the Medicare Low Income Subsidy (LIS) program. 
 
This study focuses on full dual eligibles, i.e., those who qualify for the complete set of benefits 
offered under their state’s Medicaid program and who receive some level of assistance with 
Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements and premiums (Table 3.1) (CMS 2011; Young et al. 2013).  
Medicaid coverage for this population includes services that are not part of Medicare’s benefit 
package (MACPAC 2018).  Indeed, the majority of Medicaid spending among the full dual 
eligible population is for long-term care services and supports, including care provided through 
institutions (such as in nursing homes) and in home- and community-based settings (such as in 
assisted living facilities or by home health aides or personal care assistants) (Peebles and Bohl 
2013; MACPAC 2018).  State Medicaid programs may also cover dental, vision, and hearing 
services, among other supplemental benefits (Appendix Table 3.1).   
 
3.2.2. Medicaid managed care  
States have the option of providing Medicaid coverage through direct fee-for-service (FFS) 
payments to providers, managed care plans, or both (MACPAC 2011; CMS 2019b).  Under the 
most common managed care arrangement, states contract with plans to provide a comprehensive 
set of Medicaid-covered services (referred to hitherto as “comprehensive managed care plans”) 
(MACPAC 2018).  Many states that contract with these plans carve out coverage for certain 
services, such as behavioral health care and long-term care services and supports (Gifford et al. 
2017; MACPAC 2018; CMS 2019b).  In those cases, states cover the service on a FFS basis or 
by contracting with separate managed care plans (known as “limited-benefit plans”).  
Conversely, some states cover benefits primarily on a FFS basis while delegating any remaining 
services to limited-benefit plans.  As of 2017, over four-fifths (82%) of Medicaid beneficiaries 
received coverage through some form of managed care arrangement, including over two-thirds 
(69%) who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan (CMS 2019b).   
 
In recent years, states have increasingly turned to managed care plans to provide coverage for 
dual eligibles.  For one, while many states initially excluded full dual eligibles from enrollment 
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mandates, over one-third (18 in 2017) now require this population to enroll in comprehensive 
managed care plans (CBO 2018; CMS 2019b).  Additionally, an increasing number of states 
have moved long-term care benefits from the FFS system to managed long-term services and 
supports (MLTSS) programs (Lewis et al. 2018).  Indeed, 13 of the 18 states that required full 
dual eligibles to enroll in comprehensive managed care plans also mandated enrollment in an 
MLTSS program, typically offered through the same plan (CMS 2019b).  This trend has 
particular relevance for full dual eligibles, who are more than twice as likely to require long-term 
care as other elderly and disabled Medicaid enrollees (CBO 2013).   
 
State decisions regarding the provision of Medicaid benefits interact with the Medicare program in 
complex ways.  Under Medicare, beneficiaries have the choice of receiving their benefits through the 
government-administered version of the program (known as “traditional Medicare,” which is akin to 
FFS Medicaid) or through private plans under the Medicare Advantage (MA) program (which are 
akin to comprehensive Medicaid managed care plans).  In other words, it is possible that dual 
eligibles may enroll in private plans for both their Medicare and Medicaid coverage, for one or the 
other, or for neither (Table 3.2).  Depending on where they reside, dual eligibles may also have the 
choice of receiving both their Medicare and Medicaid benefits through a single, integrated managed 
care plan (MedPAC 2019).   
 
3.2.3. The effect of Medicaid managed care on utilization and care quality  
A major impetus behind Medicaid managed care is the belief that capitated payments and 
competitive pressures will force plans to deliver care more efficiently than is possible under FFS 
arrangements (Duggan 2004; Duggan and Hayford 2013; CBO 2018).  This includes a strong 
incentive for plans to reduce the intensity of care.  Prior studies suggest that Medicaid managed 
care enrollment is associated with less inpatient use (Lurie et al. 1994; Basu, Friedman, and Burstin 
2004; Baker and Afendulis 2005; Herring and Adams 2011; Marton, Yelowitz, and Talbert 2014), 
with one exception (LoSasso and Freund 2000).   
 
At the same time, the effect of Medicaid managed care enrollment on the quality of 
beneficiaries’ care is theoretically ambiguous (Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard 2016).  
On the one hand, plans may seek to better manage and integrate members’ care and to improve 
their health in an effort to prevent unnecessary utilization and attract enrollment (Duggan and 
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Hayford 2013).  Indeed, in a 2017 survey, Medicaid managed care plans reported several 
initiatives to improve enrollees’ well-being, such as identifying high-risk or high-need enrollees 
(100% of plans), implementing chronic disease or complex case management programs (100% 
of plans), and addressing the social determinants of health (91% of plans) (Garfield et al. 2018).  
On the other hand, plan initiatives to drive down costs may also lead them to overly stint on care 
through utilization management and other managed care restrictions (Buchmueller, Ham, and 
Shore-Sheppard 2016).  In line with this ambiguity, researchers have generated conflicting 
findings when evaluating quality of care measures, such as potentially-preventable 
hospitalization rates (LoSasso and Freund 2000; Basu, Friedman, and Burstin 2004; Bindman et 
al. 2005; Hu and Mortensen 2018) and emergency room (ER) visits (Garrett, Davidoff, and 
Yemane 2003; Baker and Afendulis 2005; Herring and Adams 2011; Caswell and Long 2015). 
 
3.2.4. The effect of Medicaid managed care on utilization and care quality of dual eligibles   
As a secondary payer, Medicaid managed care plans may be less consequential for dual eligibles 
when considering the provision of Medicare-covered services, including inpatient care.  For one, 
in many instances, the government prohibits plans from implementing key managed care 
restrictions—such as requirements that enrollees see providers in their plan’s network or obtain 
prior authorization before receiving certain types of care—when covering Medicare cost sharing 
on behalf of full dual eligibles (CMS 2018c; Burke, 2019) .  To the extent that Medicaid 
managed care plans are still capable of shaping beneficiaries’ use of care, they may have less 
incentive to do so.  For example, Medicare covers the lion’s share of dual eligibles’ hospital 
expenses (91% among those in both traditional Medicare and FFS Medicaid in 2013) (MACPAC 
2018).  Hence, plan interventions that reduce inpatient use among dual eligibles may yield 
substantial savings for the Medicare program while providing little or no financial benefit to 
plans themselves.  Plans may still actively manage care for dual eligibles to the extent that: (1) 
managed care initiatives reduce spending for non-dual eligible enrollees, (2) plans cannot 
exclude dual eligibles from these initiatives, and (3) plan savings among non-dual eligibles 
exceed the costs of managing care for dual eligibles. This is less likely to be true in cases where 
dual eligibles make up a large share of a plan’s enrollee population.  It is also unlikely that 
interventions targeting the elderly, such as fall-prevention programs, will be cost-effective from 




3.2.5. Prior literature   
Three sets of studies have evaluated the effect of Medicaid managed care on dual eligibles, 
though each considered a different context than my research.  First, only one study to my 
knowledge has focused on the effect of mandatory enrollment on the noninstitutionalized dual 
eligible population.  That article found that elderly Medicaid beneficiaries who were randomized into 
a managed care plan had less utilization and reported modest improvements in their health (Lurie et 
al. 1994).  Nonetheless, these findings may have limited applicability to the current policy 
environment, given that the study was conducted twenty-five years ago and included only a subset of 
beneficiaries from a single county in Minnesota.   
 
A handful of studies have evaluated the effect of enrollment in MLTSS plans—either stand-alone or 
comprehensive managed care plans—on outcomes among dual eligibles with long-term care needs. 
This research has generally found that MLTSS enrollment is associated with a shift from institutional 
care to home- and community-based services and a reduction in inpatient utilization (McCall and 
Korb 1997; APS Healthcare 2003; Libersky et al. 2018), though it was associated with an increase in 
hospital use and had ambiguous implications for long-term care in one state (Libersky et al. 2018).  
While a major impetus behind MLTSS coverage is to move long-term care away from institutional 
settings, my study focuses on the effects of a Medicaid managed care initiative that excluded 
institutional care and focused on beneficiaries who reside in the community.   
 
Finally, another line research has assessed the effects of enrollment in integrated managed care plans 
that cover both Medicare and Medicaid benefits. One group of studies has evaluated a long-standing 
integrated plan option available under a waiver program in Minnesota (Kane and Homyak 2004).  
Altogether, these studies have found that plan enrollment corresponded to less inpatient care and 
fewer potentially-preventable hospitalizations and ER visits, but did not have a statistically 
significant association with mortality (Kane et al. 2004, 2005; Zhang et al. 2008; Anderson, Feng, 
and Long 2016). More recently, a series of government-sponsored studies have evaluated the effect 
of integrated, Medicare-Medicaid plans under a large demonstration program across several 
participating states.  This research has found mixed results for both utilization and quality of care 
outcomes across states and population subgroups (RTI International 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b).  
In contrast with this work, my study focuses on a policy scenario where many dual eligibles are 
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enrolled in a managed care plan for their Medicaid benefits alone.  This setting will continue to have 
relevance as long as some dual eligibles receive Medicare coverage through the traditional version of 
the program.   
 
3.3. Intervention, empirical strategy, and data  
3.3.1. Intervention 
Since 1995, New Jersey has operated a managed care system for Medicaid beneficiaries through 
the NJ FamilyCare program (CMS 2014).  Prior to 2011, enrollment in comprehensive managed 
care plans was voluntary for full dual eligibles and take-up was modest.  In an effort to reduce 
state spending on health care, then-Governor Chris Christie proposed in February 2011 to (1) 
require enrollment among the dual eligible population and (2) extend plan coverage to include 
personal care, home health care, and adult daycare services, which had previously been provided 
on a FFS basis (Fletcher 2011; NJ OLS 2011; NJ OMB 2011).  The state integrated the new 
benefits into its voluntary managed care program in July 2011, informed dual eligibles of the 
enrollment mandate in an August 2011 letter, and rolled out mandatory managed care in October 
2011 (ANJ 2011; DMAHS 2011b).  The share of full dual eligibles who received their Medicaid 
benefits through comprehensive managed care plans subsequently surged from 14% in 
September 2011 to 82% in October 2011.  Nonetheless, the state continued to exclude the 
institutionalized long-term care population from managed care entirely (DMAHS 2013).  Plans 
were required to disenroll any member admitted for long-term nursing home care after 30 days 
(DMAHS 2013).  Additionally, while plans were responsible for many Medicaid benefits, New 
Jersey continued to provide coverage for behavioral health care and a subset of home- and 
community-based services on a FFS basis (DMAHS 2011a, 2011b, 2013).  Finally, stand-alone 
NJ FamilyCare plans were not allowed to impose managed care restrictions when paying 
Medicare cost-sharing requirements on behalf of full dual eligibles (though plans offering 
integrated Medicare coverage could do so, see Section 3.4.4) (DMAHS 2011c; Wood 2019).    
 
I focus on New Jersey—rather than other states that also introduced enrollment mandates over 
time—for several reasons.  First, New Jersey had a comprehensive Medicaid managed care 
system in place for several years before mandating enrollment among full dual eligibles.  As a 
result, it is unlikely that there would have been significant implementation challenges that could 
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otherwise have made it difficult to evaluate the full impact of this policy change.  Second, New 
Jersey introduced and implemented mandatory managed care for full dual eligibles quickly.  
Consequently, while it appears that some beneficiaries voluntarily enrolled in managed care 
plans in anticipation of the mandate, this response was modest and constrained to the period just 
before implementation (Figure 3.2a).  Third, I was able to access Medicaid and Medicare data 
from several months before and after this policy change.   
 
3.3.2. Empirical strategy 
The objective of this paper is identify the effect of New Jersey’s enrollment mandate on health care 
use among full dual eligibles.  To do so, I rely on a difference-in-differences (DID) approach 
comparing changes over time among full dual eligibles in the state of New Jersey (the treatment 
group) with changes over time among full dual eligibles in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania (the 
control group).  If trends among the treatment and control groups would have been identical had the 
mandate not been implemented (i.e., the common trends assumption), then any differences in actual 
trends represent the effect of the policy change (Wing, Simon, and Bello-Gomez 2018).  I use full 
dual eligibles from Pennsylvania as the control group to account for local trends that are common to 
both New Jersey and Pennsylvania, such as regional economic changes.  While Delaware and New 
York also border New Jersey, I do not include full dual eligibles from these states as both initiated 
MLTSS reforms around the same time that New Jersey began to mandate Medicaid managed care 
enrollment (DHSS 2012; NYSDH 2012).    
 
I implement this DID approach by estimating the model below with data from 2010-2013.  
Indices represent the individual (𝑖) and time-period (𝑡) (either a quarter or a year depending on 
the granularity of my data).  𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents a given inpatient or long-term care outcome, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is a 
dummy for being in the post-period (i.e., October 2011 or later), 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy for being in the 
treatment group, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents individual-level control variables, and 𝛿𝑐(𝑖) represents county fixed 
effects.   
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛾𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽(𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖) + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐(𝑖) + 𝑖𝑡) (1) 
 
I drop observations that straddle the pre- and post-period (July 2011 through September 2011 for data 
at the quarterly level and 2011 for data at the annual level).  For most outcomes, I estimate linear 
regression models, in which case 𝑓 is the identity function and the DID estimator is simply 𝛽.  The 
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one exception is that I estimate a two-part model when evaluating the effect of the mandate on 
overall inpatient utilization, given the large mass of beneficiaries with zero hospital days (Belotti et 
al. 2015; Deb and Norton 2018).  In particular, I first estimate a logit model for the probability of 
having a hospital stay (the extensive margin) (in which case 𝑓 is the logit function), then estimate a 
linear regression model for the number of days conditional on a stay (the intensive margin), and 
finally combine the results to evaluate the unconditional number of days.  When estimating nonlinear 
models, I derive the DID estimate as the average marginal effect of the interaction term 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 
(Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd 2012; Puhani 2012; Setodji et al. 2017).  Although it is also 
common to use two-part models to evaluate spending outcomes, I do not do so here as Medicaid 
payments were almost always greater than $0 and did not form a substantial mass at any other lower 
bound.  This reflects the inclusion of limited-benefit plan premiums that varied by beneficiary.  All 
analyses include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level.   
 
I next conduct a more detailed analysis of trends before and after treatment.  The primary motivation 
of this approach is to explore the validity of my research design.  If trends differ between the 
treatment and control groups in the pre-period, then one might question whether trends would have 
been similar in the post-period in the absence of the enrollment mandate.  Another benefit of this 
approach is that it allows for the possibility that treatment effects may vary over time.  For example, 
if plans encouraged greater use of preventive care, one would expect any reductions in 
hospitalizations to grow over time following the enrollment mandate.  In the following model, 𝑇 and 
𝑇 represent the first and last time period, the baseline is the last full period before implementation 
(either 2010 or the first half of 2011 depending on the unit of observation), 𝛾𝑡 represents time fixed 
effects, and the parameter 𝛽𝜏 represents the DID estimator at time 𝜏 relative to the baseline. 
 






+ 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐(𝑖) + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡) (2) 
 
I also explore whether other policies that took effect in New Jersey around the time of the enrollment 
mandate may be driving my results.  First, New Jersey eliminated coverage of the Part D LIS copay 
in July 2011 (DMAHS 2011a).  Although it is difficult to disentangle this policy from the timing of 
the enrollment mandate, I evaluate whether the copay had an appreciable effect on prescription drug 
use and discuss the potential implications, if any, for the interpretation of my main results.  Second, 
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in January 2012, New Jersey began to contract with D-SNPs to cover most Medicaid benefits in 
addition to Medicare benefits (DMAHS 2011c, 2012).  D-SNPs are a type of MA plan that 
exclusively enroll dual eligibles.  I discuss the scope of this change and explore whether this reform 
may explain some of the main results by stratifying analyses based on whether a beneficiary had ever 
enrolled in one of these plans.   
 
3.3.3. Data 
This study requires data on dual eligibles from New Jersey and Pennsylvania that identifies: (1) 
the level of their dual eligibility (full versus partial); (2) whether dual eligibles received most of 
their Medicaid benefits on a FFS basis or through a comprehensive Medicaid managed care plan; 
(3) whether they received their Medicare coverage through traditional Medicare, a D-SNP, or 
another MA plan; (4) if they resided in a nursing home (and were thereby excluded from the 
enrollment mandate); (5) their utilization outcomes; and (6) their socioeconomic characteristics 
(for the purpose of comparing treatment and control groups and to include as covariates).  I rely 
on multiple datasets to obtain this information. 
 
Enrollment 
I obtain complete Medicare and Medicaid enrollment data from the 2010-2013 versions of the 
Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) and the Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) 
Personal Summary (PS) file.  The MBSF is an administrative dataset that includes detailed 
enrollment and basic demographic information for the universe of Medicare beneficiaries, while 
the MAX PS file provides comparable information—as well as summary claims and payment 
data—for the universe of Medicaid beneficiaries (Barosso 2013; CMS 2018a).  I first rely on the 
MBSF to identify whether an individual was a full or partial dual eligible and whether they were 
enrolled in traditional Medicare or MA in a given month.  I distinguish between enrollment in D-
SNPs and other MA plans by linking plan identifiers in the MBSF to data from the SNP 
Comprehensive Report, which is published monthly by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS).  I then merge the MBSF with the MAX PS file to determine whether a dual 
eligible obtained their coverage through FFS Medicaid or a comprehensive managed care plan in 





I rely on claims data from Medicare—rather than Medicaid—to identify inpatient utilization 
among dual eligibles given that Medicare is the primary payer for hospital care.  In particular, I 
use the 2009-2013 versions of the Medicare Provider and Analysis Review (MedPAR) file.  
MedPAR summarizes Part A claims data for every traditional Medicare hospital discharge 
(NCHS 2012; ResDAC 2016).  Beginning in early 2008, the government required hospitals 
receiving disproportionate share payments or indirect or direct medical education adjustments to 
also report information for MA enrollees (ResDAC 2011; Huckfeldt et al. 2017).  I restrict my 
analysis to only include this subset of hospitals (see Appendix A.1 for details).  My sample 
includes the large majority of Medicare discharges from acute care hospitals in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania (about 86% from 2009-2015 based on CMS Cost Report data).  Because DSH 
hospitals treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients by definition, these data may be 
even more complete for the dual eligible population (CMS 2017).  Appendix A.1 provides 
additional information about MedPAR data and its usefulness relative to other large datasets. 
 
I first use MedPAR to create variables related to the intensity of inpatient utilization.  My 
primary outcomes are whether a beneficiary was admitted to a hospital, the number of inpatient 
days among those with an admission (which I refer to as “length of stay”), and the number of 
inpatient days among all beneficiaries.  To gain a more nuanced understanding of differences in 
inpatient use, I also evaluate the share of beneficiaries with an emergency inpatient admission 
and a non-emergency admission.  Emergency admissions are defined as those that 
“require…immediate medical intervention as a result of severe, life threatening, or potentially 
disabling conditions” (ResDAC 2018).  Medicaid managed care plans may have a smaller effect 
on planned, elective admissions given federal limitations on prior authorization requirements.   
 
I next use MedPAR data to create two inpatient-based measures of care quality.  I first consider 
whether a beneficiary had a potentially-preventable hospitalization.  Potentially-preventable 
hospitalizations reflect admissions that could possibly have been avoided with proper primary 
care—such as hospitalizations for pneumonia—and are therefore viewed as an indicator of poor 
outpatient care quality (Gao et al. 2014; Fingar et al. 2015).  I also look at 30-day readmission 
rates, which have become a common measure of inpatient care quality (e.g., as they may reflect 
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whether patients’ conditions were resolved or whether they received proper discharge 
instructions) (Benbassat and Taragin 2000).   
 
I next rely on the MAX PS file to identify long-term nursing home use.  While the MAX PS file 
identifies the number of covered days in a nursing facility, it does not distinguish between post-
acute and long-term care.  Hence, I create a proxy for residence by focusing on beneficiaries who 
spent most of the year in a nursing facility.  I use a threshold of 220 covered days, as it is rare for 
dual eligibles to have post-acute skilled nursing facility (SNF) stays this long (5% in 2013 based 
on MedPAR data).   
 
Given that plans did not manage long-term nursing home care, a decrease in use could indicate 
that plans slowed beneficiaries’ functional decline.  However, an increase in use would be more 
difficult to interpret.  Because New Jersey excluded nursing home residents from Medicaid 
managed care, plans may have had an incentive to nudge expensive, high-need enrollees into 
institutional care.  Hence, observing an increase in nursing home utilization could indicate that: 
(1) Medicaid managed care had an adverse effect on enrollees’ health and hastened their need for 
a nursing home level of care or (2) plans were encouraging nursing home entry.  
 
Finally, I use the MAX PS file to evaluate total state Medicaid spending on each dual eligible.  
This measure includes both capitated payments to plans and the costs of services provided on a 
FFS basis.  New Jersey set capitation rates to achieve budget savings (NJ OLS 2011; NJ OMB 
2011).  In other words, a finding that the mandate increased spending would suggest that the 
state misestimated trends in health care costs.   
 
Controls 
I obtain each of my control variables from the MBSF.  These include age group (younger than 
45, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85 and older), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic African-American, Hispanic, and other), gender, original reason for Medicare 
eligibility (age versus disability or end-stage renal disease), and county.  I also provide 
descriptive statistics among the treatment and control groups, relying on my control variables, as 
well as county-level characteristics from the 2010-2013 versions of Area Health Resources File 
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(i.e., population; the share of the population in Medicare and Medicaid; poverty rates; and 
physicians, specialists, hospitals, and beds per capita).   
 
Sample restrictions 
I apply a small number of sample restrictions based on data limitations.  First, I drop observations 
in the MAX PS that could not be linked to the MBSF and vice-versa.  This affects about 10% of dual 
eligible observations across the two files.  Second, because I use Medicare hospital claims data to 
develop measures of inpatient use, I drop beneficiaries who were not enrolled in Medicare Part A, 
representing about 3% of dual eligibles in sample.  Finally, for each analysis, I drop instances where 
treatment status was inconsistent during the relevant unit of observation (e.g., cases where a 
beneficiary moved from New Jersey during a given quarter).   
 
I also narrow my sample to focus on beneficiaries who were most likely to be affected by the 
mandate.  This includes dropping dual eligibles in either state who had voluntary enrolled in a 
comprehensive managed care plan at the beginning of my sample period (i.e., in January 2010).  I 
also exclude nursing home residents from all analyses, except when considering nursing home care 
as an outcome.  While these sample restrictions draw attention to the targeted population of dual 
eligibles, they may be problematic if, for example, enrollment in comprehensive managed care plans 
does indeed affect whether or when a beneficiary enters a nursing home.  For this reason, I also 
conduct a robustness check without these sample restrictions.   
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Full dual eligibles in New Jersey differed from those in Pennsylvania in several key ways.  First, 
they tended to be older and were more likely to be Hispanic than full dual eligibles in 
Pennsylvania.  Second, they lived in counties with higher median incomes and less hospital 
capacity on average (Table 3.3).  Third, pre-period enrollment in comprehensive managed care 
plans was modest among full dual eligibles in New Jersey but negligible among those in 
Pennsylvania (15.5% versus 1.4% of person-month observations) (Table 3.4).  This reflects the 
fact that, while New Jersey offered full dual eligibles the option of enrolling in these plans, 
Pennsylvania did not (with temporary exceptions when Medicaid beneficiaries first became 
eligible for Medicare) (PHLP 2013).  Fourth, when looking at Medicare coverage, the reverse 
131 
 
was true: pre-period enrollment in an MA plan was not common among full dual eligibles in 
New Jersey but was relatively widespread among those in Pennsylvania (5.4% versus 37.7% of 
person-month observations).  Finally, average spending on full dual eligibles was much higher in 
New Jersey than in Pennsylvania ($18,604 versus $11,956 in 2010) (Table 3.4), perhaps 
reflecting differences in demographics and the Medicaid benefit package across the two states.  
These distinctions do not necessarily violate the common trends assumption, but they do 
highlight the importance of conducting additional analyses to explore the internal validity of this 
research design, as described in Section 3.3.2. 
 
At the same time, it is reassuring that there were smaller differences in average use of inpatient 
care across the two groups in the pre-period.  For example, while full dual eligibles in New 
Jersey were more likely than those in Pennsylvania to have a hospitalization in a given quarter 
(9.0% versus 8.6%) and tended to have more hospital days conditional on a stay (9.0 versus 8.2), 
these differences were modest and only the latter was statistically significant (Table 3.4).  Full 
dual eligibles in New Jersey were also more likely to have resided in a nursing home (15.8% 
versus 14.3%), a difference that was small in magnitude and not statistically significant.  Finally, 
the two populations likely came from a similar economic stratum given that New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania rely on similar income requirements (albeit different asset limits) under the 
standard eligibility pathways for full dual eligibles (see Appendix Table 3.2).   
 
3.4.2. Main findings 
Simple line graphs are useful for conveying the design of this study and previewing its key 
results.  As anticipated, after excluding those who had voluntarily joined comprehensive 
managed care plans at the beginning of the sample period, enrollment among full dual eligibles 
was similar across states in the pre-period, but diverged dramatically once New Jersey’s 
enrollment mandate took effect (Figure 3.2a).  Enrollment in MA plans also increased among full 
dual eligibles in New Jersey relative to those in Pennsylvania, though take-up was gradual and 
much smaller in magnitude (Figure 3.2b).  In addition, while a slightly larger share of full dual 
eligibles had a hospitalization in the pre-period in New Jersey relative to Pennsylvania, the rates 




A formal DID analysis confirms these results and yields others that are not as immediately 
transparent.  With regards to enrollment, the mandate was associated with an 87.0 percentage 
point increase in the share of full dual eligibles who received Medicaid benefits through a 
comprehensive managed care plan (Table 3.5, Top Panel, Column 1).  The timing of the 
enrollment mandate also coincided with a 10.8 percentage point increase in MA enrollment rates 
(Table 3.5, Column 2).  This increase largely reflects increases in D-SNP enrollment, as the point 
estimate for enrollment in other MA plans was small and not statistically significant (result not 
shown).   
 
The enrollment mandate was also associated with a modest decrease in overall inpatient 
utilization and long-term nursing home use among full dual eligibles.  In particular, it 
corresponded to a 0.3 percentage point reduction in the share who were hospitalized in a given 
quarter, which represents a 3.6% decrease relative to baseline hospitalization rates (Table 3.5, 
Column 3).  While results for length of stay were not statistically significant, the mandate was 
associated with a reduction in the total number of hospital days per quarter of 0.03 days, which 
represents a 4.9% decrease relative to the baseline (Table 3.5, Columns 4 and 5).  When 
evaluating the effect of the mandate by the urgency of hospitalizations, I found a statistically 
significant decrease in emergency admissions alone (of 0.4 percentage points or 7.0% relative to 
baseline) (Table 3.5, Columns 6 and 7).  Decreases in inpatient care also included statistically 
significant reductions in the share of dual eligibles with potentially-preventable admissions (of 
0.1 percentage points or 5.5% relative to baseline) and in hospital readmission rates (of 0.8 
percentage points or 3.1% relative to baseline) (Table 3.5, Columns 8 and 9).  Further, the 
enrollment mandate was associated with a modest reduction in the share of full dual eligibles 
who were residing in a nursing home (of 0.3 percentage points or 2.4% relative to baseline) 
(Table 3.6, Bottom Panel, Column 1).  Finally, the point estimate for total Medicaid spending 
was negative, but not statistically significant (Table 3.6, Column 2).   
 
Changes in outcomes were generally well-aligned with the timing of the enrollment mandate.  
For instance, although DID results in the pre-period suggest that enrollment in comprehensive 
Medicaid managed care and MA plans was increasing slightly in New Jersey relative to 
Pennsylvania before the mandate took effect, these point estimates are small and dwarfed by the 
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differential change in enrollment following the implementation of the mandate (Table 3.5, 
Bottom Panel and Figures 3.3a and 3.3b).  Additionally, while my analyses do not provide 
evidence of differential pre-period trends in the share of beneficiaries with a hospital stay, they 
do indicate that there was a decrease in this outcome in New Jersey relative to Pennsylvania 
following the enrollment mandate (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3c).  Estimated treatment effects were 
generally larger following the first post-period (which straddled the mandate period), but this 
difference was not statistically significant (p=0.44 when comparing the first and last post-
periods, result not shown).  Changes in the total number of hospital days and the share of 
beneficiaries with an emergency admission were also consistent with the timing of the mandate 
(Table 3.5 and Figures 3.3e and 3.3f). 
 
Despite these relatively straightforward outcomes, other results are more difficult to interpret.  
For one, pre-period DID estimates suggest that there was a relative decrease in New Jersey in 
potentially-preventable hospitalizations and in readmission rates in the period just prior to the 
enrollment mandate (Table 3.5 and Figures 3.3h and 3.3i).  This result hints at the possibility that 
the common trends assumption— i.e., that changes in outcomes from the pre-period to the post-
period among treatment and control groups would have been identical in the absence of the 
mandate—may fail for these measures.  Because I only have access to annual data for nursing 
home use and Medicaid spending, I was unable to generate pre-period DID estimates for these 
outcomes.  Nonetheless, more detailed trend analyses did yield the surprising finding that the 
mandate was associated with a spike in Medicaid spending in 2011—a year that straddled the 
pre- and post-periods—before declining back towards earlier differences in spending between 
the states in 2012 and 2013 (Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3k).  This temporary increase in spending 
does not seem to be grounded in any obvious policy change.  For example, because New Jersey 
paid plans actuarially-sound capitation rates, it is unlikely that this was a direct result of the 
state’s movement towards managed care.  One possibility is that it reflects a temporary 
accounting or administrative change during the policy transition.   
 
3.4.3. Alternative explanation: Drug copays 
It is conceivable that changes in prescription drug copays in New Jersey may have affected my 
DID estimates.  In July 2011, three months prior to the enrollment mandate, New Jersey 
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eliminated a state program that had previously paid Part D LIS copays on behalf of full dual eligibles 
(DMAHS 2011a).  Both theory and several empirical studies imply that dual eligibles would have 
used fewer prescription drugs once required to cover the copay on their own  (Goldman, Joyce, and 
Zheng 2007; Swartz 2010; Artiga, Ubri, and Zur 2017; Einav, Finkelstein, and Polyakova 2018).  It 
is unclear how large this effect would have been.  On the one hand, the Part D LIS copay is relatively 
modest for the large majority of full dual eligibles.  Most full dual eligibles (90% in 2011) would 
have faced a $1.10 copay for generics and a $3.30 copay for brand-name drugs (CMS 2010).  On the 
other hand, even modest copays may have been onerous for this low-income population.   
 
Although it is difficult to disentangle the change in copay from the timing of the enrollment mandate, 
it is worth noting that there did not seem to be a large effect on aggregate Part D program 
expenditures.  Spending on full dual eligibles in New Jersey grew in tandem with spending in 
Pennsylvania from 2010 to 2011, before decreasing only slightly relative to that state from 2011 to 
2012 (Figure 3.4).  Nonetheless, it is possible that the enrollment mandate may have increased 
prescription drug use— e.g., if disease management programs helped improve medication 
adherence—which could mask any negative effects of the prescription drug copay.   
 
Despite this caveat, to the extent that the new copay reduced prescription drug use, my DID estimates 
would understate the extent to which the enrollment mandate reduced inpatient utilization.  Indeed, 
prior research has found that increases in cost sharing for prescription drugs lead to more 
hospitalizations (Goldman, Joyce, and Zheng 2007; Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight 2010).     
 
3.4.4. Alternative explanation: D-SNP reforms 
Another possibility is that my DID estimates may, in part, reflect the effect of state MA reforms that 
were implemented around the same time as the enrollment mandate.  In January 2012, New Jersey 
began to contract with D-SNPs to cover most Medicaid benefits in addition to Medicare benefits 
(DMAHS 2011c, 2012).  While this was an important policy development in itself, D-SNP 
enrollment was voluntary, meaning that the change affected fewer beneficiaries than did the 
Medicaid managed care enrollment mandate (Figure 3.2a and 3.2b).   
 
To evaluate whether these reforms are driving my results, I conducted stratified DID analyses based 
on whether full dual eligibles in New Jersey had ever enrolled in a D-SNP during the sample period.  
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My main findings relating to inpatient care persisted and point estimates increased slightly when 
excluding beneficiaries from New Jersey who had ever enrolled in one of these plans (Table 3.7, 
Columns 1-4).  Conversely, when focusing instead on D-SNP enrollees from New Jersey, point 
estimates for inpatient care were positive and in most instances statistically significant (Table 3.7, 
Columns 5-8).  This is consistent with the possibility that there may have been short-term 
implementation challenges when rolling out an innovative, integrated coverage option (Gutman 
2015).  Point estimates for nursing home care were small and not statistically significant across both 
populations. 
 
These results suggest that, if anything, my DID estimates may understate the extent to which the 
enrollment mandate reduced inpatient care.  This analysis could be biased to the extent that health 
trends among beneficiaries who chose to enroll in a D-SNPs were different from those who did not.  
However, prior research suggests that healthier beneficiaries tend to select into MA plans (perhaps 
because these beneficiaries are less averse to provider network restrictions and other managed care 
barriers) (Hellinger and Wong 2000; Mello et al. 2003; Newhouse and McGuire 2014).  Indeed full 
dual eligibles in New Jersey who switched into D-SNPs in 2012 were much less likely to have had a 
hospitalization in a given quarter of the pre-period than beneficiaries who were always in traditional 
Medicare (6.3% versus 9.1%).  One would similarly expect that beneficiaries with an increasing need 
for inpatient care would have been more likely to enter D-SNPs over time.  In other words, the 
potential bias of this analysis is in the opposite direction of my results.   
 
3.4.5. Robustness check: Sample restrictions 
My analysis excludes beneficiaries who had voluntarily enrolled in managed care at the 
beginning of the sample period, as well as beneficiaries who were residing in nursing homes.  A 
potential issue with the first sample restriction is that it almost exclusively affects full dual 
eligibles from New Jersey.  This could make the two comparison groups less comparable to each 
other at baseline.  A potential concern with the second sample restriction is that I found that the 
enrollment mandate affected whether beneficiaries entered a nursing home, which could lead to 
sample bias.  Removing these sample restrictions does not generally alter my primary findings 
(Table 3.8).  As expected, reincorporating populations who were largely unaffected by the 
mandate leads to smaller point estimates when evaluating the effect of the policy on 
comprehensive managed care plan enrollment rates.  Nonetheless, I find statistically significant 
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decreases among the same set of inpatient care outcomes.  At the same time, reductions in 
nursing home residence were no longer statistically significant.   
 
3.4.6. Robustness check: Data completeness 
This study includes acute care hospitals that account for most, but not all, Medicare discharges in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  Hence, my results would be biased if the enrollment mandate 
affected the likelihood of beneficiaries receiving care at unobserved hospitals. To explore this 
possibility, I consider whether my results persist in a subset of counties where the data appear to 
the most complete.  In particular, I drop the bottom quartile of my sample based on the share of 
traditional Medicare discharges that appear in the data for a given county (the completeness of 
MA data could not be determined).  My sample accounts for 97% of all traditional Medicare 
discharges in the remaining counties of each state.  The primary findings of my study are robust 
to this change (Table 3.9).  Aside from this analysis, it is also unlikely that Medicaid managed 
care itself had a large effect on where beneficiaries received their hospital care, given that plans 
were not allowed to restrict dual eligibles’ choice of provider.   
 
3.4.7. Limitations 
Because of data limitations, this study was unable to evaluate some potentially important 
outcomes of New Jersey’s managed care mandate.  For one, it did not directly consider the effect 
of the mandate on outpatient services.  Hence, while I found a reduction in hospitalizations for 
medical emergencies, it is unclear whether plans prevented these emergencies altogether or 
simply reduced the number of inpatient admissions among enrollees with emergency department 
visits.  Additionally, this study was unable to directly evaluate the intensity and quality of 
Medicaid-only services that were carved-into managed care, such as personal care, long-term 
home health care, and adult day care services.  Comprehensive managed care plans had greater 
latitude to shape the use of this care—such as through provider network restrictions—relative to 
services that are also Medicare benefits.  Hence, it will be important for future research to 
evaluate the effect of enrollment mandates on the quality of and access to these services.   
 
Given that the structure of the Medicaid program varies by state, the results of this study may not 
carry over to other contexts.  For one, the effect of managed care mandates on dual eligibles may 
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be larger when plans provide a more complete set of Medicaid benefits, including behavioral 
health services, long-term institutional care, and all types of home- and community-based care.  
While it is not uncommon for states to cover some or all of these services separately on a FFS 
basis—as New Jersey did during my sample period—or through limited-benefit plans, several 
states require comprehensive managed care plans to include them in their benefit package 
(Gifford et al. 2017; CMS 2019b).  Indeed, New Jersey began to add these benefits to the 
FamilyCare program after the end of my sample period (DMAHS 2015).  Plans that cover these 
services have a greater incentive to manage utilization among enrollees with mental illness, such 
as by investing in behavioral health case management programs.  They also stand to gain more 
from helping enrollees maintain their functional status, such as by creating targeted interventions 
for those at high risk of having a fall.  As a result, mandates in such situations could lead to 
larger reductions in inpatient and long-term care than observed in this study.   
 
A related limitation of this study is that the New Jersey mandate excluded beneficiaries receiving 
long-term institutional care, a population with high needs that could very well have a much 
different experience in managed care from other beneficiaries.  On the one hand, plans may have 
more opportunities to reduce inpatient utilization among nursing home residents and other 
beneficiaries living in long-term care facilities.  For instance, nursing home residents have high 
hospitalization rates, and prior research suggests that many of their admissions may be avoidable 
(Walsh and Wiener 2011).  Plans also have additional tools for reducing inpatient care among 
this population, such as by employing nurse practitioners to provide care on-site (Konetzka, 
Spector, and Limcangco 2008; Ouslander and Berenson 2011; Goldfeld et al. 2013).  On the 
other hand, plans may also have less incentive to do so (Grabowski 2007).  In fact, it is 
conceivable that plans could spend less on nursing home residents while they are in the hospital, 
given that Medicare is the primary payer for this care and that plans may be allowed to reduce or 
eliminate payments to nursing facilities during an inpatient stay (Grabowski et al. 2010).   
 
Finally, this study relies on MedPAR data for information on hospital care, which may raise 
concerns about missing data.  For example, if inpatient data were more likely to be missing for 
MA than traditional Medicare patients, then estimates relating MA enrollment and total hospital 
use would be biased downwards.  This could be the case if MA enrollment increased the 
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likelihood of receiving care at hospitals that were out-of-sample or if hospitals in sample did not 
submit claims for all MA patients to the government (e.g., given that MA plans typically 
reimburse hospitals through a separate process) (ResDAC 2011; Afendulis, Chernew, and 
Kessler 2017).  Nonetheless, Section 3.4.6 suggests that the former issue does not significantly 
affect my results.  Further, hospitals in my sample were required to submit claims for all MA 
enrollees (ResDAC 2011; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017; CMS 2019b).  Appendix A.1 
describes the usefulness of MedPAR data relative to other large datasets. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This study indicates that Medicaid managed care can shape dual eligibles’ use of care in 
meaningful ways, despite the fact that these plans play a secondary role to Medicare for many 
services.  In particular, I found that the introduction of mandatory managed care in the state of 
New Jersey led to lower inpatient utilization among full dual eligibles, including reductions in 
the share with a hospitalization and in total inpatient days.  It is unlikely that these changes 
represent barriers to care, given that dual eligibles were exempt from prior authorization and 
provider network restrictions in Medicaid managed care plans.  I also found suggestive evidence 
that changes in inpatient care included reductions in potentially-preventable hospitalizations and 
in 30-day readmission rates, both indicators of unnecessary care.  Further, the mandate was 
associated with a decrease in the share of full dual eligibles residing in nursing homes, even 
though this benefit was not the financial responsibility of managed care plans.  Finally, total 
Medicaid spending results were not statistically significant when comparing pre- and post-
periods, though there was an unexplained jump in spending during the transition year.   
 
Although these results are promising, additional policy changes could lead to greater efficiency 
gains from Medicaid managed care.  Many of the potential savings from Medicaid managed care 
enrollment are realized by the Medicare program, rather than by states or plans.  For example, 
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the enrollment mandate reduced Medicare 
spending on inpatient care by about $139 million, while only lowering total Medicaid spending 
on these services by about $14 million (see Appendix A.2).  This arrangement mutes the 
incentive of states to implement managed care initiatives and of plans to invest in the care of 
their dual eligible members (Grabowski 2007).  One solution to this problem would be to share 
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savings across the Medicare and Medicaid programs, conditional on meeting care quality 
standards.  The federal government has been testing a similar approach in the context of 
integrated Medicare-Medicaid plans and coordinated care initiatives in FFS Medicaid (MedPAC 
2018).  This study suggests that extending such a program to cover Medicaid managed care 






A.1. MedPAR data 
This study relies on MedPAR claims data for information about inpatient utilization among 
traditional Medicare and MA beneficiaries.  Hospitals receiving disproportionate share (DSH), 
indirect medical education (IME), or direct graduate medical education (GME) payments were 
required to submit information-only claims for MA enrollees during my sample period, in 
addition to submitting claims for traditional Medicare beneficiaries (ResDAC 2011; Huckfeldt et 
al. 2017).  I restrict my analysis to this subset of hospitals.  To do so, I rely on MedPAR data to 
identify hospitals with DSH or IME payments in a given calendar year.  I am unable to isolate 
hospitals receiving GME payments based on MedPAR data alone.  However, the vast majority of 
hospitals receiving GME payments also received IME or DSH payments during my sample 
period (about 99% based on Cost Report data).  I also evaluated an alternative approach where I 
used Cost Report data to identify hospitals receiving DSH, IME, or GME payments during a 
given year.  This method captured a very similar set of hospitals and yielded comparable results 
when rerunning my primary analyses.   
 
There are at least two other potentially-relevant data resources, though each comes with 
important limitations.  One alternative is the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 
State Inpatient Databases (SID), which include the universe of hospital discharges for the 
majority of states.  However, only a subset of these states (36 in 2011) identify dual eligibles and 
even fewer (18 in 2011) also distinguish between traditional Medicare and MA (Barrett and 
Jiang 2014).  Further, dual eligibles are identified in the HCUP SID based on whether the 
expected payer for a hospitalization was both Medicare and Medicaid (Barrett and Jiang 2014).  
This presumably does not include non-QMB partial dual eligibles and it does not distinguish 
between full and QMB partial dual eligibles.  Prior research has also found large error rates when 
evaluating the accuracy of the expected payer field (Buchmueller, Allen, and Wright 2003; 
Chattopadhyay and Bindman 2005; Afendulis, Chernew, and Kessler 2017).  Another alternative 
would be to combine traditional Medicare claims data with MA encounter data, which have only 
recently become available to researchers (CMS 2018b).  However, preliminary work suggests 
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that there are significant gaps in the encounter data (e.g., as it captured only 78% of MedPAR 
admissions in 2015) (Johnson and Podulka 2018). 
 
A.2. Back-of-the-envelope calculations  
I estimate changes in total Medicare and Medicaid spending by multiplying the following: 
 The total number of full dual eligibles in New Jersey in 2012.  193,345, based on the 
public use version of the Medicare-Medicaid Linked Enrollee Analytic Data Source 
(MMCO 2019a).   
 
 The estimated share of full dual eligibles who switched from FFS Medicaid to Medicaid 
managed care as a result of the mandate.  65.4%, based on my DID estimates for the 
complete sample of full dual eligibles (Table 3.8).   
 
 Average Medicare and Medicaid spending on inpatient care for full dual eligibles in 
2012.  $21,613, based on a government report that evaluated data among full dual 
eligibles in traditional Medicare and FFS Medicaid (MACPAC 2018).  The report 
provides average spending separately for Medicare ($19,580) and Medicaid ($2,033), 
which I use to estimate aggregate spending effects for each.  
 
 The estimated percent reduction in inpatient costs as a result of the mandate among full 
dual eligibles who switched from FFS Medicaid to Medicaid managed care.  5.6%, based 
on my primary DID estimates for percent change in total hospital days, which I use as a 
proxy for percent change in costs.  Because I conduct intent-to-treat analyses, I scale my 
estimate for the percent change in total hospital days by the percentage point change in 
the share in Medicaid managed care: 5.6% = 4.9% / 0.87 (Table 3.5).  The latter figure 
differs from the second bullet because my primary analyses exclude beneficiaries who 
were already enrolled in Medicaid managed care prior to the mandate as well as nursing 
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3.8. Figures and tables 










asset limit Typical** benefits








QMB partial dual 
eligibles 




Non-QMB partial dual 
eligibles
1.5 101%-120% FPL $7,390 Part B premium
Table 3.1. Dual Eligible Groups
SOURCES: MACPAC 2018 and 2015 Medicare Beneficairy Summary File (MBSF). 
NOTES: *Enrollment estimates from January 2015. **Eligibility requirements and benefit levels applicable to 
the majority of beneficiaries in each dual eligible group. Other members of each group qualify through different 
eligibility pathways or based on different asset and income limits in particular states. Other full dual eligibles 
may receive less comprehensive coverage of cost sharing and premiums based on their eligibility pathway and 
state of residence. A very small number of dual eligibles (<50) receive Part A premium coverage alone. 
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Total 83% 17% 100%
Table 3.2. Share of Full Dual Eligibles Enrolled in 
Medicare and/or Medicaid Managed Care in 2012
Medicare coverage
SOURCE: 2012 Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF) and Medicaid 
Analytic eXtract (MAX) Personal Summary (PS) file.
NOTES: N = 5,720,068.  Includes beneficiaries who could be matched 
between files.  Data were unavailable for beneficiaries from Colorado, Idaho, 
Kansas, and Rhode Island. *Mostly Medicare Advantage enrollees.  **Some 














<45 0.222 0.137 -0.084***
45-54 0.190 0.147 -0.043***
55-64 0.161 0.138 -0.023***
65-74 0.235 0.272 0.038
75-84 0.139 0.212 0.074***
≥85 0.054 0.093 0.038***




NH White 0.671 0.424 -0.247**
NH African-American 0.203 0.215 0.012
Hispanic 0.083 0.262 0.179***
Other 0.043 0.099 0.056**
Female 0.608 0.622 0.015**
County characteristics
Population (1,000s) 646.9 574.9 -72.0
% in Medicare 0.191 0.156 -0.035***
% in Medicaid 0.229 0.177 -0.052
Median income $47,261 $65,516 $18,255***
% in poverty 0.158 0.120 -0.038
% of 65+ in poverty 0.097 0.093 -0.004
Physicians/1,000 3.234 3.047 -0.186
Specialists/1,000 1.137 1.298 0.160
Hospitals/100,000 1.368 0.749 -0.619***
Beds/1,000 3.163 2.309 -0.854***
N (person-years) = 892,206 387,426
Table 3.3. Summary Statistics, by State
NOTES: Excludes beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive Medicaid 
managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home residents (except when looking at 
residence as an outcome)  Statistical significance of state differences evaluated by 
estimating a linear regression model of outcomes against a dummy variable for state 














Medicaid managed care 0.014 0.155 0.141***
Medicare Advantage 0.377 0.054 -0.323***
D-SNP
Inpatient utilization
Any hospitalization 0.086 0.090 0.004
Length of stay 8.244 9.031 0.787***
Total inpatient days 0.709 0.813 0.104*
Emergency 0.063 0.073 0.010
Non-emergency 0.030 0.023 -0.007
Potentially-prevantable 0.020 0.021 0.002
Rehospitalization rate 0.155 0.169 0.014
N (person-quarters) = 1,462,309 616,736 2,079,045
Share in nursing home 0.143 0.158 0.014
Total Medicaid payments $11,956 $18,604 $6,648
N (person-years) = 253,988 111,363 365,351
Table 3.4. Summary Statistics of Outcomes in Pre-Period,
a
 by State
NOTES: Excludes beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in 
January 2010 and nursing home residents. Statistical significance of state differences 
evaluated by estimating a linear regression model of outcomes against a dummy variable for 
state with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. a. Pre-period 
defined as January 2010-September 2011 for outcomes observed at the person-quarter level 










































































































































































































N= 2,768,114 2,768,114 2,768,112 359,670 2,768,112 2,766,056 2,765,548 2,768,060 353,255
Enrollment Inpatient utilization
Table 3.5. DID Estimates: 
Full Dual Eligibles in New Jersey Versus Pennsylvania
NOTES: Estimates come from linear, logit, and two-part difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county fixed effects and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. All analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home residents 
(except when looking at residence as an outcome) Estimates for shares represent percentage point changes. Pre-post DID analyses are at the person-quarter year level and exclude data from July through 
September 2011.  Multi-period DID analyses are at the person-half-year level.  a. The baseline represents predicted values among the entire sample after setting the DID interaction term to 0.  b. Estimates 










































Table 3.6. DID Estimates: 
Full Dual Eligibles in New Jersey Versus Pennsylvania (cont'd)
NOTES: Estimates come from linear difference-in-differences models that control for 
age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county fixed effects and 
include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. All 
analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan 
in January 2010 and nursing home residents (except when looking at residence as an 
outcome) Estimates for shares represent percentage point changes. Pre-post DID 
analyses exclude data from 2011.  All analyses are at the person-year level.  a. The 
baseline represents predicted values among the entire sample after setting the DID 





































































































































Table 3.7. Main DID Estimates by D-SNP Enrollment
Never enrolled in D-SNP Ever enrolled in D-SNP
NOTES: Estimates come from linear, logit, and two-part difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county fixed effects and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. All analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home 
residents (except when looking at residence as an outcome) a. The baseline represents predicted values among the entire sample after setting the DID interaction term to 0.  b. Estimates for shares 
represent percentage point changes. c. Enrollment and inpatent utilization analyses are at the person-quarter level, while long-term care and total Medicaid payment analyses are at the person-year 
level.  *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Table 3.8. Main DID Estimates Without Sample Restrictions
Original analysis
Without Subsetting Based on Nursing Home Residence 
or Pre-Period Managed Care Enrollment
NOTES: Estimates come from linear, logit, and two-part difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county fixed effects and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Original analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing 
home residents (except when looking at residence as an outcome) a. The baseline represents predicted values among the entire sample after setting the DID interaction term to 0.  b. Estimates for 
shares represent percentage point changes. c. Enrollment and inpatent utilization analyses are at the person-quarter level, while long-term care and total Medicaid payment analyses are at the person-
year level.  *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Table 3.9. Main DID Estimates in Counties With More Complete Hospital Data
Original analysis Counties With More Complete Hospital Data
d
NOTES: Estimates come from linear, logit, and two-part difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county fixed effects and include 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. Original analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing 
home residents (except when looking at residence as an outcome) a.The baseline represents predicted values among the entire sample after setting the DID interaction term to 0.  b.Estimates for 
shares represent percentage point changes. c. Enrollment and inpatent utilization analyses are at the person-quarter level, while long-term care and total Medicaid payment analyses are at the person-
year level. d. This analysis excludes the bottom quartile of the sample based on the share of total traditional Medicare discharges that are available in a given county. Data account for 97% of 
traitional Medicare discharges in the remaining counties. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Prescription drugs X State option
Oupatient 
Physician services X X
Outpatient hospital care X X
Ambulatory surgical services X X
Durable medical equipment X State option
Outpatient mental health services X X
Dental State option
Vision and hearing State option
Lab and x-ray services X X
Diagnostic, screening, and preventive services X State option
Clinic services X State option
Physical, occupational, and speech therapy X X
Home health care X X
Hospice X State option
Inpatient 
Inpatient hospital  X
a X





Skilled nursing facility  X
c X




IMD  State option
d
Assisted living facility State option
Round-the-clock services
Home health care X
Personal care State option
Case management State option
Appendix Table 3.1. Medicare and Medicaid benefits
SOURCES: MACPAC 2018 and CMS 2019.
NOTES: ICF/ID = Intermediate Care Facilities for individuals with Intellectual disability.  IMD = Institution for Mental 
Diseases. a. Medicare covers the first 90 days in a hospital for a given benefit period (or more if an individual has 
remaining lifetime reserve days).  b. This optional benefit is only available for beneficiaries under age 21.  c. Medicare 
covers the first 100 days in a skilled nursing facility for a given benefit period.  d. This optional benefit is only available 
for beneficiaries ages 65 and older.  
162 
 





Income limit (% FPL) 100% 100%
Income disregard $20 $20
Asset limit $4,000 $2,000
Medically needy pathway
Income limit (% FPL) 37% 43%
Income disregard $4,000 $2,400
Budget period 6 months 6 months
Partial dual eligibility
QMB program
Income limit (% FPL) 100% 100%
Asset limit $4,000 $7,280
SLMB program
Income limit (% FPL) 120% 120%
Asset limit $7,280 $7,280
QI program
Income limit (% FPL) 135% 135%





Personal care X X
Case management X X
Hospice care X X
Dental services X X
Vision services X X
Hearing services X X
Mandatory managed care
Full dual eligibles
Jan.2010 - Sept. 2011 Voluntary Not an option
a
Oct.2011 - Dec. 2013 Mandatory Not an option
a





Appendix Table 3.2.  State Medicaid Program Features
SOURCES: KFF 2012, KFF 2013, KFF 2015, and KFF 2019.
NOTES: ABD = Aged, blind, and disabled. QMB = Qualified Medicare Beneficiary.  SLMB = 
Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary.  QI = Qualified Individual. ICF/ID = Intermediate 
Care Facilities for individuals with Intellectual disability.  IMD = Institution for Mental Diseases. 
ACA = Affordable Care Act. a. Some Medicare beneficiares in Pennsylvania are required to enroll in 
a managed care plan when first enrolling in Medicaid but are quickly switched to fee-for-service 
Medicaid. b. The early expansion in New Jersey covered adults with incomes under 23% of the 



































Figure 3.1. Beneficiary Characteristics,
by Dual Eligible Status
Non-dual eligibles Dual eligibles
SOURCES:  CBO 2013, Mathematica 2014 and author’s analysis of the 2015 National Health Interview Survey and the 2019 the Medicare-Medicaid 
Linked Enrollee Analytic Data Source (MMLEADS) Public Use File (PUF) data.
NOTES: Non-dual eligibles represent other Medicaid beneficiaries (except when looking at Medicare spending, where they represent other Medicare 
beneficiaries).  Non dual eligibles data only include the disabled for health conditions.  Nursing home and Medicaid spending data are only for 
beneficiaries in fee-for-service Medicaid.  IHD = Ischemic Heart Disease.  
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Figure 3.2. Enrollment and Hospitalization Trends Among Full Dual Eligibles, by State 
 
  
SOURCE: 2010-2013 Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) Personal Summary (PS) file, Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MSBF), and MedPAR data.
NOTES: All analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home residents. D-SNP = 
Dual-eligible special need plan.
Figure 3.2.  Enrollment and Hospitalization Trends







Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
a.  Share in Comprehensive Medicaid Managed Care Plans
Medicaid mandate







Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
c.  Share With An Inpatient Stay
Medicaid mandate






Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
b.  Share in Medicare Advantage Plans
Medicaid mandate






Figure 3.3. DID Estimates 
 
SOURCE: 2010-2013 Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) Personal Summary (PS) file, Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MSBF), and MedPAR data.
NOTES: Solid lines represent estimates from difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county 
fixed effects and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. All analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a 
comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home residents (except when looking at residence as an outcome).  Estimates for shares 
represent percentage point changes. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 








a. Enrollment in Comprehensive Managed Care Plans
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec







b. Enrollment in Medicare Advantage
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec












Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec











d. Length of stay
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec








e. Total hospital days
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec







f. Any emergency hospitalization
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec





SOURCE: 2010-2013 Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) Personal Summary (PS) file, Medicare Beneficiary Summary File (MSBF), and MedPAR data.
NOTES: Solid lines represent estimates from difference-in-differences models that control for age, race, sex, initial reason for Medicare eligibility, and county 
fixed effects and include heteroskedastic-robust standard errors clustered at the county level. All analyses exclude beneficiaries who were enrolled in a 
comprehensive managed care plan in January 2010 and nursing home residents (except when looking at residence as an outcome).  Estimates for shares 
represent percentage point changes. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 










g. Any non-emergency hospitalization
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec







h. Any potentially-preventable hospitalization
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec








i. Hospital readmission rates
Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec Jan-June July-Dec












j.  Nursing home residence








k.  Total Medicaid spending
2010 2011 2012 2013
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2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 3.4.  Average Medicare Part D Plan Expenditures 
Per Full Dual Eligible, by State
SOURCE: 2019 Medicare-Medicaid Linked Enrollee Analytic Data Source (MMLEADS) Public Use File (PUF) data.
New JerseyPennsylvania
$828 $692 $726 $601Difference:
